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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

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COMPLAINTS: FOLLOWUP REPORTS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

'Collapse of Gutman & Co.'

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 9 Apr 78 p 3

[Text] That was the title of S. Ivanov's article in SOVETSKIY PATRIOT No 11, of this year. The article described the unsavory affairs of the director of Riga's DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Air Force of the USSR] Motor Vehicle School No 2, S. Gutman; his deputy in charge of on-the-job training, Ya. Anzh; and instructor B. Gitel'man. The leadership of the Latvian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee did not notice the serious shortcomings in the school's work and even praised S. Gutman to the hilt. And when a criminal case was brought against him and his accomplices, the deputy chairman of the republic DOSAAF Central Committee, I. Vitol, gave the supposedly qualified former school director a nonobjective reference.

The editors have received a reply from the chairman of the Latvian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, E. Evin. He writes that the article was discussed by the bureau of the presidium of the Latvian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee. The facts and criticisms which the article addressed to the Latvian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee and certain of its officials were acknowledged to be valid.

The leadership of the Latvian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee has taken steps to upgrade the senior staff of its educational organizations. Comprehensive inspections and audits of financial and operational activities are now being regularly carried out. The status of educational and personnel work is being discussed at meetings of the presidium and its bureau.

The bureau has required the division of military technical training to improve the selection, placement and indoctrination of the senior staff of its educational organizations; to monitor their professional, political and moral qualifications; and to avoid appointing to senior positions people who have been convicted or compromised in their work. The division of mass organizational work and military patriotic propaganda and the directors of the educational organizations have been requested to improve their political indoctrination work, especially the legal indoctrination of the permanent staff of the DOSAAF schools.

The bureau has required the chairmen of the DOSAAF raykoms and gorkoms and the directors of the educational organizations and STKs [Athletic and Technical Clubs] to improve the selection, placement and indoctrination of the teaching staffs and to wage a decisive campaign against time padding and violations of established training priorities.

The deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, I. Vitol, was reprimanded for his unprincipled evaluation of the activities of the former director of Riga's Motor Vehicle School No 2, S. Gutman.

'Misfire in Chitinskaya Oblast'

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 12 Apr 78 p 3

[Text] A report under this headline published 1 February in our newspaper dealt with the serious shortcomings in the development of marksmanship in the rayons and cities of Chitinskaya Oblast. The report noted that neglect by the DOSAAF obkom of the needs of marksmen had caused the oblast to lose its first-place position.

The chairman of the Chita DOSAAF obkom, A. Chernyshev, has informed us that the report was discussed by the obkom presidium and that the criticisms were acknowledged to be valid.

A number of steps have been taken to eliminate the shortcomings and re-vitalize the sport. A comprehensive plan has been worked out. It envisions, among other things, a 3-year program of building beginning-level firing ranges in all the rayon centers and on the central farms of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. In 1978, construction is to be completed on an indoor 50-meter firing range in the town of Aginskoye, the center of the Aginskiy Buryatskiy National Okrug.

In order to attract more people to the sport and to improve the training of instructors and judges, games will be held at the rayon, municipal and oblast levels.

The oblast gun club has received some new equipment. The club's director, V. Semenov, instructor F. Kostyuchenko and the deputy chairman of the DOSAAF obkom, S. Paznikov, have been disciplined for the breakdown of the oblast marksmanship contests.

Driving Instructor Fired

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Apr 78 p 2

[Text] A group of STK students in the town of Zavety Il'icha in Sovetsko-Gavanskiy Rayon wrote to the editors. They said that driving lessons were not being held regularly because of the lack of a permanent instructor. They had to go all the way to the STK, 25 kilometers from the town, for driver training.

The chairman of the Khabarovskiy Kray DOSAAF committee, V. Zhmurko, has informed us that the reason for the interruption in the lessons was the organizational incompetence of the Sovetsko-Gavanskiy STK director, Yu. D. Korshenko. The students have now completed their training. Yu. D. Korshenko has been relieved of his position for neglecting his duties.

'Not By Bullets Alone'

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Apr 78 p 4

[Text] That was the headline under which a critical letter appeared in our newspaper on 25 December 1977 describing the unsatisfactory state of affairs at a gun club in Elist. Here is what the chairman of the Kalmytskiy DOSAAF obkom, N. Belikov, told the paper about this: "The shortcomings described in the letter took place. The reasons for the poor performance of the gun club were discussed by the presidium of the DOSAAF obkom. A special resolution was adopted outlining steps to eliminate the shortcomings.

"The gun ports in the shooting gallery were repaired, and nine metal gun cabinets, 10 observation telescopes, and an automatic electric silhouette unit were purchased and delivered to the club.

"Estimates were taken and a contractor hired to carry out major repairs on the gun club building and the shooting gallery, at a total cost of 4,190 rubles."

Punishment Meted Out

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 19 Apr 78 p 3

[Text] From the Altayskiy Kray DOSAAF committee comes a report of steps taken in response to an article entitled "Under Hostile Conditions" published 16 November last year. The deputy chairman of the kraykom, I. Ye. Kudryavkin, writes that the facts set forth in the article were discussed at meetings of the trade union organization of the Barnaul Technical School and the party organization of the DOSAAF kraykom.

The question of the status of political indoctrination work in the school was examined at a meeting of the presidium of the defense society kraykom. The presidium outlined a specific set of measures aimed at improving the indoctrination work among the educational organization's permanent and temporary staff.

By decision of the presidium of the DOSAAF kraykom, the director of the Barnaul Technical School, Comrade V. M. Kirichenko, was severely punished for neglecting indoctrination work.

'By Will of the Waves'

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 26 Apr 78 p 4

[Text] That was the title of an article published 18 January in our newspaper on the problems of developing the sport of motorboating in our country. The article noted in particular the serious shortcomings of the leaders of the USSR combined team and discussed its poor performance in international competitions, the inferior equipment with which the sport has had to cope, and the shortcomings in the training of sportsmen, the organization of competitions and the work of the all-union federation.

The editors have received a reply from the deputy director of the Administration of Military Technical Sports of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, O. Boyarskiy. "The article 'By Will of the Waves,'" it says, "was discussed at a special plenum of the USSR Federation of Motorboat Sports. It was acknowledged to be both valid and useful.

"In order to eliminate the shortcomings in the work of the federation's presidium, there have been some changes in its staff: K. Sukachev, a representative of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, has been named chairman of the USSR Federation of Motorboat Sports; and P. Bogdanov, a USSR world-class master of sports and frequent champion and record-holder, has been named head trainer in motorboat sports of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, replacing A. Shevelev.

"'The Status of Motorboat Sports and Equipment and the Prospects for Their Future Development' was the subject of a meeting of the council on science and technology.

"The bureau of the presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee will shortly review the work of the USSR Federation of Motorboat Sports. A plan for the further development of motorboat sports is being prepared."

'No Fans in Poltava'

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 26 Apr 78 p 4

[Text] An item under that headline was published in SOVETSKIY PATRIOT on 15 February 1978. It dealt with shortcomings in the organization of ice skating races in Poltava.

The editors have received a reply from the director of the Poltava STK, V. Chernobay. The athletic and technical club discussed the item. Steps are being taken to eliminate the shortcomings in the organization of competitions in military-technical sports at the Poltava DOSAAF motordrome.

'Getting Around the Rules'

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 14 May 78 p 2

[Text] That was the title of a letter published in SOVETSKIY PATRIOT on 15 March of this year. The letter dealt with the shortcomings in the work of the DOSAAF primary organization at the Pyazhel'skaya Secondary School.

The deputy of the Vologda DOSAAF obkom, V. Smirnov, has informed the editors that a review of the state of affairs in the primary organization was carried out on behalf of the obkom. As a result, the school's DOSAAF committee was asked to improve its mass defense and athletic work and to strengthen the society's athletic organizations. The school's party organization and local trade union committee have helped the DOSAAF collective to improve its work.

Military instructor I. Kuz'min was selected chairman of the primary organization committee at a special meeting. The committee was reminded of the need to adhere strictly to the procedures for admitting members to the society.

Forced Halt

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 21 May 78 p 2

[Text] That was the headline under which SOVETSKIY PATRIOT of 15 March 1978 published a letter from some sportsmen complaining of shortcomings in the work of the sports club at the Zheltye Vody Motor Vehicle School.

The reply to the criticism states: "The facts described in the letter actually took place. The DOSAAF obkom severely reprimanded the director of the school, V. Kuz'menko, for his inadequate supervision of the activities of the club's various sections and required him to supply them with the necessary tools and machinery to train a team to perform in republic competitions; the sportsmen were also assigned a bay in the garage and arrangements were made to give them lessons. [signed] V. Lazerenko, chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk DOSAAF obkom.

Personnel Replacements

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 21 May 78 p 2

[Text] The editorial in SOVETSKIY PATRIOT on 12 March of this year reported the fact that the Ivanovo DOSAAF obkom was not following up on its decision in order to make sure that they were carried out. The situation in the society's Yur'yevetskiy Rayon organization came in for particular criticism.

According to the chairman of the Ivanovo DOSAAF obkom, V. Tarasov, the committee has taken definite steps to bring about a significant improvement in the situation in the Yur'yevetskiy Rayon organization.

The chairman of the DOSAAF raykom, N. Kutyugin, has been relieved of his position. Reserve officer N. Rytov has been chosen to replace him.

The DOSAAF obkom and the Yur'yevetskiy Rayon committee of the CPSU are taking steps to upgrade the personnel of the rayon STK.

'Fliers Without Wings'

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 24 May 78 p 2

[Text] That was the title of a report published in SOVETSKIY PATRIOT on 22 March of this year dealing with serious shortcomings in the organization of the educational process at the Sibay (Bashkiriya) and Mozhga (Udmurtiya) motor vehicle schools. According to Sh. Minigulov and A. Ankudinov, chairmen respectively of the Bashkir and Udmurt DOSAAF obkoms, the newspaper's report was acknowledged to be valid.

The article was discussed at party meetings at the Sibay and Mozhga motor vehicle schools and at a meeting of the presidium of the Udmurt DOSAAF obkom.

The leadership of the Bashkir DOSAAF obkom reprimanded the director of the Sibay motor vehicle school and his deputies for shortcomings in the organization of the educational process and for inadequate efforts to improve the teaching abilities of the instructors and technicians, and helped to develop specific measures for eliminating these shortcomings. The director of the school, M. Malozemov, was severely reprimanded for serious shortcomings in the administration of the educational organization and given instructions for improving his personnel work.

The director of the Mozhga Motor Vehicle School, N. Sannikov, was severely censured.

DOSAAF Dormitory Shortfalls

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 24 May 78 p 2

[Text] On 5 February of this year SOVETSKIY PATRIOT published an article entitled "Student Living" which dealt with serious shortcomings in the operation of a dormitory at the Mary DOSAAF Motor Vehicle School. The chairman of the Mary DOSAAF obkom, D. Atakulihev, informed us that the newspaper's report was acknowledged to be justified.

The article was discussed at a general meeting of employees of the DOSAAF obkom and the motor vehicle school. Steps were taken to improve and maintain sanitary conditions in the dormitory. New furniture, fixtures, televisions and radios were acquired.

The director of the motor vehicle school, V. Makeyev, was penalized for allowing the shortcomings to occur.

'Behind the Pleasing Facade'

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 31 May 78 p 3

[Text] That was the headline under which SOVETSKIY PATRIOT on 15 March of this year published a report criticizing the manner in which the Balakhna DOSAAF gorkom was managing its primary organizations.

The chairman of the Gor'kiy DOSAAF obkom, B. Suslov, informed the editors that the article in question was discussed at an expanded meeting of the presidium of the Balakhna DOSAAF gorkom. The presidium members and the aktiv acknowledged the accuracy of the facts contained in the article and made a number of suggestions for stepping up the work of the lagging primary organizations.

The presidium's resolution outlines a number of specific measures for improving the work of primary organizations. In particular, the members of the presidium were requested to offer practical help to the lagging defense collectives.

A resolution was also adopted to compete with the Gorodets city DOSAAF organization in the area of mass defense work and to take a number of steps to improve the visibility and efficacy of socialist competition.

A seminar of chairmen of primary organizations was held to analyze the performance of socialist obligations.

With the help of the DOSAAF obkom, the seminar devised a program of future measures for improving the Balakhna DOSAAF gorkom's management of its primary organizations.

By agreement with the oblast trade union council and the Komsomol obkom, the presidium of the DOSAAF obkom resolved to deprive the Balakhna city DOSAAF organization of third place in the 1977 socialist competition for serious shortcomings in its organizational work.

The shortcomings in the work of the Balakhna DOSAAF gorkom which were noted in the article were also discussed by the oblast aktiv of the DOSAAF organizations.

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SOVIET-YUGOSLAV COMBAT COOPERATION IN WW II REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 1978 signed to press 27 Apr 78 pp 67-73

[Article by Col A. Antosyak, Cand Hist Sci]

[Text] Friendship and cooperation among peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has its roots deep in history. Many times have they had to fight together against foreign invaders. The joint struggle against fascism during World War II was a brilliant chapter of combat cooperation.

Nurtured by world imperialism, German fascism attempted, by force of arms, to annihilate the sovereign states of Europe, evolved over the ages, and transform their peoples into their slaves, thus laying the road for their world supremacy. Enslaving almost all countries of Europe, the Germans established a regime of monstrous terror and compulsion, and they created a network of concentration camps and death factories in which millions of people were murdered. Destruction of the fascist barbarians became history's most pressing task of peoples.

We know that a force that could oppose fascist Germany could not be found in the West. Only the Soviet Armed Forces were able to halt and destroy the enemy's main forces and the lion's share of his combat equipment and armament. This had a decisive influence on the entire course of World War II and predetermined its victorious conclusion. "During this long war, the hardest in the history of our motherland," the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" states, "the Soviet people performed a deed of which mankind had never known an equal. They managed not only to defend their liberty and independence but also to make a decisive contribution to rescuing European and world civilization from annihilation by fascist barbarians."

Led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavian people fought a heroic struggle against the fascist invaders for liberty and independence of their motherland for 4 years. This courageous struggle was an

inspiration to all oppressed peoples of Europe; Yugoslavian patriots were our comrades-in-arms and allies from the first day of the war to the last. In his speech during a meeting held at the Belgrade Electronic Industry Plant, L. A. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet people know how great the sacrifices of Yugoslavia were in World War II, how significant its contribution was to the defeat of fascism.... The Peoples Liberation Army of Yugoslavia contributed the most brilliant pages to the history of European resistance and brought the long-awaited day of our common victory closer."¹

Immediately after the country was occupied by the Germans, the CPYu [Communist Party of Yugoslavia] began organizing armed resistance. The Main War Committee was created under the chairmanship of CPYu Central Committee General Secretary Broz Tito, war committees were created in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Montenegro, and combat detachments began to undergo formation. During a conference of CPYu organization executives held May 1941 in Zagreb, a decision was made to intensify resistance to the fascist invaders and local collaborators.

The Soviet Union's entry into the war against the German aggressors was the most important prerequisite for successful development of the struggle of peoples liberation waged by the peoples of Yugoslavia. "After the USSR was attacked," J. Broz Tito declared in an interview on Belgrade radio and television on 7 May 1975, "we decided to appeal to the people for a universal rebellion, believing that the most appropriate moment for this was at hand, though due to lack of time we were unable to complete our preparations entirely. We prepared substantially for our rebellion, and it began in organized fashion."²

In an appeal to Yugoslav laborers, on as early as 22 June 1941 the CPYu Central Committee called the laborers up for a decisive struggle against fascist invaders: "The hour of decision has struck. A decisive battle against the evilest enemy of the working class has begun, a battle which the fascist criminals had themselves started by their insidious attack on the Soviet Union--the hope of laborers of all the world."³ This appeal also stated that the Soviet people were fighting not only to protect socialist countries but also to liberate all mankind, that the struggle of the Soviet Union was also the struggle of the Yugoslavs, and that they must support the former with all their strength. The Main Headquarters of Yugoslavian peoples liberation partisan detachments was formed on 27 June under the command of Josip Broz Tito. A decision was made on 4 July 1941 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPYu Central Committee to switch from sabotage to a universal armed rebellion.

The rebellion began on 7 July 1941 in Serbia. Soon its flames spread to Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Macedonia. With "Death to Fascism, Liberty for the People!" as their motto, Yugoslav communists did a great deal of work to unite all antifascist forces

and mobilize them for the struggle against the invaders. By fall 1941 the rebellion embraced more than a third of the territory of Yugoslavia. A partisan republic with its center at Uzice--the "Uzice Republic," where the power was returned to the people--was created in liberated regions of western Serbia. The Main Headquarters was reorganized as the Supreme Headquarters. CPYu Central Committee General Secretary J. Broz Tito became the supreme commander-in-chief of the peoples liberation partisan detachments of Yugoslavia. By the end of 1941 the strength of the rebellion's armed forces reached 80,000 men.⁴ Creation of the Peoples Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOAYu) began with formation of the 1st Proletarian Brigade on 22 December 1941.

In extremely difficult conditions the peoples of Yugoslavia, the NOAYu and the partisans fought the fascist invaders and local quislings--Croatian collaborators, troops of Serbia's marionette "Premier" (Nedich), General Mikhailovich's followers, and other pretenders. They courageously fought off the numerous punitive expeditions of the fascists, inflicted significant losses on them, and pinned down a significant proportion of the enemy troops. The armed struggle grew into an all-peoples war. The NOAYu transformed into an awesome combat force. In November 1942 the Supreme Headquarters made a decision to form, within the composition of the NOAYu the first divisions and corps capable of performing strategic missions in the Yugoslavian theatre of war. By the end of 1942 it contained 28 brigades combined into 9 divisions and 2 corps, 9 independent brigades, 34 partisan detachments, and a number of subunits having a total strength of 150,000 men.⁵ It was opposed by 32 fascist divisions and a large number of quisling units and subunits.⁶

In the course of the peoples struggle of liberation under the guidance of the CPYu the union of the working class and the peasantry grew stronger and a socialist revolution took shape. "To the peoples of Yugoslavia," wrote J. Broz Tito, "the struggle of liberation was simultaneously a victorious socialist revolution...."⁷ The old administrative agencies that had served the invaders were liquidated in liberated regions, and new democratic agencies--committees of peoples liberation, the embryo of future popular rule--were created. An all-Yugoslavian political agency--the Antifascist Vetsche of Peoples Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOYu), which declared itself to be the supreme political agency of the peoples liberation movement--began operating in November 1942. The Executive Committee of the AVNOYu was elected at its first session. A year later, in November 1943, the second session adopted decisions that were an important landmark in the struggle of the Yugoslavian peoples for creation of a federated socialist Yugoslavia. The AVNOYu was declared to be the supreme representative, legislative, and executive agency of Yugoslavia. The National Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia (NKOYu) was instituted concurrently as the provisional government. The session adopted a number of highly important decisions promoting creation of the Yugoslavian democratic federated state. The emigrant government was deprived of all the rights of

legal representation of Yugoslavia, and the king was prohibited from returning to the country until the end of the war. J. Broz Tito, who was awarded the highest military rank, marshal of Yugoslavia, was appointed chairman of the NKOYu.

The decisions of the second session of the AVNOYu were met by the Soviet Union with approval. On 14 December 1943 the USSR government declared that it interpreted reorganization of the AVNOYu into the supreme legislative body and creation of the NKOYu as the provisional government of Yugoslavia as positive factors promoting success in the struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia against Hitler's Germany.⁸ Simultaneously the Soviet government once again condemned the treason of Mihailovich's followers, who did considerable harm to the fight of the Yugoslavian peoples against the Germans.

At the Teheran conference of the heads of state of the USSR, USA, and Great Britain, the Soviet Union decisively opposed Churchill's plan for landing Anglo-American troops in the Balkans which, according to the intent of the author's plan, was to suppress the revolutionary movement and restore a capitalist order in the Balkan countries, Yugoslavia in particular. A decision was made on the USSR's initiative to render assistance to the NOAYu and Yugoslavian partisans "to the maximum possible extent."⁹

The NOAYu grew and strengthened as the struggle of national liberation developed. By the end of 1943 it possessed 27 divisions combined into 8 corps with a total strength of almost 300,000 men.¹⁰ By September 1944 the NOAYu had 50 divisions with a total strength exceeding 400,000 soldiers.¹¹ It liberated a large part of the country.

Throughout the entire war Soviet laborers exhibited a feeling of sincere friendship and great respect for the struggle of Yugoslavian laborers and their armed forces--the NOAYu and the partisans, which they treated as their allies in combat. "Your struggle, comrades," L. I. Brezhnev stated in his speech at Belgrade on 15 November 1976, "had not only national but also great international significance. To us, the Soviet people, it was tangible support in the titanic engagements that evolved over the expanses of our country and later in Europe, in engagements which led to the total defeat of fascist invaders. Strikes against the enemy at Moscow and on the Volga at the Kursk salient merged with the courageous action of Yugoslavian soldiers who would not allow the invaders even a day of rest."¹²

In its joint struggle against fascism the Soviet Union provided moral and political support and military and logistical aid to the peoples of Yugoslavia. The acts of heroism of Yugoslavian brothers were extensively illuminated in the Soviet press and on radio. By as early as 8 July 1941 the Soviet Information Bureau reported mass uprisings against German fascism in Yugoslavia.¹³ PRAVDA wrote: "Separated from Soviet partisans and the Red Army by many hundreds of miles, Serbian partisans are fighting shoulder to shoulder for the common good."¹⁴

The Yugoslavian radio station "Free Yugoslavia" began broadcasting from USSR territory on 11 November 1941; its broadcasts were prepared by CPYu representatives in Moscow from materials transmitted by radio from the leadership of the Yugoslavian peoples liberation movement.¹⁵ "We take pride," J. Broz Tito noted in a speech during a ceremony in which the 2d Proletarian Brigade was awarded the battle pennant, "in the fact that the heroic struggle of the Peoples Liberation Partisan and Voluntary Army of Yugoslavia is talked about in almost every radio broadcast today in the Soviet Union. This is the highest award that anyone can earn."¹⁶

One of the forms of Soviet-Yugoslav combat cooperation was participation of Soviet citizens in battles against fascism on Yugoslavian soil. Finding themselves in fascist prison camps, many of our servicemen escaped and attached themselves to Yugoslavian partisans and the NOAYu. The first Soviet partisans appeared in Serbia by as early as August-September 1942.¹⁷ In 1943 the NOAYu Supreme Headquarters began creating special "Russian" subunits and units out of Soviet patriots in many divisions. The largest of them was the 1st Soviet Strike Brigade, which was part of the NOAYu IX Corps. Soviet citizens fought in 188 units and formations. In all, more than 6,000 Soviet people fought in Yugoslavia.¹⁸ Many of them died the death of the brave. At the same time about 300 Yugoslavs fought in partisan detachments in the Ukraine and Belorussia.^{18a} At the end of 1943 the Soviet government decided to send a military mission to Yugoslavia with the principal objective of seeking the ways and possibilities for rendering all forms of assistance to the NOAYu and the partisans. Headed by Lt. General N. V. Korneyev, in February 1944 the military mission crossed the Middle East, Africa, and Italy by air and arrived at the Supreme Headquarters of the NOAYu. News of its arrival spread quickly throughout the entire country. "Our motherland takes joy in the arrival of sons of the heroic Soviet Union and representatives of the glorious Red Army and it says to them "'Welcome','" wrote the newspaper NAPRED.¹⁹ Its arrival helped to strengthen ties and cooperation between the Soviet Union and new Yugoslavia. An NOAYu military mission reached Moscow in April.

After direct contacts were established between the Soviet Army and the NOAYu, the conditions were created for organizing deliveries of armament, ammunition, food, and medicines to the NOAYu and the partisans. At first all of these supplies were delivered by airplanes from Vinnitsa to Drvar in Yugoslavia. Soviet pilots had to fly almost this entire tremendous distance over territory occupied by the enemy, in the face of intense activity by his antiaircraft resources, and they had to land their airplanes at un-equipped airfields in partisan regions.

On agreement with the Anglo-American Command, a Soviet air base was created for these purposes in Bari (Italy). During 1944 1,460 sorties were flown from it, and about 3,000 tons of various military cargo were airlifted to

Yugoslavia. Soviet pilots evacuated back to Italy a large number of sick and wounded officers and enlisted men of the NOAYu and partisans, who were rendered medical assistance there. They airlifted about 5,000 NOAYu enlisted men and officers in various regions of partisan activities. In June 1944, when the NOAYu leadership was threatened by the landing of German airborne troops in the vicinity of Drvar, Soviet pilots evacuated executives of the NOAYu Supreme Headquarters, with Marshal Tito in charge, to a safe region. After the liberation of Belgrade all of the airplanes at the base were given to the NOAYu gratis.

Major supply bases were created at Craiova (Romania) and Sofia (Bulgaria) after the fascists were expelled from Romania and Bulgaria. This made it possible to organize direct supply of everything needed by NOAYu units and the partisans by air transport from these bases. As soon as the Soviet Army entered Yugoslavian territory, weapons, ammunition, and other war materiel began to be carried to the NOAYu from Craiova by different forms of ground and water transportation. Yugoslav patriots operating in southern Serbia and Macedonia were supplied from bases in Sofia.

In November 1944 the Soviet government transferred two separate air divisions and one air base region together with all personnel and combat equipment to the NOAYu command;²⁰ an air group of about 350 airplanes was created out of these formations. Major General of Aviation A. N. Vitruk was placed in charge of it. The group was at the disposal of the NOAYu Supreme High Commander. Its missions were to conduct combat activities against enemy ground troops and aviation within the zone of advance of the NOAYu, and to concurrently train personnel for the air force of Peoples Yugoslavia. By February 1945 107 Yugoslavian pilots and 1,104 technicians had been trained,²¹ while by the end of the war the figure climbed to 4,516 aviation specialists.²² Pilots and other personnel were trained for the Yugoslavian Air Force in Soviet schools as well.

The Soviet Union accepted a large group of Yugoslav servicemen for training at Soviet military training institutions; as of 1 April 1945 their total number was 3,126 men.²³

On our territory, a separate infantry brigade, a tank brigade, and two air regiments were formed out of Yugoslav citizens. They took part in battles for liberation of Yugoslavia at the end of the war.

In all the Soviet Union provided about 155,300 rifles and carbines, more than 38,000 automatic rifles, over 15,500 machineguns, 5,800 guns and mortars, 65 tanks, and 491 airplanes to Yugoslavia.²⁷ This significantly heightened the combat capabilities of the NOAYu. In 1944 several dozen Soviet physicians were airlifted to Yugoslavia, and in December of that year Soviet medical agencies created a hospital base there with a capacity of 5,000 beds. In addition the USSR transferred seven evacuation hospitals and four field surgical hospitals to the NOAYu together with medical

personnel, equipment, medicines, clothing, and everything necessary to provide medical assistance. Our seamen evacuated 3,006 wounded soldiers of the NOAYu from Novi Sad to the hospital base on ships of the Danube Naval Flotilla. The lives of many thousands of Yugoslav soldiers and partisans were saved owing to Soviet medics.

The joint combat activities of the soldiers of our armies aimed at liberating Belgrade and other cities and villages in the course of the Belgrade operation, which in Marshal J. Broz Tito's words was the ultimate of Soviet-Yugoslav combat cooperation, are described in flattering terms in the chronicle of battle friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

On the night of 20 September Marshal Tito flew to Moscow from the island of Vis in order to coordinate upon problems in the interaction of Soviet and Yugoslav troops and to develop Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation further. During talks with I. V. Stalin agreement was reached on temporary invasion of eastern Serbia by Soviet Army formations with the mission of liberating the country's eastern regions and Belgrade together with the NOAYu. The Soviet government's official report on the results of the negotiations emphasized that following completion of their operational missions the Soviet troops would be removed from Yugoslavia and that while they remained on Yugoslavian territory the civilian administration of the NKOVu was to remain effective there.²⁸ By this act the Soviet government provided important international support to new Yugoslavia at a time when the English were planning to land their own troops there. Agreement was also reached on increasing logistical and military deliveries to Yugoslavia. The Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty signed at Moscow in September 1944 had great significance to swift liberation of Yugoslavia and to international recognition of its peoples government. By officially announcing the signing of this treaty the Soviet government once again emphasized that it believed the NKOVu to be the sole legal representative of Yugoslavia, and that it was ready to provide all-out assistance to it in the future. Somewhat later, in a report pertaining to the negotiations in Moscow given at a meeting of the Antifascist Vetsche of Peoples Liberation of Yugoslavia held on 8 August 1945, Marshal Tito stated: "In September 1944 I visited Moscow to ask for assistance in expelling the invaders from our country as quickly as possible. Inasmuch as the Red Army had almost reached the borders of our country, agreement had to be reached on coordination of combat activities; moreover I asked the Soviet government to cross Red Army troops over the border into eastern Serbia and have them render assistance to our forces in liberation of Serbia and Belgrade. At this time the Germans had very powerful German and quisling forces in Yugoslavia, against whom we were engaged in hard continuous battles. Moreover they also possessed major forces in Greece and on the islands. We agreed that major Red Army formations were to cross the Danube and enter eastern Serbia with the mission of liberating Belgrade together with our troops. The Soviet Union gave our army large quantities of various sorts of armament, from rifles to tanks and airplanes, permitting us to arm many of our divisions."²⁹

Following the savage battles of 20 October, Belgrade was liberated by the joint efforts of Soviet and Yugoslav troops. Yugoslav laborers joyously greeted the Soviet Army. They hold sacred the memory of Soviet soldiers who had shed their blood for their liberation. Just in the Belgrade operation alone Soviet troops lost more than 35,000 men killed, wounded, and missing in action.³⁰

The joint combat activities of Soviet and Yugoslavian troops multiplied the historic traditions of the struggle waged by peoples of the USSR and Yugoslavia against a common enemy. The Belgrade operation had important political and military strategic significance to the victorious outcome of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia. In a telegram to I. V. Stalin Marshal Tito wrote: "To our peoples, the liberation of Belgrade is historically significant especially because the country in which the tormented peoples live is the arena in which blood was shed together by sons of the great Soviet Union and the honorable sons of Yugoslavia. This once again confirmed the brotherhood of the peoples of Yugoslavia and the peoples of the Soviet Union."³¹ Many Soviet and Yugoslav soldiers were awarded USSR and Yugoslavian medals and orders for participation in the Belgrade operation.

Considering the grave supply situation of the residents of Belgrade and other liberated regions, in short order (by 7 December 1944) the Soviet government provided 3.3 million poods of free food to Yugoslavia.³²

After Belgrade was liberated the main forces of the 3d Ukrainian Front were transferred to Hungary, where they participated in the Budapest, Balaton, and Vienna operations. Some of the forces (LXVIII Rifle Corps and other units) remained in Yugoslavia until the end of 1944, while General Vitruk's air group remained until the end of the war. They helped the NOAYu in its struggle to complete expulsion of the Germans from the country.

The Soviet Union continued to render assistance in modernizing and rearming the NOAYu during the concluding stage of the war and after its end. In compliance with a 10 February 1945 decree of the State Defense Committee, just between March and September 1945 alone the Soviet Command transferred a significant quantity of combat equipment and other war materiel to the Yugoslavian side to equip 20 infantry divisions, 3 artillery and 3 tank brigades, a mixed air division, an air transport division, and other units.³³

By the end of the war the Yugoslavian Army had a strength of about 800,000 men. Favorable strategic conditions were created for the Yugoslavian Army for final liberation of the country's entire territory from the Germans as a result of the defeat of German troops in Hungary and the swift advance of Soviet troops toward Berlin; the Yugoslavian Army completed this operation by 15 May 1945.

Yugoslav peoples paid a high price for their liberty and independence: Yugoslavia's total war losses were 1.7 million men, to include 305,000 dead and 425,000 wounded on battlefields.³⁴

The friendship between the peoples and armies of the USSR and Yugoslavia grew stronger in the joint struggle against fascism. "This joint struggle against fascism," wrote Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia President, LCY Chairman J. Broz Tito, in an article on the event of the 60th anniversary of Great October, "and the awareness that the USSR carried the greatest burden of the war are imprinted deep within the hearts of our people and within the memory of the peoples of Yugoslavia. In this, they see one of the guarantees of firm friendship and cooperation between our countries today."³⁵

The CPSU and the LCY have devoted and continue to devote a great deal of attention to strengthening and developing Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation, which is developing successfully between our parties, countries, and peoples. "The foundation of the friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples gained its strength from the blood shed in the struggle against the common enemy," said L. I. Brezhnev. "This foundation is unshakeable. And we, all of us, comrades, are responsible to history, to the memory of all those who had died, to our children and grandchildren. It is our responsibility to see that the edifice of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation erected on this foundation is brilliant and strong, to see that an atmosphere of sincerity and mutual trust would reign within it."³⁶

The visit by L. I. Brezhnev to Yugoslavia in November 1976, the visit by J. Broz Tito to the USSR in August 1977, and the talks held at these times provided a new powerful impetus to development of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation. As is noted in a communique on the negotiations in Moscow, their participants expressed the resolve to continue to develop ties between the countries and the parties, and Soviet-Yugoslav friendship, being firmly convinced that successful development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations is in the fundamental interests of the peoples of both countries, consolidation of world peace, and the struggle for democracy, social progress, and socialism.³⁷

In order to permit deeper analysis of the most important issues in cooperation between the peoples and armies of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in World War II, a number of new documents [22 documents] retrieved from the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Policy Archives of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs are published below.

FOOTNOTES

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POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE GROUND FORCES DISCUSSED

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[Article by Lt Gen Tank Trps A. Dunin]

[Text] Owing to the concern of the Party and the heroic labor of the Soviet people our armed forces changed beyond recognition following the victorious conclusion of the war. They received nuclear missiles capable of striking an aggressor in any region of the globe, dependable antiaircraft resources, missile-carrying airplanes, nuclear submarines, and other combat equipment of the latest types.

As with all armed forces, the ground troops grew and matured. Their development went along the lines of greater firepower and striking power, mobility, maneuverability, reliability, and stability of control. Control of the ground troops was made the responsibility of the commander in chief and the General Headquarters in compliance with a 25 February 1946 decree of the USSR SNK [Council of Peoples Commissars].¹ Marshals of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, A. A. Grechko, V. I., Chuikov and, since 1967, Army General I. G. Pavlovskiy served successively as commanders in chief of the ground troops.

The Main Headquarters was headed by army generals G. K. Malandin and M. M. Popov, colonel generals S. M. Shtemenko and M. T. Nikitin and, since 1974, Colonel General V. Z. Yakushin.

The ground troops went through two periods in their development during the postwar era. The first lasted from 1945 to 1953. In these years, conventional strike resources were improved and the highly rich experience of the Great Patriotic War was introduced into troop training practice.

In the first postwar years the ground troops consisted of rifle, armored, and mechanized troops, artillery, cavalry, and special troops--engineering, signal, and so on. The rifle, mechanized, and tank divisions were the principal formations. There were still a few cavalry formations at that

time. However, their number decreased continually, and by 1954 the cavalry ceased to exist as a branch of troops. The role of armored and mechanized troops, artillery, and air defense troops increased constantly.

The mobility of the ground troops increased continually in the first period. Industry provided them with enough transportation to convey unit and formation personnel together with the armament and various materiel necessary for life and combat activities. In addition to more-sophisticated motor vehicles and prime movers, the troops received armored transporters which significantly heightened their maneuverability.

Tanks and self-propelled guns (SPG) were provided to rifle troops with the goal of heightening their firepower and striking power. Units and formations received the better Kalashnikov assault rifles and Goryunov medium machineguns, antitank grenade throwers, guns, mortars, and other new models of combat equipment.

The power of the combined arms army grew as well. Its combat capabilities increased dramatically due to reorganization and rearment with army, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery, and addition of the heavy tank-self-propelled regiment and other army units and formations to its composition.² As a result of motorization and mechanization of formations and units in the combined arms army, the latter acquired qualities inherent to a tank army of the Great Patriotic War. Such a combined arms army could penetrate prepared enemy defenses and exploit the offensive at strategic depth more successfully, and in interaction with other armies it could quickly encircle and annihilate large enemy groupings.

The rifle corps underwent reorganization in 1946. A mechanized division, an artillery brigade, a tank destroyer artillery regiment, a Guards mortar regiment, a separate antiaircraft regiment, and other units were added to it. As a result of these measures the quantity of artillery in the corps increased by 21 percent, while that of tanks and SPG increased by more than 20 times. Not counting the fire of tanks, SPG, and antiaircraft artillery, the salvo of the rifle corps increased from 5 tons at the end of the war to 37 tons in 1953.³

Such a corps could independently penetrate enemy defenses throughout their entire tactical depth, support commitment of tank and mechanized formations into a breakthrough, and advance at a high pace or hold its lines firmly.⁴

The organization of the rifle division changed as well. A second artillery regiment, a tank-self-propelled regiment, a separate antiaircraft artillery battalion (later replaced by an antiaircraft artillery regiment) and other units were included within its composition. After obsolete armament models were replaced and tanks and SPG (86 units in all) were added to the division and the regiments, the weight of the division's artillery-mortar

salvo increased, by the end of 1946 as compared to 1944, from 1,589 to 3,500 kg, while the rate of fire increased from 491,000 to 652,000 rounds per minute.⁵ The organic quantity of tanks and SPG insured direct support to infantry on the battlefield.

The mobility and striking power of the rifle corps were increased dramatically by inclusion of the mechanized division. Its organic armament included 251 tanks and SPG--more than a mechanized corps had during the war.⁶ In addition the division was armed with armored personnel carriers.

Significant changes were made in the organization and armament of armored and mechanized troops. Soon after the war the tank and mechanized corps were replaced by tank and mechanized divisions, while tank armies were reorganized as mechanized armies.⁷ New medium tanks, T-54 in particular, and heavy tanks with thicker armor, more powerful armament, and greater range and speed, and floating tanks were supplied to the armored and mechanized troops.

The mechanized army had two tank and two mechanized divisions, a light artillery brigade, an antiaircraft artillery regiment, a Guards mortar regiment, a motorcycle regiment, an engineering-sapper brigade, a signal regiment, and other units. Possessing a smaller quantity of heavy artillery, mortars, and motor transportation than a combined arms army, the mechanized army was characterized by greater mobility and maneuverability. It was a powerful resource with which to exploit the success of an operation.

The combat and maneuvering capabilities of artillery increased continuously. In the post-war years, artillery and mortar formations and units received the new D-48 85-mm antitank gun, the D-74 122-mm gun, the M-47 130-mm gun, the 240-mm mortar, and ground target detection and fixing radar stations.⁸ Recoilless antitank guns firing hollow-charge and high-explosive fragmentation shells appeared. Rocket weapons enjoyed further development. The BM-14 and BM-24 systems added to the armory had a greater range of fire, better grouping of projectiles, and a more-powerful projectile than the famous "Katyusha" of the war era (M-8 and M-13). All new guns and weapon systems were characterized by greater range of fire, armor-piercing capability, maneuverability, and automation of both loading and sighting.

The greater range of artillery fire afforded a possibility for striking not only the entire depth of the enemy's main defense zone, but also in part systems in the second zone, for supporting commitment of second echelons and reserves to the battle (engagement), for cooperating in the capture of the second zone and intermediate positions while on the move, and for fighting enemy artillery.

Concurrently with growth of the firepower of artillery and mortars, their maneuvering capabilities increased dramatically. New prime movers made it possible to move even heavy artillery systems at a speed of 25-30 km/hr.

The most up-to-date military equipment was also supplied to special troops. The engineering troops received self-propelled and motorized crossing resources as well as other more-sophisticated combat and special equipment. The strength of engineering manpower and resources increased continually in combined arms formations and units. The number of sapper companies in the rifle corps increased from 21 in 1945 to 30 at the end of 1953.

Improved shortwave and ultrashort wave radio stations, special receivers, mobile communication centers, and radio relay and other resources appeared in the signal troops. Wire communication resources enjoyed considerable development, permitting the signal corps to provide multiplex long-distance telephone communication.

As a result of all of these measures the combat and maneuvering capabilities of the ground troops increased significantly, and their control became more reliable and sophisticated.

Deep study and generalization of the experience of the Great Patriotic War had decisive significance to further development of the strategy and tactics of the ground troops during the first period. On the basis of this study, and on the basis of postwar doctrine accounting for development of armament and military equipment and the new troop organization instituted in 1946, the most important problems of the combined arms battle were solved. This was reflected in the Soviet Army Field Service Manual (Regiment-Battalion), the regulations of the branches of troops, and the Soviet Army Headquarters Field Service Regulations. These manuals and regulations presented the basic problems of organizing and conducting a combined arms battle, and they formulated the most important premises of Soviet art of war.

Owing to the concern of the Communist Party, together with all armed forces the ground troops began their second period of development at the beginning of 1954--a period of fundamental transformations in armament and combat equipment, organizational structure, theory of the art of war, and troop training and indoctrination practice. Two stages can be distinguished in this period. The first covers 1954-1959. It was associated with creation and introduction of nuclear missiles into the troops and development, on this basis, of new methods for conducting combat activities. The second stage began in 1960, and it has lasted to the present. It is characterized by assimilation and subsequent development of new types of weapons and military equipment, and by fundamental qualitative changes in the strategy and tactics of subunits, units, and formations.

Introduction of nuclear weapons and other equipment into the ground troops increased their firepower, striking power, and maneuverability immeasurably, dramatically increased the combat capabilities of formations and major formations, and imparted great independence to them in executing various

missions. New branches of troops were added to their composition: Missile troops, to include tactical and strategic missile subunits and units, and air defense troops. Airborne troops were also added to the organization of the ground troops.¹⁰

Formerly existing branches of troops became qualitatively different: Infantry, tank troops, artillery, and special troops--engineering, chemical, signal, and so on.

Missile troops and artillery developed especially quickly. The launching range and target precision of missiles increased continually, their operating characteristics improved, and the maneuverability and combat readiness of units and subunits increased.

Today, strategic and tactical missiles can strike any targets within their range with great accuracy and reliability. In relation to many important indices they are superior to similar missiles in the armies of capitalist countries.

The armament of artillery units and formations was strengthened by new (the 122-mm howitzer with an all-around field of fire, and the 122-mm and 152-mm self-propelled howitzers) or modernized models of gun and howitzer artillery distinguished by great mobility, maneuverability, firing accuracy and range, and shells of greater power.

Rocket artillery enjoyed further development. It is now characterized by greater range, higher firing accuracy and a more-power salvo, permitting successful destruction of a target in a short time.

The air defenses of ground troops have become more reliable and effective.

Antiaircraft artillery was no longer effective due to appearance of jet aviation. This is why fundamentally new weapons appeared in the armament of the air defense troops--various systems of highly mobile antiaircraft complexes, the rockets of which were typified by greater speed, altitude, and range, and higher target striking precision. Improvement of anti-aircraft rocket complexes was directed at increasing their mobility to insure continuous cover to units and formations during highly maneuverable combat activities in all situations, terrain, and weather. Antiaircraft artillery also underwent qualitative improvement. It was armed with multiple-barrel self-propelled guns characterized by high firing rate and effectiveness. They could strike swift aerial targets flying at low altitude in all weather conditions, both day and night.

Much attention was devoted to developing antitank resources. In the mid-1950's the ground troops began to receive guided antitank missile complexes capable of destroying any tank with a single projectile at significant range.

Much attention was devoted in improvements on rifle armament to reducing the weight and heightening the reliability of automatic weapons. Today, the ground troops are equipped with diverse high-quality Kalashnikov automatic weapons.

New models of motor vehicles and armored transporters were supplied to the units and formations of the ground troops--BTR-50P, BTR-40, BTR-60P, BTR-60PB, BRDM, and others. The BMP infantry combat vehicle, which was not only a personnel carrier but also a powerful combat resource in motorized rifle subunits and units, was adopted.

The tank troops enjoyed development and improvement. Among all combat vehicles, the tank was found to be best suited to action in nuclear warfare. Its thick armor makes it more resistant to the effect of a shock wave, and it dramatically decreases injury to the crew by penetrating radiation. This is why tank development proceeded mainly in the direction of heightening firepower, fire effectiveness, and maneuverability, improving the armor protection, installing a nuclear protection system and resources with which to cross rivers under water, and increasing their range and life. The medium tank adopted during this time was characterized by powerful armament equipped with a fire stabilizer, reliable armor protection, high speed, and great range.

The equipment of the engineering troops changed considerably. Enlargement of the volume of engineering operations and the need for sharply reducing the time of such operations increased the requirements on engineering resources used to support troop maneuvers and erect obstacles and nuclear shelters.

Today, the engineering troops are outfitted with highly productive road building, excavating, and trench digging machines, tank bridge layers, high-speed bulldozers, new pontoon ferries and self-propelled caterpillar-mounted ferries, and various sectional structures. Their armament was strengthened by improved antipersonnel and antitank mines and various mobile minelayers. All of this permits the ground troops to successfully complete their missions in the face of mass destruction, rubble, fires, and floods.

The tasks of the chemical troops and their equipment have changed. They must perform radiation, chemical, and biological scouting, monitor radioactive irradiation of personnel, subject troops to special processing, decontaminate armament, equipment, and terrain, and perform other special functions.

The chemical troops received improved instruments for radiation, chemical, and biological scouting, radioactivity monitoring instruments, special personnel, weapon, and equipment cleansing vehicles, and terrain decontamination vehicles.

The equipment and organizational structure of signals troops underwent significant change. Their missions became more complex--supporting troop commanders and command and control staffs during highly maneuverable combat activities involving nuclear weapons and active electronic countermeasures by the enemy.

The need for generalizing and evaluating a large flow of information within a short time and reacting immediately to swift, dramatically changing situations necessitated organization of troop command and control on a new technical basis, making use of the latest achievements of science in electronics, automation, and computer technology. The role of headquarters in the collection and generalization of data on the situation increased considerably. In turn, this necessitated introduction of a dependable, stable command and control system, and continuity and automation of the entire process of troop command and control.

It was for this purpose that the troops began to receive new signal resources, mainly ultrashort wave and radio relay resources. Tropospheric and ionospheric communication resources as well as resources heightening communication reliability in the presence of active radio interference and high-altitude nuclear bursts were broadly introduced.¹¹ Various electronic apparatus required to support normal operation of electronic computers and automated troop command and control resources began to supplied to the troops as well. The new communication resources significantly heightened the continuity, reliability, and stability of control in various forms of combat activity.

The organizational structure of subunits, units, and formations in the ground troops also changed as a result of qualitative and quantitative growth of armament and combat equipment.

Thus rifle and mechanized divisions were replaced by motorized rifle divisions, which were more powerful, mobile, maneuverable and, at the same time, easily controlled. Subunits and units of different branches of troops and of special troops were included in the composition of the motorized rifle division in the course of subsequent organizational changes. Not counting missiles, the weight of a volley from a motorized rifle division increased by more than four times as compared to that of a rifle division in 1939; the quantity of tanks increased by 16 times, that of automatic weapons increased by 13 times, and that of armored personnel carriers increased by more than 37 times.¹²

Today, motorized units and formations of the ground troops are outfitted with modern top-class automatic infantry weapons, powerful antitank resources, tanks, artillery, and other types of weapons. Operating in armored vehicles, they could swiftly march great distances, maneuver flexibly on the battlefield, defend themselves steadfastly, and conduct an offensive at a swift pace in all situations, in all terrain, in all sorts

of weather, day and night. Because motorized rifle units and formations now possess their own tank subunits, their striking power and firepower have increased, and control and interaction in battles and operations have improved.

The tank division underwent significant reorganization as well. In subsequent years its organizational structure improved constantly. The manning was decreased significantly, but the quantity of artillery armored transporters, and motor vehicles grew. The modern tank division has more tanks than the tank or mechanized corps of the past war.¹³

Today, the tank troops are characterized by great firepower, high maneuverability, and dependability of armor protection. They are more resistant to the destructive factors of nuclear weapons--the force of a shock wave, light radiation, and penetrating radiation. Tank formations have become powerful, highly mobile formations capable of marching significant distances, entering into battle on the move, and making hard, swift strikes against the enemy.

Quantitative and qualitative growth of nuclear missiles, their introduction into the troops on an extensive scale, and changes in organizational structure necessitated review of military theoretical viewpoints on the nature of operations and battles conducted by ground troops. The missions which the new weapons could perform were determined, and the premises of the art of war that had to be defined more specifically or amended, and the ones which had lost their significance were established. The problems of massing manpower and resources on the axis of the main strike began to be solved in a different way. The continuous front line disappeared. Under the new conditions the units and formations began to operate on separate axes, following the principle of "advancing separately but fighting together." The modern battle is clearly a combined arms battle. United by the single intent of the commander, all branches of troops fight intensively; each of them performs its own mission in close interaction with others, and they all have a common objective--defeating the enemy. The scope of operations, the breadth of the zone of advance, and the depth and pace of the offensive have increased in the new conditions. On the other hand the length of the operation and battle has decreased. The role of surprise, camouflage, and deception has grown.

All theoretical premises and practical recommendations are reflected in the manuals and regulations governing the actions of the ground troops today. However, the methods and forms of combat activities are not constant. They change as science and technology develop and as new weapons are created and introduced into the troops. This process is going on swiftly today.

The fundamental changes in armament and combat equipment, in troop organization, and in the methods of combat activities have imposed higher requirements on soldiers in the ground troops, on their experience and discipline, and on their moral-psychological, military-technical, and

physical training. Only he who has perfect mastery of weapons and combat equipment, who can artfully conduct combat activity, and who possesses high moral-combat qualities and the capability for performing his duty in all conditions can be victorious in modern battle. As a result the significance of party-political work, which has the purpose of instilling all of these qualities in the personnel, has risen dramatically.

The new "Regulation on Political Agencies of the Soviet Army and Navy," "Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy," the 21 January 1967 CPSU Central Committee decree "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," and the all-army conferences of party and Komsomol secretaries and ideological workers held in recent years have ideologically strengthened the party and Komsomol organizations of the units and subunits and heightened the effectiveness of party-political work in the troops. Party-political work has become significantly more active in response to decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, adoption of the USSR Constitution, and celebration of the 60th Anniversary of Great October and the Soviet Armed Forces. It has become more effective and purposeful, which has in turn improved troop discipline, increased the numbers of outstanding soldiers of combat and political training and classed specialists, and insured maintenance of high combat readiness in the subunits, units, and formations.

The Communist Party and Soviet government have done a great deal of work in the last few years to train and retrain military personnel, upgrade their skills, and improve ideological and political indoctrination. Presently about half of the officers in the ground troops are engineers and technicians. Almost all formation commanders and 90 percent of the regiment commanders, all political agency chiefs, and more than 80 percent of the political workers at the regimental level have a higher education. Ninety percent of the officers are communists and Komsomol members.

The profound socioeconomic, spiritual, and cultural transformations that have occurred in the life of our society have altered the qualitative and social composition of the ground troops beyond recognition. Significant growth in the level of general and technical education of Soviet youth and good moral and physical training permit the young people to master their military specialties, weapons and combat equipment within a short time. Today, almost 100 percent of the servicemen have a higher, secondary, and an incomplete secondary education, and 65 percent of them are qualified sportsmen.

Held in the last 12 years, the Kavkaz, Sever, Karpaty, and Berezina troop exercises have demonstrated the high skill of the ground troops, their ability to perform swift marches day and night in complex natural conditions, to perform reconnaissance artfully, to camouflage themselves well, to reach the start line covertly, to deploy quickly and make swift attacks, to defend themselves steadfastly and stubbornly, and to conduct decisive counterattacks and counterstrikes.

Thus postwar development of the ground troops has proceeded along the lines of heightening the mobility and maneuverability, striking power, and firepower of the units, formations, and major formations, improving their capability for executing tactical and operational missions independently in offense and defense, and increasing the reliability of troop command and control.

I would like to emphasize in conclusion that owing to the untiring concern of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, the ground troops now possess tactical and strategic missiles, new tanks, armored transporters, new conventional and rocket artillery systems, powerful antitank resources, self-propelled antiaircraft rocket launchers and guns, sophisticated command and control resources, and experienced commanders and personnel having high moral-combat qualities. Together with other branches of the Armed Forces, they are capable of executing any mission the motherland and the Communist Party might pose to them.

FOOTNOTES

1. "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" (50 Years of the USSR Armed Forces), Voyenizdat, 1968, pp 477-478.
 2. "Armiya Sovetskaya" (The Soviet Army), Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, p 403.
 3. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" (History of the Art of War), Book 3, Moscow, Izd-vo VAF, 1961, p 697.
 4. "Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskusstva" (History of Wars and the Art of War), Voyenizdat, 1970, p 472.
 5. "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR," Voyenizdat, 1968, p 483.
 6. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva," Book 3, p 697.
 7. "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR," Voyenizdat, 1968, p 483.
 8. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva," Book 3, p 698.
 9. "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR," Voyenizdat, 1968, p 484.
 10. "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR," Voyenizdat, 1968, p 506
 11. "Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskusstva," p 493.
 12. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1977, p 23.
 13. "Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskusstva," p 496.
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON ARMY GEN A. A. YEPISHEV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 78 signed to press 27 Apr 78 pp 58-63

[Article by USSR Deputy Minister of Defense Mar SU K. Moskalenko]

[Text] Those were difficult times. At Khar'kov, in May 1942. The enemy was pressing East. Enjoying a great superiority in manpower and equipment, especially tanks and aviation, the Germans were preparing for an attack on Kupyansk following failure of the Southwestern Front's Khar'kov offensive operation. The 38th Army, which was under my command at that time, was in their way. Its mission was to defend its line steadfastly. Its troops quickly created a defense in depth. An intermediate position covering the Chuguyev-Kupyansk axis, the army's most important defensive axis, came into being not in days but in hours.

The local public was of invaluable assistance to the units and formations in construction of the lines of defense. Women, old people, and adolescents came to the excavation sites as entire villages and labored from dawn to dawn. The firm guiding hand of a great organizer could be felt in all of this. It was here in Kupyansk that I became well acquainted with Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev, first secretary of the Khar'lovskaya Oblast VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Committee though I had met with him briefly on occasion in March. The 38th Army's command post was next door to the oblast party committee and the oblast executive committee at that time. And the fact that the obkom secretary was an efficient, comprehensively trained executive went a long way in ensuring mutual understanding and a businesslike relationship in our contacts with local government agencies. The events that evolved were such that our soldiers had to retreat. I spent many anxious days and nights together with Aleksey Alekseyevich during that hard summer.

Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev was born 19 May 1908 in Astrakhan' to the family of a laborer. Beginning his creative activity early, he participated actively in social life. In 1929 he became a party member and worked for some time as an instructor in the Komsomol raykom and the Astrakhan' party raykom.

In 1930 Aleksey Alekseyevich was drafted into the army. After graduating from a command school he held command and staff posts, and in 1933 he entered the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization (presently the Academy of Armored Troops). Here he proved himself to be a capable student and, quoting one of his performance reports, a "strong communist." Aleksey Alekseyevich graduated with honors from the academy in 1938, having been awarded the rank of Military Engineer 3d Rank. In June of the same year he was placed at the disposal of the party Central Committee (while retaining his army rank) and sent by the CPSU Central Committee party organization to the Machine Building Plant imeni Komintern in Khar'kov.

Comrade Yepishev worked himself into the life of the plant collective with all of his energy, directing the efforts of the laborers and engineers toward high-quality completion of the production plans and fast assimilation of defense production. He was awarded the Order of the Red Star for his participation in the preparations for production of the famous T-34 tank.

A little time passed, and the communists elected him first secretary of the Kominternovskiy Raykom of the Ukrainian SSR Communist Party. In March 1940 A. A. Yepishev was elected first secretary of the Khar'kovskaya obkom of the KP(b)Yu [Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)].

With the start of the war, the range of problems with which the first secretary of the party obkom had to deal broadened even more. He organized the work of filling defense orders to industrial enterprises, and of mobilizing the manpower and materiel of Khar'kovskaya Oblast for the needs of the front. In fall 1941, when fascist German troops capitalized upon their temporary advantage and seized a part of Soviet territory, including the Ukraine, Aleksey Alekseyevich managed the evacuation of the largest plants, institutions, and material valuables of Khar'kov and the oblast. Concurrently he headed the people's militia, served as commissar of the Khar'kov Peoples Militia Corps participating in the city's defense, and organized and led the party underground and the partisan movement. The peoples avengers fought actively against the invaders, inflicting heavy losses on them.

Thus the war caused my road to cross with that of a remarkable person, a famous party, state, and military official. Soon after the described events our roads parted, but not for long. During this time Aleksey Alekseyevich was a principal VKB(b) Central Committee organizer, an official of the Stalingrad Front's Military Council, a party executive in the Urals, first secretary of the Nizhiy Tagil' City Party Committee, and USSR deputy minister of medium machine building.

In spring 1943 our troops were faced by a hard battle demanding colossal application of moral and physical strength. The 40th Army occupied defenses on the southern face of the Kursk salient. The troops prepared meticulously for the forthcoming battles, and their leadership was changed. We lost one of the experienced members of the army's military

council, I. S. Grushetskiy. Parting with him was difficult, but new responsibilities awaited him as a member of the Steppe Front's Military Council.

In May 1943 A. A. Yepishev, who was then a major general, was appointed to the military council of the 40th Army. It was at that time that our joint activity at the front began.

Aleksey Alekseyevich was not at all a novice in military affairs when he arrived at our unit. The great amount of experience in political and organizational work supplemented by knowledge acquired in the military academy permitted him to begin work immediately to support the morale and fighting spirit of the troops. I should note that members of the military council often visited the troops and were always within the mainstream of all army affairs; they actively discussed the most important military issues and participated in their resolution. Under their guidance the political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations, and the troop commanders directed all of their efforts at instilling steadfastness, courage, and bravery, and a readiness to apply all effort to destroy the hated enemy. The most diverse methods were used for this purpose. Up to 500 communist and Komsomol agitators worked in the divisions, inspiring the soldiers by work and personal example. Daily party-political work reinforced the spiritual strengths of our troops. Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev deserved the credit for the selflessness, devotion to the party, people, and motherland, and the unshakeable desire to annihilate the enemy in battle demonstrated by soldiers of the 40th Army, Voronezh Front in the battle of Kursk, during liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine, during crossing of the Dniepr, and in other operations.

At the very peak of the Kiev offensive operation, on 26 October 1943, a Headquarters decision relieved me of the 40th Army holding the Bukrinsk beachhead and gave me the command of the 38th Army, which was to make the main strike to liberate Kiev. A. A. Yepishev was appointed to this army's military council. Aleksey Alekseyevich and I remained together in this army until the end of the Great Patriotic War, reaching Prague at its end.

The 38th Army distinguished itself in liberation of the capital of the Soviet Ukraine and in the Zhitomir-Berdichev, Proskurovsk-Chernovtsy, L'vov-Sandomierz, Carpathian-Dukla, Moravian-Ostrava, and Prague operations, which played an important role in liberation of the Right-Bank and Western Ukraine, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Once again Aleksey Alekseyevich deserves great credit for this. The military council's decisions directed at reinforcing the political-moral state of the troops, mobilizing the troops for successful completion of their missions, encouraging communists and Komsomol members to serve as examples in battle, strengthening military discipline, and instilling a hatred for the fascist German invaders in the soldiers were prepared and discussed under his guidance. General Yepishev was always in the center of events, in the

decisive sector; he could see and isolate what was most important, displaying sensible initiative, concern for other people, and personal courage; he was able to use the proper tone in communication with subordinates.

Aleksey Alekseyevich's frontal biography is abundant with examples showing him to be a competent, valorous political worker capable of encouraging people to complete their missions in all situations, no matter how complex. Thus at the end of September 1943 we were faced with the mission of crossing the Dniepr. However, organic and attached crossing resources had fallen behind, and the reconnaissance and forward detachments began crossing the river with whatever resources available. In this difficult situation A. A. Yepishev managed to direct the efforts of all active party members toward supporting the troops with the resources they needed to cross the river, mobilizing all local resources.

In the battle for Kiev's liberation A. A. Yepishev displayed personal courage, bravery, and enviable military capabilities. When the enemy went over to the counteroffensive and one of his tank divisions threatened a flanking movement against our troops at Fastov, Aleksey Alekseyevich transferred two tank destroyer artillery regiments from the army's left flank, assuming a line crossing the path of the enemy tanks. The enemy's numerous thrusts remained unsuccessful. Suffering losses, the enemy withdrew. As soon as the threat went away A. A. Yepishev returned to his immediate responsibilities.

I can also recall the L'vov-Sandomierz operation. The enemy was withdrawing in the face of the Soviet Army's advance. Together with frontal troops, the 38th Army successfully pursued the fascists. The advance slowed down somewhat only in the center, within the zone of the 121st Rifle Division commanded by General I. I. Ladygin. I had to travel there. Army General A. A. Yepishev, a member of the military council, came with me. It was always this way. We traveled together to wherever things were difficult, and his counsel and assistance invariably promoted success. Many times we miraculously escaped from danger, but we were unable to avoid it during this trip.

After issuing the appropriate orders we decided to have breakfast on invitation of the division commander; it was already close to midday, and we had not had even a morsel since the day before. As soon as we settled ourselves on the grass beside the formation's observation post the mortar fire and machinegun storm began. There were wounded and dead soldiers everywhere. We hit the dirt. Aleksey Alekseyevich received a serious wound. I helped him to crawl away from the zone of fire, and together with soldiers coming to my assistance I gave him first aid. Ladygin, the division commander, was also brought here, seriously wounded. Both were immediately sent to the medical battalion, and then to Moscow for treatment.

Ours was not an idle trip to the division. The new decision helped to rectify the situation. But it was sad to realize that perhaps the army was to be deprived of a remarkable political leader for a long time.

After his treatment Aleksey Alekseyevich returned to us, and we completed our victorious battle road together. The harsh days of war and its last engagements made our mutual understanding and friendship even stronger, the innumerable manifestations of which included the readiness to rescue a comrade in a minute of danger. Once while traveling in a vehicle near the front lines we found ourselves under machinegun fire. Time was of essence. Without pondering the situation, Aleksey Alekseyevich covered my body with his. He released me from this "prison" only after the danger passed. The soldiers in another vehicle traveling with us were killed.

Recalling the days of war spent together with Aleksey Alekseyevich, I would also like to tell the story about our frontline encounters with Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. This was after the liberation of Kiev, and later in the anxious days of 1944 when the Soviet troops reached their state border. During joint work to transfer some of our units to the 18th Army and in general conversations Leonid Il'ich stated his satisfaction that these troops had been transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front, which was operating on one of the main strategic axes. He told us many things about the first days of the war, about the defensive and offensive operations of the Southern and Northern Caucasian fronts. Aleksey Alekseyevich and I liked Leonid Il'ich's simplicity, and the firmness and decisiveness of his conclusions and actions. We were also attracted by his method of work: Even as the troops were just arriving he acquainted himself with them and immediately made preparations for the forthcoming operation. In a word, we understood that we were dealing with a talented organizer of party-political work and a person who also had a broad outlook in problems of strategy. Moreover we found him to be a good comrade and an interesting speaker.

Aleksey Alekseyevich ended the war in Czechoslovakia. We celebrated Victory Day in Prague, reaching that city with the 38th Army's mobile group. The spring of victory found the city its own master. As with everyone else, we were happy, and our spirits were high; there were many languages being spoken. Wherever they went, the citizens of Prague had a warm reception for Soviet soldiers of liberation. The music, the songs, the dances, and the universal joy produced a holiday atmosphere we had not been able to experience for a long time.

The country and army relaxed to a peaceful status. A tremendous amount of work now had to be done: Within the shortest time possible the wounds of war had to be healed and the foundation for swift movement forward to the pinnacles of socialism had to be erected.

The party needed experienced, devoted personnel. Being a good communist and a competent political organizer of the masses, in May 1946 A. A. Yepishev was transferred to party work and elected personnel secretary of

the KP(b)Yu Central Committee and member of the KP(b)Yu Central Committee Organizational Bureau. In 1950 he graduated from advanced courses at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee and was elected first secretary of the Odesskaya Oblast Party Committee. By decision of the CPSU Central Committee A. A. Yepishev was approved as the USSR deputy minister of state security. In connection with the ministry's reorganization in March 1953 he returned to party work and was once again elected first secretary of the Odesskaya Oblast Party Committee. In July 1955 Aleksey Alekseyevich was appointed to important diplomatic work as the extraordinary and official ambassador of the USSR to Romania (until 1961) and then to Yugoslavia.

Being an experienced political activist and party worker, in 1962 A. A. Yepishev was once again called into the armed forces. He was awarded the rank of army general, and he was appointed chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The days in which Army General A. A. Yepishev headed the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy coincided in time with swift development of our armed forces, significant changes in their countenance, and growth in their combat power. In the postwar years the army and navy were equipped with modern types of weapons and combat equipment, and military science and the theory and practice of troops training and indoctrination made a new step forward. The profound socioeconomic, spiritual, and cultural transformation that occurred in the life of our society had a favorable effect on the qualitative characteristics of the personnel. All of this promoted further improvement in party construction and a new upsurge in ideological and organizational activity in the army and navy.

It is with full certainty that we can note the tremendous contribution Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev is making to heightening the effectiveness of party-political work at the present stage of Soviet military construction. Extensive general, political, and special training, multifaceted experience in party, government, and military work, and outstanding qualities of leadership permit him to direct the activities of army and navy communists toward strengthening the political-moral state of the troops, heightening military discipline, and mobilizing army and navy personnel for improvement of combat and political training. Relying upon the collective experience and the efforts of personnel in the Main Political Directorate and political agencies, he is seeing that all resources of party-political work would ensure successful implementation of the requirements the CPSU has imposed on the armed forces, completion of the tasks posed by the 25th CPSU Congress and spelled out in the USSR Constitution, and unification of Soviet soldiers about the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee and Politburo.

General A. A. Yepishev is validly associated with development of such traits of party-political work such as its inseparable tie with the party's and state's common tasks and extensive introduction of the scientific

approach at all levels of party construction in the armed forces. A. A. Yepishev substantiated many of the pressing and theoretical and practical problems of party-political work in light of the decisions of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses in his reports and speeches at scientific conferences and all-army conferences, and in his publications. We can cite works that are well known to army and navy society, to include "Some Problems in Party-Political Work" (1970), "Army and Navy Communists" (1971), "The Party's Mighty Weapon" (1973), "The Ideological Struggle in Military Issues" (1974), "Some Problems of Ideological Work in the Soviet Armed Forces" (1975), "The Party--The Organizer of Our Victories" (1976), and "The CPSU--Organizer and Leader of the Armed Forces" (1977). The works "Partiya i Armiya" (The Party and the Army) and "Partiyno-Politicheskaya Rabota Vooruzhennykh Silakh SSSR" (Party-Political Work in the USSR Armed Forces) were published under his editorship.

Army General A. A. Yepishev devotes tremendous attention in his management of party-political work to constantly strengthening party influence on all aspects of army and navy life, and to problems associated with heightening troop combat readiness, improving the tactical, field, air, and naval skills of the soldiers, and mastering combat equipment and weapons. His speeches at conferences of army-navy executives, at party and Komsomol conferences, and in discussions with officers, generals, and admirals orient the commanders and political workers toward high-quality completion of combat and political training plans and at effective use of the entire complex of educational resources to instill a communist philosophy and high moral-political and psychological qualities in the soldiers.

Army General A. A. Yepishev always participates in management of exercises, directing the attention of military councils, commanders, and political agencies toward gaining a deep understanding of the nature of a possible war and of the means of warfare in modern conditions, and at creatively developing the theory and practice of party-political work in conditions close to those of combat. He often visits the troops, where the complex tasks of heightening the combat readiness of the army and navy are completed. And his every visit to the units and ships, his penetrating words, and his sensible advice leave a deep impression in the consciousness and behavior of the personnel, heightening the efficiency of party organizations, mobilizing the reserves for high-quality completion of combat training missions, and increasing discipline and organization.

A. A. Yepishev is engaged in a great deal of public work. He has been elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet many times. Being a representative to the USSR Supreme Soviet, Aleksey Alekseyevich meets with his electorate often and does much to satisfy its requests.

Comrade Yepishev was a member of the Ukrainian SSR Communist Party Central Committee from 1938 to 1955. He was selected as a CPSU candidate at the 19th, 20th, and 22d party congresses, and in November 1964 he became a

member of the CPSU Central Committee. He devotes a great deal of attention in his activity to strengthening the ties of armed forces political agencies with local party and soviet organizations and to reinforcing the unity of the army and people.

For his great services to the motherland Army General A. A. Yepishev has been awarded two orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, three orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitsiy, 1st Degree, the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st Degree, the Red Labor Banner, three orders of the Red Star, the order "For Service to the Motherland and the USSR Armed Forces," 3d Degree, and many medals. His activity in strengthening socialist cooperation among fraternal armies has been marked with numerous foreign orders and medals.

At the eve of the 60th anniversary of the armed forces Army General A. A. Yepishev was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title, the Order of Lenin, and the "Gold Star" medal for personal courage and valor displayed in the struggle against the fascist German invaders and for his great contribution to training and increasing the combat readiness of the troops in the postwar era.

A. A. Yepishev has now been at the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy for 16 years. His personal qualities include experience in and profound knowledge of party-political work, high erudition and culture, persuasive logic in his judgments, boldness, diligence, a capability for organizing people to complete their missions, tactfulness, equable and tactful communication with surrounding people, and the ability to achieve mutual understanding with them and create a truly businesslike atmosphere; these qualities have earned A. A. Yepishev deserved universal respect.

Aleksey Alekseyevich celebrates his glorious jubilee--his 70th birthday--full of creative power, alertness and energy. We wish the celebrant good health, many years of life, and further successes in his great, responsible, and fruitful activity for the good of our beloved socialist motherland and in behalf of strengthening the power of our valorous armed forces--the dependable guard of the conquests of Great October, of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

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ROLE OF MILITARY IN SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Moscow, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 1978 signed to press 27 Apr 1978 pp 24-36

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Plekhov, Cand Phil Sci: "The Political System of the Society of Mature Socialism"; this article is recommended for use in officer Marxist-Leninist training groups during study of the subject "Political Organization of Developed Socialist Society. The 25th CPSU Congress on Further Reinforcement of the Socialist State."]

[Excerpts] Socialism has achieved a high degree of maturity in the USSR in the process of its forward movement. Its productive capacities have grown tremendously, and social relations have become more sophisticated. Significant changes have also occurred in the society's political organization, as is reflected in the new Soviet Constitution. Developed socialist society, it states, is a truly democratic society, the political system of which ensures effective control of all public affairs, greater participation of laborers in the life of the state, and coordination of the real rights and freedoms of citizens with their responsibilities and duty to the society.

The new USSR Constitution is the culmination of the party's fruitful efforts directed at all-out development of the Soviet society's political system. Basing itself on premises stated by the 25th CPSU Congress, our Fundamental Law documents not only the general principles of the socialist structure, which express the class nature of the Soviet state, but also the main characteristics of developed socialist society, its political organization (see "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" (Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress), pp 81,86).

The political system of socialist society does not arise in ready-made form. It proceeds through certain stages in its development, and it changes in response to changes in the economic base and the social structure. Dictatorship of the proletariat is the political organization of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism; it is needed by the working class for socialist transformation of all spheres of social life, for management of other classes of laborers, for their reindoctrination

in the spirit of socialism, and for suppression of resistance by exploiters and armed defense of the achievements of the revolution against internal and external reaction. When the dictatorship of the proletariat completes the historic tasks assigned to it, it ceases to be necessary.

Dictatorship of the proletariat means power in the hands of a single class. But in managing the country the working class relies upon its allies, on the nonproletariat laboring masses. V. I. Lenin interpreted dictatorship of the proletariat as a special form of the union of the proletariat and the laboring masses "for the purposes of final creation and reinforcement of socialism" ("Poln. sobr. soch." (Complete Collected Works), Vol 38, p 377). Characterizing the political organization of Soviet society and revealing the "mechanism" behind dictatorship of the proletariat, he pointed out that power is exercised by the working class, which is organized into soviets and led by the Communist Party, and which relies in its work on trade unions and other social organizations. "What we get in sum total," V. I. Lenin wrote, "is a formally noncommunist, flexible, relatively broad, extremely powerful proletarian machine through which the party communicates closely with the class and with the masses, and through which dictatorship of the class is exercised under party guidance" ("Poln. sobr. soch." Vol 41, p 31).

The complete and final victory of socialism in our country and its attainment of developed forms has led to transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a national political organization in the society. Proletarian democracy has become universal, a characteristic of all the people. The classes of laborers and social groups have also undergone significant transformation. The society has achieved sociopolitical and ideological unity. A historically new social and international society--the Soviet people--has arisen. All USSR citizens have equal rights and freedoms, which are documented by the Fundamental Law of our state.

Embodying the political relations of friendly classes, social strata, and groups, in developed socialism power is the concentrated will of all people--laborers, peasants, and the intelligentsia. The people exercise their power in the society under the guidance of the Communist Party and with the help of an integrated system of state agencies and social organizations reflecting the sum total of the political relations of the people and the level of their political awareness. All of these elements of the society's political organization are in unity with the principles and rules on the basis of which the mechanism of popular rule is built, develops, and operates and an internally consistent complex--the political system of mature socialism--forms.

Although it has become an all-peoples organization, the political organization of developed socialist society has not lost its class nature. As before, the working class, the ideology of which has not been accepted by all laborers, continues to be the society's dominant social force. But even in the conditions of mature socialism the need remains for strengthen-

ing relations among friendly classes and strata, the new order of discipline and morality must still be instilled, and the struggle against the vestiges of the past in the consciousness and behavior of the people, against penetration of bourgeois ideology into our environment, and against morals and customs foreign to our society must continue. Our class enemy--imperialism--engages in subversive activity against the socialist structure and its ideology and morals. This is why Soviet sociopolitical institutions, the entire political system of the society fully retain their class orientation, the class content of their activity in the struggle between two world systems--socialist and capitalist.

The fundamental premises concerning the political system of Soviet society are reflected in our Fundamental Law, which describes the mechanism of popular rule exercised by the entire complex of state and social organizations. They function on the basis of the appropriate legal rules, on the basis of further expansion and deepening of socialist democracy and significant elevation of the political culture and activity of the masses. The USSR Constitution also foresees new forms of participation of the masses in political life. The most important state issues are presented for discussion by all the people, and they are subjected to national plebiscite (by way of the referendum).

The main institutions in the political organization of mature socialist society are the Communist Party, the socialist all-peoples government, mass social organizations, and labor collectives.

The USSR Constitution treats protection of the socialist fatherland as one of the most important functions of our state and defines it as the affair of all the people. The issues of military construction are constantly at the center of attention of the party and government. Owing to this the power and battleworthiness of the Soviet Armed Forces have increased significantly. Our people can be assured, the 25th CPSU Congress emphasized, that the fruits of their creative labor are being protected reliably (see "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 83).

Being an organ of the all-peoples state, the socialist army occupies a prominent place among the former's institutions. This can be explained by the unique features of world social development in the present era. Although the Soviet Union has no need for an army from the standpoint of internal conditions, the CPSU Program emphasizes that the need for reliably protecting the achievements of socialism against an attack by imperialist aggressors forces our people to maintain and strengthen our armed forces. Their historic significance is documented by the USSR Constitution: "The USSR Armed Forces have been created and the universal military obligation has been instituted for the purposes of protecting socialist achievements, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.

"The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people is to reliably protect the socialist fatherland and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate repulse to any aggressor."

The socialist army is a new type of military organization. Born in the fire of the October Revolution as a weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet Armed Forces have traveled a glorious historic road in the 60 years of their existence. They have experienced profound qualitative changes in the process of their development, and they have transformed from an implement of the dictatorship of the proletariat into an organ of the all-peoples state. In the conditions of developed socialism, the class orientation of the Soviet Armed Forces is manifested exclusively in their external function. They are the implement by which the interests of our people are protected and the security of the socialist fatherland is ensured.

The external function of the Soviet Armed Forces has broadened significantly with formation of the world socialist system. Together with allied armies of other socialist countries, our armed forces reliably protect the revolutionary achievements of our fraternal peoples and restrain the aggressive designs of imperialism.

Close ties with the laboring masses are typical of the armed forces of an all-peoples state. The army's interests are in common with those of the people, and it sees selfless service to them to be its sacred duty. That the army and people are one stems from the very nature of the socialist social structure. Laborers provide everything necessary to their army, and the armed forces reliably protect the peaceful labor of the people and the security of the Soviet Union. Being full-fledged citizens, soldiers in the army and navy participate in the country's sociopolitical life. The unity of the army and people is also reflected in the fact that the armed forces are not only a school of combat excellence but also a school of ideological and physical improvement, a school of discipline and organization. Military service seasons the young people, provides technical and occupational knowledge to them, and teaches them collectivism, steadfastness, and endurance.

Management by the Communist Party is the source of the power of the army of the socialist all-peoples state. It is the foundation of Soviet military construction. Our armed forces are indebted to the CPSU's wise leadership for all of their successes, the power of their weapons, their efficient organization, and the unprecedented morale of the personnel. Under its guidance, they have become a top-class military organization in our times. In a report dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov laid special emphasis on the fact that the Communist Party's policy in military construction has brilliantly withstood the test of time.

Thus the role of the all-peoples state is growing in the conditions of developed socialism rather than weakening. Unmasking the designs of bourgeois propagandists, who assert that the Soviet Constitution has supposedly categorically abandoned the communist principle of "withering away of the state," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that capitalist ideologists cannot or do not wish to see what is most important--the dialectics of our state and social development. In accordance with this, as the socialist state undergoes development and improvement millions of citizens participate more and more in the work of government agencies, in the functions of peoples control agencies, in management of production and distribution, in social and cultural policy, and in administration of justice. In a word, as socialist democracy develops, our form of government is gradually transforming into a system of communist social self-government.

Recommendations for a Seminar

The purpose of a seminar on the subject "Political Organization of Developed Socialist Society. The USSR Armed Forces--a Reliable Guard of the Creative Labor of the Soviet People, the Bulwark of Universal Peace" is to help officers gain a deep understanding of the important changes that have occurred in the political life of our socialist society and were legalized by the new USSR Constitution, to assimilate the most important premises characterizing further movement of the political system of mature socialism toward social communist self-government, and to clarify the role and functions of the army and all-peoples state.

It is recommended that the seminar begin with a reading of the report "Growth of the Role of the CPSU in Management of the Armed Forces--A Law of Soviet Military Construction in Modern Conditions."

The following problems are suggested for discussion in the seminar: 1. The essence and structure of the political organization of developed socialist society. 2. The place and role of the Communist Party in the political system of developed socialist society. The 25th CPSU Congress on the increasing leadership role of the party at the present stage of communist construction. 3. The army within the system of the political organization of developed socialist society. 4. Management of the armed forces by the Communist Party--the foundation of Soviet military construction.

Beginning the discussion of the first problem, the seminar leader should keep in mind that the political organization of developed socialist society is called upon to ensure completion of the economic, sociopolitical, and ideological tasks of communist construction. Significant changes are occurring in the society's political organization in the stage of mature socialism, the most important one being the transition from political dominance of the working class to government by all the people, and transformation of dictatorship of the proletariat into an all-peoples political

system. This process reflects the sociopolitical and ideological unity of the society that has evolved, and its new qualitative content.

Considering the seminar plans, in which the second problem is devoted entirely to the place and guiding role of the CPSU in the political organization of Soviet society, during discussion of the first problem the seminar leader should concentrate attention mainly on its other structural elements--the socialist all-peoples state, mass social organizations, and labor collectives.

The basic functions of the all-peoples state, its main tasks as worded in the new USSR Constitution, and the directions and perspectives of development need to be thoroughly revealed in the seminar. The CPSU defines these tasks on the basis of V. I. Lenin's supremely important directive that "the state gains its strength from awareness of the masses. It is strong only when the masses know everything within their power to judge and do everything consciously" ("Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 35, p 21).

The seminar affords extensive possibilities for unmasking bourgeois, Maoist, and revisionist distortions of the essence and nature of the all-peoples socialist state. Anticommunists are trying to label our state "totalitarian," "despotic." Peking slanderers are especially unprincipled in their fabrications. They declare creation of an all-peoples state in the USSR to be "denial of the principles of Marxism-Leninism," "restoration of capitalism," and so on. All of these fabrications must be subjected to substantiated criticism, and their hostile nature and class orientation must be revealed.

The role and significance of social organizations and labor collectives in the Soviet Union's political life should be clarified in the seminar. In the words of V. I. Lenin, mass organizations of laborers are constant and invariable participants of state control (see "Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 37, p 501). One of the main features of socialist democracy is precisely that the laborers control the society not only through state agencies but also through a branched system of mass social organizations. Reflection of the role of social organizations in the new USSR Constitution emphasizes their significance as an inseparable part of our political system.

In the process of communist construction, the ties among different elements of the political system of developed socialism are becoming increasingly more intimate. These elements are united by common organizational forms and principles of activity. They perform their functions in close unity in the interests of attaining the main goal--the construction of communism.

During discussion of the second problem, emphasis should be placed on the objective and subjective factors defining the place and guiding role of the Communist Party in mature socialist society, in its political system. It is important to deeply reveal why precisely the Communist Party and not some other political institution has the leading role. This can be explained mainly by the specific features of the development of the communist socio-

economic formation as a result of the conscious creativity of the masses, and by the need for developing socialist society on the basis of its objective laws. This conscious activity of the popular masses requires that the goals and tasks be defined correctly and that the political leadership be of the highest type. The CPSU is precisely the entity which, since the moment of its creation, has guided the masses in their revolutionary practice and ensured development of real socialism. Being a true expression of the interests of the working class and all people, the party unites within its ranks the most conscious representatives of the people, and it is capable of uniting the broadest masses about itself. This is precisely why it has the power to heighten the sociopolitical activity of the laborers and direct it at solving the diverse, complex problems of communist construction.

The leading and guiding role of the CPSU and its place as the core of the entire Soviet political system and of state and social organizations is legalized in the new Fundamental Law of our country. The party defines the policy line, manages the masses and the economic, sociopolitical, and spiritual life of the society, and unifies and coordinates the activities of all levels in the system of control.

The essence of the party's political management of all spheres of life of developed socialist society should be revealed in the seminar, and it should be demonstrated that this management is based on a truly scientific foundation. The CPSU is improving its artful political leadership with a consideration for the concrete historical conditions. An integrated systems approach to analyzing the phenomena of social life is inherent to it.

The CPSU is the ruling party. The causes and factors responsible for growth of its leading role in the period of communist construction are reflected quite distinctly and objectively in the CPSU Program and in other party documents, and they are placed in concrete form in decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. I am referring to factors such as growth in the scale and complexity of the tasks of communist construction, requiring a higher level of political and organizational leadership, greater creative activity of the masses, encouragement of millions of new laborers to participate in the management of state affairs and production, further development of socialist democracy, augmentation of the role of social organizations, and expansion of the rights of union republics and local organizations; growth in the significance of the theory of scientific communism, its creative development and explanation; the need for intensifying communist indoctrination of laborers and surmounting the vestiges of the past in the awareness of the people. The internal objective causes are supplemented by a number of external circumstances responsible for growth in the activity and diversity of the CPSU's international functions. It should be kept in mind that the leading role of the party, the style of its work, and the scale of its influence on the masses depend mainly on the activity of party organizations, which are obligated to

improve their activity in all possible ways and display increasingly greater energy and ability in solving today's problems of social development.

During discussion of the third problem, the seminar leader should reveal the place and role of the army in the political system of mature socialism. The socialist army is a state organ, and it develops and improves together with it. It is important to emphasize its fundamental difference from capitalist armies, which have always defended the interests of the ruling classes of exploitation. It is precisely to this aspect that V. I. Lenin turned his attention: "No matter where, no matter in what country, permanent armies function not so much against an external enemy as against an internal enemy. Permanent armies everywhere have become the tool of reaction, the servant of capital in the fight against labor, the executioner of national liberty" ("Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 12, p 113). Today, the armies of imperialist states continue to be extensively used as a tool by which to protect the interests of the ruling classes, to suppress strikes, mass peoples demonstrations, and so on.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that from the very first days of their birth, the purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces has been to protect the achievements of the revolution, our popular rule (see "Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 35, p 216). They have always handled their honorable, important missions with honor. "The armed forces of the Soviet state," noted CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov in a report devoted to their jubilee, "have been standing an alert guard over the revolutionary achievements of our people for 60 years, and they are supporting the great work of the Leninist party, the goals of communism selflessly and devotedly."

Transformation of the army of the dictatorship of the proletariat into an all-peoples army, the withering away of its internal function of suppressing the resistance of classes of exploitation, typical of it in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, and the continued development of its external defensive function must be analyzed, and the diversity of ways in which the unity of the army and people is being strengthened should be revealed deeply and thoroughly in the seminar.

The all-peoples nature of the Soviet Armed Forces manifests itself in that they are manned in accordance with the USSR Constitution and the Law on Universal Military Obligation. Protection of the fatherland is a sacred duty, and service in the USSR Armed Forces is an honorable obligation of every citizen in our country, irrespective of race, national origin, creed, education, and social and material status. The Soviet government has recruited all nations and peoples for defense of the socialist fatherland. Today our army is represented by all classes and social strata of Soviet society; it is the embodiment of the friendship and brotherhood of peoples, an embodiment of a historically new social and international society of people--the Soviet people.

Another distinguishing trait of the socialist army is that it is a powerful bulwark to anti-imperialist forces in their struggle of liberation. The military power of the armies in the socialist fraternity, especially the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces, has already stood as an insurmountable obstacle to aggressors many times. At the same time our country and the fraternal socialist countries do not boast idly about their military power, instead doing everything to see that mankind is alleviated of the woes and deprivations of another world war.

Speaking to seamen of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet on the cruiser Admiral Senyavin on 7 April 1978, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev turned his attention to the fact that forces interested in perpetuating the arms race and supercharging the atmosphere of fear and hostility are present both West and East of our borders. Thus no task is more important than achieving real disarmament and promoting movement toward reduction and, in the end, elimination of the threat of a thermonuclear disaster. It is precisely here, in this direction that the fundamental issue as to how the international situation will develop further is being resolved, and it is precisely here that the struggle is most acute today.

"We threaten no one," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized. "References to a so-called 'Soviet threat' are an obvious fabrication by the enemies of relaxation of internation tension, and nothing more. We are building our defenses with a single goal--reliably protecting the achievements of Great October and firmly defending the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and our friends and allies. Soldiers of the Soviet Army and Navy serve this noble goal."

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev appealed to the Pacific seamen and, through them, to all army and navy personnel to heighten their military skills, improve their political training, and honorably carry the banner of the Soviet armed forces.

Examining the fourth problem, the seminar leader should emphasize that it has now been proven, not only theoretically, but also through lengthy historical practice, that not even an important sphere in the life of socialist society, its defense, can do without communist party leadership. CPSU management of military construction and development and improvement of our armed forces is a law of nature, the foundation of Soviet military construction. Here lies the important advantage of the socialist military organization.

The Communist Party is improving the armed forces on the basis of an understanding of the objective laws of war. It is scientifically solving the entire complex of problems pertaining to the defense of socialism and the theory and practice of military affairs; this is embodied in the Communist Party's military policy, which defines the essence and basic content of the activities of state agencies and social organizations in the defense area. The military policy is a part of the Communist Party's general

policy. It gains its strength and viability from the fact that it is being developed on the sound theoretical-methodological foundation of Marxism-Leninism. It is precisely on this foundation that the party does all of its diverse work to create and develop the military organization of socialism and increase its power.

In this seminar it would be desirable to thoroughly reveal the basic directions of the CPSU's military policy in today's conditions, and to emphasize that in solving the diverse problems of improving the armed forces, the CPSU relies on military personnel wholly devoted to communism and on a broadly branched system of political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations, which are doing active ideological and organizational work in the army and navy.

Today the role of the CPSU in military construction, in management of the armed forces is growing significantly. This is the product, on one hand, of the general factors responsible for the greater role of the party in developed socialism and, on the other hand, of the unique features of protecting the socialist fatherland in the modern era associated with the new disposition of forces in the world arena and with the nature of fundamental changes that have occurred in military affairs.

Concluding the examination of the last problem, the lesson leader should turn the attention of the students to deep study of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the statutes of the new USSR Constitution, and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, which have great significance to heightening the level of party management of modern military construction.

As a conclusion to the seminar it should be emphasized that the political system of the society of mature socialism that has evolved in the USSR is an entire complex of state and social agencies, through which the Soviet people, led by the working class, control the society's affairs. In the center of this system stands the political leader of the people--the Communist Party, the theoretical, organizational, and education activities of which are directed at all-out growth of the country's power and further improvement of socialist democracy as the most important prerequisites for successful completion of the great tasks of communist construction.

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COMMANDER OF BELORUSSIAN M.D. ON TROOP TRAINING RESULTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 1978 signed to press 27 Apr 1978 pp 49-56

[Article by Col Gen Tank Trps M. Zaytsev, Troop Commander, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "With a Consideration for the Requirements of Modern Battle"]

[Text] The Berezina troop exercise was a significant event in the life of the district's troops. To the personnel of the units and subunits participating in it, it became a good school of field skills, a school of combat mastery, of psychological and physical tempering. Also noteworthy is the fact that this exercise was conducted on Belorussian soil, where bloody engagements took place during the Great Patriotic War and where Soviet troops destroyed the strong enemy Army Group Center with annihilatory strikes in 1944. This was a strategic offensive operation. It came to be called the Belorussian operation, one of the largest operations brilliantly conducted by the Soviet Army in the past war. Right now our people and all progressive mankind are triumphantly celebrating the 33d anniversary of the world-historic victory of the Soviet Union over fascist Germany.

As we know, the Belorussian strategic offensive operation made a great contribution to development of Soviet art of war. Organization and conduct of powerful simultaneous strikes on six separate axes by the forces of four fronts was a classical example of penetration of enemy defenses. Also instructive in this operation was encirclement of large enemy groupings at strategic depth in the course of pursuit. The outstanding results of the operation once again demonstrated to the world the high moral-combat qualities of Soviet soldiers, their political awareness, and their mass heroism.

These remarkable qualities, instilled in the Soviet people by the wise Leninist party, are also inherent to the present generation of the socialist fatherland's defenders. During the Berezina troop exercise, for example, the patriotic feelings of the soldiers were clearly expressed in their desire to complete their missions in a superior manner and perpetuate and

multiply the combat glory of their fathers and grandfathers. In an intense, swiftly changing situation, in conditions as close as possible to those of combat, the officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and enlisted men had to display high professional skill, true bravery, and firm physical and psychological fitness. And I should say that the personnel honorably passed a difficult examination of combat maturity, demonstrating improved field skills and an ability to complete complex missions with a consideration for the requirements of modern battle.

Continuous, close interaction was maintained among units and subunits of different arms and services during the exercise. Motorized riflemen and tank crews achieved high results in fire preparation and vehicle driving. Pilots and airborne troops, missilemen and sappers, air defense troops, and soldiers in other combat specialties also exhibited bravery and skill.

No matter what aspect of the "battle's" organization you take--attack or offensive deep in "enemy" defenses, fire preparation or fire support by motorized infantrymen and tanks, marches, or comprehensive troop supply, every stage of the exercise, each of its parts were instructive in many respects. The troops accumulated rich experience operating in a dynamic, swiftly changing situation in complex roadless terrain, and in the presence of snowdrifts and low temperatures. No less valuable is the experience acquired in organizing party-political work, socialist competition, technical and administrative services to subunits and units, and so on.

The experience accumulated in the Berezina exercise is invaluable to us. It is being studied, generalized, and introduced into practice everywhere. Commanders, political agencies, headquarters, and party and Komsomol organizations are using the most diverse forms and methods for this purpose. Among them are demonstrations and teacher training lessons, in which the best training methods are graphically demonstrated. Remarks by the creators themselves of this experience, coupled with practical demonstrations of effective work methods and ways for servicing and operating combat equipment and armament, have a great effect on fellow servicemen. The experience of the best units and subunits is being publicized at meetings, seminars, and conferences. The district newspaper VO SLAVU RODINY and high-volume newspapers are regularly publishing information in the "Implementation of the Berezina Exercise Experience," "The Heroes of Berezina," and other columns.

Discussing the problems of publicizing and implementing the best experience at meetings of bureaus and committees, communists and Komsomol members are planning concrete measures and implementing them persistently. They recognize that this would be a real guarantee of new successes in the tactical, fire, technical, and special training of the personnel, in strengthening discipline and organization, and in heightening the alertness and combat readiness of the district's troops.

The outcome of the Berezina exercise was the result of persistent, fruitful work by commanders, headquarters, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations to improve the entire personnel training and indoctrination process, their creative search for ways to heighten the effectiveness and quality of every assignment, and their competent utilization of the mobilizing role of socialist competition.

As during the Great Patriotic War, the encouraging words and personal example of communists and purposeful party-political work mobilized the soldiers for bold, decisive actions. In his recently published memoirs "Malaya Zemlya" (The Little Land) Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev writes: "Faithful sons of the party, in its name they called the soldiers to mortal combat. They made an appeal to spare no life in the name of the motherland, and in battle they were the first to do what they asked others to do, urging the soldiers to follow in their wake." Following the example of the legendary commissars, political instructors, and party organizers, communists and, living up to the former, Komsomol members were in the forefront during the Berezina exercise, in the most decisive sectors.

A letter from the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AWCCTU, and the Komsomol Central Committee on initiating the 1978 socialist competition elicited an avid response and a new upsurge of creativity among the district's troops. The results of the winter exercise attest to successful completion of plans and programs and the socialist pledges adopted in the year of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is pleasing to note that as required of us by the party, these results are being evaluated thoroughly and self-critically, especially in the military collectives in which all effort is aimed at improving combat and political training and field skills are in the center of attention of commanders, political workers, headquarters, and party organizations.

Much good has been achieved in this respect, for example, in the motorized rifle regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Boriskin. He distinguished himself in the Berezina tactical exercises. In the complex conditions of modern battle, the personnel honorably completed the most diverse training missions. The soldiers also displayed high skill in other exercises. I visited the motorized riflemen not long ago. In what way is the organization of combat and political training in this regiment instructive? A distinct rhythm of training is ensured here in all lessons, and the combat and political training plans, lesson schedules, and socialist pledges are adhered to. Careful preparations are made for every field exercise. The lessons are conducted by competent teachers, by the chiefs of the arms and services. Training is structured with a consideration for the best experience. Lesson leaders actively penetrate into the details of the competition's organization and make competent use of its mobilizing role.

The regiment's commander himself is a good example. Communist Boriskin is distinguished by high exactingness toward himself and subordinates.

He delves deeply into the training process, and he is well aware of the training level of every subunit and of every officer. The commander can always be found wherever lessons are going on, wherever the tactical and fire skills of a subunit are being improved. All of the regiment's officers imitate him, and they learn from him to competently direct the efforts of the soldiers toward solution of concrete problems in military training, toward heightening the quality and effectiveness of the entire process of training and indoctrination.

It is natural that attention is perpetually devoted to the field skills of the troops and the party's concern over them, since this is the main factor defining the level of combat readiness.

The profound transformations that have recently occurred in military affairs, the qualitative changes in troop equipment availability, and continuous improvements in the forms and methods of warfare have significantly stiffened the requirements on field skills and combat readiness. "Combat readiness" notes CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "is an alloy of the equipment available to the troops, their combat training, their moral-political, psychological, and physical seasoning, their organization, and the readiness of every Soviet soldier to perform acts of heroism in the performance of his military duty to the motherland." Guiding themselves by Communist Party directives and fulfilling the requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense, commanders of all ranks are meticulously accumulating the experience of organizing tactical lessons and exercises, they are constantly improving their teaching techniques, and they are seeking the most effective ways and means of training subunits and units in the field, in a situation as close to that of combat as possible. These issues are under the constant control of the district's military council, political directorate, and headquarters. Special attention is devoted to tactical, tactical-special, fire, and special training, to assimilation of equipment and armament, and to the search for the most effective ways to use this equipment in modern battle.

In addition to the fact that the principal measures pertaining to field training are prepared and implemented under the guidance of the district command, progress in field training is regularly discussed at meetings of the military council and the executive staff, and during critiques of troop, command and staff, and staff exercises, and group exercises and lessons. Areas in which most of the shortcomings were revealed during such exercises are discussed first. Concrete measures are implemented to correct these shortcomings. At the beginning of the year, for example, it was recognized suitable in a discussion of the problem of improving fire training for the personnel to implement a number of concrete measures; this was subsequently done. These measures foresaw increasing the number of training sessions and the required time of work at control consoles, conducting fire training with smaller targets, improving the quality of lessons held for the instructors themselves, and so on.

Integration of other subjects with technical training is a widespread practice aimed at upgrading the quality of field training in the district. As a rule these problems are foreseen in lesson plans and schedules, and they are solved in most battle drill and tactical lessons and exercises.

Unfortunately combat training does not proceed rhythmically and in a sufficiently organized manner in every military collective. There are shortcomings in the procedures employed in some lessons, and cases of simplification, relaxation, and padding of training indices still occur here and there. In my opinion the possibilities for eliminating these shortcomings lie mainly in improving the quality of officer training--improving the system of their command training, and intensifying independent work to improve theoretical knowledge and reinforce practical habits. As an example they regularly attend local tactical exercises and take tests on the basic topics of study. But this is not all. To improve the teaching skills of the officers, we make broad use of forms of works such as instructor training in the most complex subjects of the program, and briefing of the immediate supervisors at the eve of exercises. Stiff requirements have been imposed on officer upgrading.

Concerned over improving the occupational and teaching skills of the officers, we do not forget about the sergeants. Much attention is devoted to their training in the district troops. Their tactical training and improvement of their teaching skills and their ability for commanding subordinates in battle are an object of special concern. Instructor training at demonstration lessons in tactical training are performed for sergeants in the complex situation of a modern battle as a rule. Battalion commanders organize lessons for them in the most difficult subjects. Such training serves as a good school of tactical skills for the sergeants.

Unfortunately there are shortcomings in the training of some junior commanders. Some units and subunits are thoughtless in their approach to organizing command and instructor training, the requirements of the regulations are explained to sergeants incompetently, and a readiness to perform independent missions is not instilled adequately. This is why certain junior commanders manage their subordinates unconfidently during tactical exercises, they act passively, and they fail to display initiative. Such shortcomings were typical, for example, of battalions commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Lustach and Major V. Vlasov.

Much is also being done in the district troops to improve staff field skills. This could be seen from the Berezina troop exercise, during which many staffs displayed good coordination and well organized work in the most complex conditions. At the same time some of them are still inefficient in solving various problems pertaining to control of units and subunits. Stability of control is often lost during a "battle," especially in the presence of active jamming. Sometimes even the personal training of officers leaves something to be desired.

There are many ways for improving staff field skills. The most important of them are, without a doubt, staff exercises, command and staff exercises, and participation in troop tactical exercises. The goal of staff exercises is to permit officers to assimilate their functional responsibilities and learn to process battle documents quickly. As a rule such exercises are conducted in the field, together with communication resources.

Command and staff exercises are an important link in staff training. They are usually conducted on integrated subjects in complex field conditions, where staff officers learn to coordinate their work and gain a familiarity with each other's jobs. We conduct all staff exercises and command and staff exercises in the presence of jamming with the hope of achieving continuity in battle control.

The principal index of troop field skills is high coordination of subunits and units, their readiness to perform the most diverse missions. This is achieved in exercises, and it is based on outstanding training for enlisted men, sergeants, and officers. Battle drill exercises are especially important. This is why we turn the most serious attention to preparing for these lessons and teaching commanders to conduct them properly. This is also important because there are many young officers who are still weak in teaching skills at the platoon and company levels.

Combined arms tactical exercises play the decisive role in battle coordination among subunits and units. We are perpetually improving this technique. We strive to see that commanders learn to teach battle organization to subordinates and maintain firm and continuous control over the troops with a consideration for today's requirements, avoiding petty tutelage, "coaching," relaxation, and simplifications.

Most of our exercises are two-sided. This makes them more interesting to all categories of students and permits them to realistically solve all problems of reconnaissance, security, combat activities, and protection of troops against nuclear weapons, and to use various sorts of simulators.

Practical exercises involving combat gunnery play an important role in troop training. In these exercises, we see that commanders and staff practice using fire resources to suppress and annihilate the enemy as much as possible, acquire firm habits in control of the combat activities of subunits, use different weapons, and learn to competently exploit an advantage resulting from nuclear strikes and air raids. Despite difficulties in organizing and conducting tactical exercises involving combat gunnery, we demand that they proceed strictly according to the plan, instructively, and in a complex situation.

However, there are difficulties in tactical training as well. Sometimes certain subunits conduct tactical exercises in conditions not fully corresponding to the requirements of modern battle. We see all of these

shortcomings, and we implement the most decisive measures to correct them. Cases of relaxation and simplification in one of the subunits were discussed thoroughly at a recent meeting of the military council. Steps were taken to correct the shortcomings.

Discussing the Party's constant concern over field skills, we can cite many positive examples. The political section of the Guards Motorized Rifle Rogachev Order of the October Revolution, Red Banner, Order of Suvorov, Order of Kutuzov Division imeni Verkhovnyy Soviet BSSR, commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Oleshchenko, actively influences the course of combat and political training. Care is taken here to see that lessons in tactical training, in the driving of combat vehicles, and in other subjects proceed at the highest level; party-political work is constant during these lessons. Much attention is devoted to organizing socialist competition on missions and standards. Thus, planning party-political work for the time of the Berezina exercise, the political section made sure that all soldiers, especially officers, were within the reach of party influence. This is understandable, since the level and quality of any tactical exercise depends to a decisive degree on the skills of commanders and political workers, on their understanding of the nature of modern battle, and on a scientific approach to its organization. This is why the problems of strategic and technical training for officers is constantly at the center of attention.

At the eve of the exercise the officers deepened their knowledge, especially in regard to troop command and control, and organization of party-political work. They devoted a great deal of time to studying the manuals and regulations. Discussions and consultations were conducted with commanders, and theoretical conferences were organized. They attended lectures and reports. Work with each category of servicemen was differentiated. Much attention was devoted to briefing active party and Komsomol members. The political section made sure that party and Komsomol organization secretaries, agitators, combat bulletin editors, and other activists had a clear idea of the nature of combat training missions and of their place and role in these missions.

The political section showed itself to be highly concerned over the efficiency of party-political work during the exercise, seeing that the more complex the situation was on the "battlefield," the more active it would be. When the order to move forward was received, the commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations directed their efforts at inspiring a high offensive spirit and the resolve to successfully complete all missions in the personnel. All of this purposeful work bore its fruits. The battalion commanded by Captain Ye. Gelyukh distinguished itself especially well. The personnel of this subunit and, incidentally, those of others, completed all combat training missions competently, with initiative; they displayed matured combat skills, coordination, mobility, moral-volitional maturity, and physical endurance. And this was natural. The training process is well organized here and the

commander and all communists in the battalion deeply study progress in combat and political training and, through their active influence, promote improvements in the weaker areas. They display party principles in their concern for intensifying the training process, for making sensible use of time and engine life, and for generalizing and disseminating the experience of the best teachers and leading soldiers, which permits them to train specialists in a short time at minimum materiel outlays.

At the beginning of the year the personnel decided to raise their battalion to the ranks of the excellent. The issue of seeking reserves that could make every lesson and training session maximally effective was raised before the commander, the staff, the party and Komsomol organizations, and all soldiers. Thus, a decisive war was waged against arbitrariness and relaxation. Today not a single lesson, not a single training session or gunnery practice is conducted without creating a complex tactical situation with targets. Planning, as an example, a field exercise for even just a single subunit, the commander and the battalion staff foresee a great deal: They write out the appropriate tactical scenario, they find suitable unfamiliar terrain, and they exclude possible arbitrariness in lesson organization. In turn the political workers and active party and Komsomol members mobilize the people for exemplary completion of the combat training missions and for achievements in excess of the standards. Specialists of the technical service take the appropriate steps for logistical support. In a word, everything that can make the atmosphere of even the most mundane lesson close to that of real battle is put to use.

The battalion believes it suitable to add complexity not only to lessons pursuing the goal of training, of honing the skills of the motorized infantrymen, but also test exercises. After all, the skill displayed by a company or platoon on a limited tactical background while executing a narrow range of missions is one thing, while placing a subunit in a situation where it must, as an example, maintain fire to a great depth in an offensive or surmount obstacles on natural terrain is quite another. Moreover these are only particular problems that may arise in a major tactical mission, imposing only a fraction of the tremendous physical and moral load that may fall to the lot of the soldiers in modern battle. Only when this method is used to test battle skills can we realistically assess the training level and coordination of the military collective, the flexibility and depth of the commander's thinking, the moral stability of the soldiers, and much else.

Socialist competition is a powerful stimulus to development of the creative initiative of soldiers, their mobilization for successful completion of combat and political training missions, and for development of high moral-combat qualities. Following Lenin's principles in implementing the directives of the CPSU Central Committee concerning development of socialist competition, the commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations have acquired a significant amount of experience in organizing and managing competition. Competition promotes improvement of troop combat and political training, reinforcement of military discipline, and maintenance of order.

In compliance with requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the district's military council and political directorate have developed and are implementing measures aimed at highly important goals such as ensuring concreteness of the socialist competition's management in the field on the part of commanders and political agencies, elevating the role of party and Komsomol organizations in this work, fundamentally improving propaganda, and introducing the best experience in the study and care for weapons and equipment. Working to see that the competition would permeate all aspects of the training process and mobilize the military collectives for achievement of new successes in combat and political training, its organizers are attaching special significance to rivalry in execution of missions and standards, and to the fight to increase the ranks of outstanding soldiers, classed specialists, and masters of military affairs, and to achieve mutual exchangeability.

The military collective in which Officer Yu. Kozlov serves provides an instructive example as to how socialist competition should be used to master weapons and equipment. This collective persistently fights to upgrade the quality of all lessons and make effective use of time; Lenin's principles of competition--visuality, comparability of results, the possibility for practical repetition of experience, and comradely mutual assistance--are implemented daily. Much attention is devoted to publicizing the experience of the best students and to disseminating it. Outstanding soldiers of combat and political training and the best specialists share the "secrets" of their expertise with fellow servicemen at the firing ranges, practice ranges, tank driving ranges, and during field exercises. The results of the competition are regularly summarized in the subunits, the reasons why particular servicemen fail to satisfy their pledges are revealed promptly, assistance is rendered to those who need it, and moral stimuli are competently employed.

A school of combat mastery has been created in the regiment on initiative of the communists. During the lessons the students acquire deep knowledge, become aware of the best experience in studying and operating combat equipment, and become better prepared for class examinations.

Competition on missions and standards has enjoyed extensive development among the district's troops. It helps to infuse a spirit of rivalry in every day of training, and it makes the personnel more interested in the lessons. What is most important here is quality and time. The fight to pare down the seconds at the tank driving ranges, practice ranges, rifle ranges, and in exercises is a fight to anticipate the enemy in battle and gain the victory over him. These seconds are earned through mastery of the combat equipment and its outstanding use.

The winter training results show that the level of combat training and military discipline of the personnel are quite sufficient to permit them

to complete their missions. However, this is not an excuse for relaxation. Life demands further improvement of the training process, better quality lessons, and reinforcement of organization and military order. Deeply aware of their responsibility for defense of the socialist motherland, our soldiers are continuing their deep study of the proceedings and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the USSR Constitution, jubilee documents devoted to the 60th anniversary of Great October and the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the theoretical premises and conclusions in the reports and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. On this basis the commanders, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations are improving ideological, political, military, and moral indoctrination, and they are promoting unification of the military collectives.

"The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people," the USSR Constitution states, "is to dependably protect the socialist fatherland, and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate repulse to any aggressor." The requirements of our country's Fundamental Law and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the December (1977) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee predetermine the main directions of the work of commanders, political agencies, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations, and all of the district's soldiers. To ensure success in their missions, the units and subunits are making maximum use of the upsurge in political spirit of the personnel elicited by the letter of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and the Komsomol Central Committee concerning initiation of the 1978 socialist competition. To every soldier of our Red Banner Belorussian Military District, this training year is a new stage in the fight to satisfy the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and increase the combat strength of the USSR Armed Forces.

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GUIDE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON MILITARY WORK, MATERIEL

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[Article by Col O. Sokolov, Can Hist Sci, Asst Prof: "The CPSU On a Communist Attitude Toward Labor and Socialist Property. A Conscientious Attitude Toward Military Work, Care For Military and Public Property"]

[Excerpts] Political lessons in this subject have the purpose of helping the students think out and understand the significance of a communist attitude toward labor more deeply, explaining the features of military work and the role of the USSR economic system in creation of the material foundation of the power of the army and navy, and mobilizing soldiers and seamen for effective, high quality military work and exemplary care of weapons, combat equipment, and military and public property.

Eight hours are devoted to this subject. It would be best to distribute this time in the following manner: Two hours for lecture (narration), 2 for independent work, and 4 hours for a seminar (discussion).

The following problems are suggested for the lecture (narration): 1. The CPSU on a communist attitude toward labor. The significance and unique features of military work in the army and navy. 2. Socialist ownership of production resources--the foundation of the USSR economic system. Weapons and combat equipment--the people's property, a guarantee of the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces. 3. A conscientious attitude toward military work, all-out care of weapons, combat equipment, and military and public property--a matter of honor of every soldier.

It would be desirable to emphasize in a brief introduction that the Soviet people began their 7th decade of the October era full of strength, energy, and optimism. Adoption of the USSR Constitution and celebration of the 60th anniversary of Great October have left an indelible impression in the hearts of the Soviet people.

Invariably following the party's Leninist course, the Soviet people are attaining new successes in all directions of communist construction. The

impressive program of socioeconomic transformations spelled out by the 25th CPSU Congress is being implemented successfully. A socialist competition to complete and surpass the assignments of the third year of the Ninth Five-Year Plan has attained broad scope. "The tremendous economic growth history's first socialist country has experienced," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at a solemn meeting devoted to the 60th anniversary of Great October, "is the result of the liberation of labor, the result of the labor of people who recognize that they are working for themselves, for the common good."

The military work of army and navy soldiers is an inseparable part of the creative activities of all Soviet people. Celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are reliably protecting the achievements of Great October, has transformed into a truly all-peoples triumph. It was with deep satisfaction that the motherland's defenders accepted the warm words of welcome of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers to the soldiers of the valorous USSR Armed Forces. In response to the paternal concern of the party and people, army and navy soldiers are striving to achieve even better mastery of military skills, and they are persistently upgrading the quality and effectiveness of their military work.

1. The CPSU on a Communist Attitude Toward Labor. The Significance and Unique Features of the Military Work of Army and Navy Soldiers

Successful completion of the program for economic and social development of the society spelled out by the 25th CPSU Congress depends on the working people who are directly involved in the plans of the party to raise the Soviet Union to new heights of progress.

Concentrating the efforts of the Soviet people on completing the grandiose plans of communist construction and on fighting for peace and security of nations, the Communist Party is aware that the forces of war and reaction, the forces of aggression and militarism have not been rendered harmless, that they have not laid down their arms. This is why the daily military work of our soldiers, their persistent training, their stubborn mastery of top-class military equipment, their high alertness, and their combat readiness are so important.

The work of Soviet soldiers is a special sort of work having the main purpose of defending the socialist fatherland. The place and role of military work is predefined by the historic purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are standing guard over the creative labor of the Soviet people. The role of military work has grown immeasurably today. "Today, Soviet soldiers," emphasized USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov in his report "Sixty years on guard over the achievements of Great October," "are controlling highly complex combat vehicles, missile complexes,

and electronic systems, they are navigating nuclear submarines and supersonic aircraft, and they are assimilating the methods of combat use of various other military equipment. In order that they could achieve high coordination in their actions and perfect mastery of modern weapons, all personnel must exert a great deal of effort. Man has been and continues to be the decisive element in war."

Military work has its unique features. Its content is complex, and it is associated with application of many of the achievements of science and technology. This work is undergoing further division and specialization. While in World War I there were 15-20 military specialties, their number increased to 160 in World War II and has now reached almost 2,000.

Growth in automation and the availability of modern weapons and equipment are altering the nature of military work, making it increasingly more intensive and requiring knowledge, energy, will, discipline, initiative, and deep awareness of personal responsibility for protection of the achievements of socialism.

Deeply justified by their essence and content, the missions of our armed forces impart great meaning to military work, transforming service in the army and navy into a true school of citizenship, a school of endurance and discipline. The army and navy in a sense complete the civic development of young people.

A high assessment was given to the tremendous role played by the armed forces in educating the Soviet citizen by the 25th CPSU Congress. In his Accountability Report to the Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "Young people enter the military family with no experience in life. But they return from the army as people who have undergone a school of endurance and discipline, having acquired technical and occupational knowledge and political training" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" (Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress), pp 75-76).

In their military work many young soldiers acquire new knowledge and skills and master a large number of specialties which they can apply in the national economy following their retirement into the reserves. Former soldiers carry their good work habits to all ends of the boundless expanses of our motherland.

Soldiers of the railroad troops and military construction engineers have been given the great honor of working right within the sphere of material production. Military construction engineers erect housing, making their contribution to construction of buildings of Olympic proportions. Military railroaders are actively participating in construction of the Baikal-Amur Trunkline.

Each year a large number of servicemen work in the harvests. In the event of natural disasters they are among the first to come to the public's aid.

Faithful to their duty, Soviet soldiers exhibit models of military work; it is with great diligence and responsibility that they master weapons and combat equipment and improve their field, aerial, and naval skills.

A letter written by personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy on the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces to the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers was a pledge of faithfulness to the party and motherland, a confirmation of the fact that all of the deeds and thoughts of Soviet soldiers and their military work are subordinated to the great work of communist construction, to protection of its achievements.

A socialist competition with the motto "Dependably Protect the Socialist Fatherland, Be In Constant Combat Readiness, Persistently Master Weapons and Equipment, and Improve Combat Skills" has now been initiated in every military collective. The movement for best formation, which was initiated by the personnel of the Guards Motorized Rifle Taman' Division imeni M. I. Kalinin, has enjoyed further development.

An appeal by the Komsomol organizations of the units and the nuclear submarine that had initiated a competition in the brances of the armed forces to army and navy Komsomol organizations to heighten their contribution to satisfying adopted pledges, multiplying the efforts of every Komsomol member in combat training and service, and honorable welcoming the 18th Komsomol Congress and the 60th anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol has enjoyed broad support.

2. Socialist Ownership of Production Resources--The Foundation of the USSR Economic System. Weapons and Combat Equipment--Public Property, A Guarantee of the Strength of the Soviet Armed Forces

The USSR economic system is based on socialist ownership of production resources, taking the form of state (all-peoples) and kolkhoz cooperative ownership. "...it is precisely these two forms of socialist ownership of production resources," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev points out, "that predetermine the nature of our national economy and division of Soviet society into two friendly classes--workers and peasants."

The USSR's national wealth presently exceeds 2 trillion rubles (not counting land and forests), and the fixed productive capital possessed by all national economic sectors has attained a worth of 870 billion rubles, having increased by 34 times in comparison with the 1917 level.

The need for strengthening the country's defenses and the army and navy is presently always at the center of attention of the party, its Leninist

Central Committee, the Central Committee Politburo, and personally CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "The party is doing everything to see that our country's defenses are at their required level," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on being awarded the Order of Victory. "Strengthening our armed forces, however, in no way are we transgressing upon the real needs for our security and the security of our socialist friends."

Charting the paths for creation of the material-technical base of communism, the party constantly heeds the military danger of imperialism, and therefore it remains constantly concerned over heightening the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, supplying them with adequate equipment, and improving them.

Owing to the growing potentials of the socialist economy, the outstanding achievements of domestic science and technology, and the selfless labor of the Soviet people, the army and navy have changed beyond recognition; all arms and services of the Soviet Armed Forces have enjoyed proportionate development. Their personnel are wholly devoted to the party and people, and they are protecting our great socialist achievements alertly and reliably.

3. A Conscientious Attitude Toward Military Labor, All-Out Care of Weapons, Combat Equipment, and Military and Public Property--A Matter of Honor of Every Soldier

The high level of the battleworthiness and combat readiness of the armed forces and the successes that have been attained by army and navy soldiers in military work and in the socialist competition for an honorable welcome to the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces serve as a good foundation for forward movement, for attainment of greater heights, and for achievement of new limits in military skills. The words of the greeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers to soldiers of the valorous Armed Forces of the Soviet Union are a call to battle: "In the interests of heightening the power of the army and navy, Soviet soldiers are called upon to improve their combat skill, persistently assimilate modern equipment, constantly improve their organization, and comply strictly with the military oath."

Entering the ranks of the armed forces, the Soviet soldier pledges to conscientiously study military affairs. The Internal Service Regulations state that a private (seaman) has an obligation to know the weapons, combat equipment, and other equipment entrusted to him to perfection and to always keep it operable, ready for battle, and clean. These requirements of the military oath and the regulations are a law, the first commandment of the Soviet soldier. At this point it would be a good idea for the propagandist to describe samples of exemplary military work, cite instructive

examples, name the best privates, seamen, sergeants, and master sergeants of the particular subunit, and criticize those who are not working to full capacity, who display passiveness, and who are satisfied with mediocre results. It is important to encourage the privates and seamen to constantly make a personal contribution to satisfaction of collective socialist pledges, and to persistently and purposefully fight for their satisfaction. He can once again recall the concrete missions of the unit, ship, or subunit, and make every soldier deeply aware of precisely what is required of him in relation to heightening the effectiveness of military work, achieving high quality in fulfillment of the combat and political training plans, and heightening alertness and combat readiness.

From the first days of Soviet rule V. I. Lenin appealed to the workers and peasants to care for public property. In his appeal to the laborers of our country, V. I. Lenin wrote: "Protect and care for, as you would your eyes, the land, bread, factories, tools, products, and transportation-- everything that from this day on will be wholly yours, the property of all the people" ("Poln. sobr. soch." (Complete Collected Works), Vol 35, p 67).

The communist party is implementing Lenin's commandments. They have been embodied in party decisions and in Soviet laws, in which the premise that national property, our social wealth must be preserved and multiplied is visibly embodied.

The new USSR Constitution states: "USSR citizens are obligated to care for and secure socialist property. The duty of the USSR citizen is to fight against misappropriations and waste of state and public property, to be careful with national wealth."

Following Lenin's ideas, party directives, and the laws of our country, the Soviet people are displaying constant concern over socialist property, over the people's property.

The weapons, combat equipment, and military property entrusted to the mother-land's defenders embody considerable state assets and the labor of many thousands of people. It is the moral duty and responsibility of every Soviet soldier to make a contribution to preserving material valuables and national property, to be careful and thrifty with these valuables, and to ensure their maximum life.

Concern over weapons and combat equipment and thriftiness are a glorious tradition of the Soviet Armed Forces. The deep political meaning of careful maintenance of one's weapon was revealed in the first "Red Army Soldier Service Manual" approved by V. I. Lenin in 1918. It stated that every soldier must constantly remember that the weapon in his possession was obtained at a high price and that he must know it to perfection and protect it as he would his eyes.

Soviet soldiers are striving to maintain weapons and equipment competently, remembering that even the best skills could turn out to be useless if a weapon fails at the decisive minute of battle.

The battle chronicle contains numerous examples of heroism and selflessness of soldiers rescuing weapons, combat equipment, and public property from the enemy. It would be useful to cite examples of exemplary maintenance of weapons and equipment by the subunit's soldiers in the lecture.

The requirement of outstanding maintenance of weapons and combat equipment has acquired especially important state significance today. The reason for this lies, on one hand, in the immeasurably greater cost of the equipment supplied to the armed forces and, on the other hand, in the need for maintaining it constantly combat ready, for ensuring not only trouble-free operation of vehicles and armament but also maintenance of the basic technical indices over a long period of time.

Primary concern for maintaining weapons and combat equipment means strict compliance with operating conditions, correct and timely maintenance, and compliance with regulations, instructions, and other guidelines by each soldier. The requirements of these guidelines are important and binding upon all servicemen , as are the requirements of the manuals.

Practice has shown that armament and equipment is constantly combat ready in subunits in which all measures concerning the maintenance and care for combat equipment are fulfilled without fail, as is required by the manuals and instructions. When equipment is operated competently and it is treated with love, it works stably during intense exercises, in the air, and on long oceanic cruises, and it works much longer than its rated life.

However, the propagandist must not ignore the cases encountered on occasion in which certain privates and seamen maintain equipment and weapons carelessly, without adhering to the maintenance schedule. As a result parts wear prematurely on vehicles or in armament, and problems arise in the work of individual units, systems, and machine units. This makes premature repairs necessary, leads to additional outlays of materiel, and in some cases causes failures and accidents.

At the same time, strict, precise compliance with the requirements of regulations, instructions, and manuals does not preclude creative initiative on the part of soldiers in the operation, maintenance and preservation of weapons and combat equipment, or their active participation in efficiency and invention work. Military efficiency experts help to improve combat equipment and the training material base, to heighten the productivity of military work, to achieve more effective use of equipment, and to improve technical maintenance, repair, operation, and preservation of machines, mechanisms, and armament articles.

As an example a number of training resources have now been developed through the work of military innovators and are being introduced into the training process in the ground troops. This makes fuller use of training resources possible in tactical training and in lessons on combat vehicle driving, and consequently it produces a savings in engine life, equipment, fuel, and ammunition. Many military collectives have taken an active part in the All-Union Review of Utilization of Inventions and Efficiency Proposals.

The proper propagandist would recall to the privates and the seamen the basic directions in which efficiency work is developing in the unit or ship.

The Communist Party interprets thriftiness, economy as an indispensable requirement of socialist management. "No matter how much the wealth of our society grows," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress, "the strictest economy and thriftiness continue to be the most important prerequisites for the national economy's development and for improving the welfare of the people."

"It is our great party duty to use every ruble, every hour of work, and every ton of production effectively, to finally eradicate carelessness and slovenliness. This is because we are economizing in behalf of what is precious to us, in behalf of the wealth and power of the motherland, the well-being and flourishing of our people." ("Poln. sobr. soch.", p 45).

This requirement pertains wholly and completely to every Soviet soldier; it obligates him to be a thrifty master, to economize on state assets everywhere and in everything. The army and navy are waging an active struggle to lengthen the life of vehicles and mechanisms, to economize on engine life and fuel, to achieve better maintenance of barracks and other buildings, to reduce the waste of bread, potatoes, and vegetables, and to instill a careful attitude toward clothing. Unfortunately cases of spoilage of various sorts of property still occur. Failure to show concern for maintaining barracks property by certain privates and seamen must be treated as abnormal.

There are great reserves in economization, in strict control over expenditure of construction materials at many facilities being erected by military construction engineers.

Transition to a new uniform was completed in 1973. The new uniform fully satisfies modern requirements and permits the soldier to maintain an exemplary appearance in exercises and in his leisure time. The Internal Service Regulations require that every private and seaman preserve state property, treat clothing and footwear carefully, mend clothing promptly and well, clean it daily, and store it as required. "The soldier's

appearance," noted USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov at the All-Army Conference on Improving the Personal Life of the Troops, "is a reflection of his inner state, a reflection of his capability and readiness to perform his military duty to the motherland. It is no accident that we have the saying: 'Those who march like cattle are even worse in battle'."

It would be suitable to recall the responsibility of persons in the daily work detail have for preserving military property. The Internal Service Regulations state that the company duty officer is responsible for the care of weapons, pistol cabinets (boxes), ammunition boxes, company property, and the personal articles and privates and sergeants under his protection. It is the duty of every private and seaman appointed to the daily work detail to comply strictly with the regulations, to make sure that they are satisfied strictly.

Special responsibility is imposed on servicemen performing guard duty at important facilities, combat equipment, supply depots, missile complexes, and airfields.

Guard duty is a combat mission. It obligates every private and seaman assigned to it to display constant alertness and to perform his duty with a sense of high responsibility.

The Communist Party nutures all Soviet people in the spirit of thriftiness, economy, and a communist attitude toward socialist property, the people's property. There can be no room for money-grubbers, bribe-takers, and parasites in a society building communism.

V. I. Lenin called swindlers the main enemy of socialism, demanding their punishment without vacillation (see "Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 35, p 201). It is a direct responsibility of the Soviet soldier to display alertness and to prevent and actively reveal cases of misappropriation of military and public property.

Soviet law foresees strict punishment and severe chastisement of those who are wasteful of public property. Servicemen mishandling socialist property bear responsibility for their criminal acts.

It would be pertinent for the propagandist to recall the content of particular articles in the law on criminal responsibility for military crimes. The book "Osnovy pravovykh znaniy" (Fundamental Principles of Legal Knowledge) (Voyenizdat, 1973) can be used for this purpose.

Concern for heightening the effectiveness and quality of military work, for maintaining weapons and combat equipment in constant readiness for battle, and conservation and economization of military and public property is an important element of the work of party and Komsomol organizations.

Considering that the bulk of the audience consists of Komsomol members, the activities of the subunit's Komsomol organization in this area could be discussed in greater detail.

Army and navy Komsomol organizations have started displaying greater activity and initiative in making Komsomol members examples of good mastery of combat equipment and weapons, and they are participating better in creation of a modern training material base for lessons and exercises. Competitive reviews for the best Komsomol organization in military-technical propaganda have been conducted regularly in recent years in the ground troops and the air force. A movement for the "Successors of the Best War-time Naval Specialists" has taken hold everywhere in the navy. Young army soldiers have initiated glorious movements in all branches in the USSR Armed Forces. Better satisfaction of socialist pledges by all young soldiers has been promoted by patriotic initiatives that have enjoyed considerable development: "On Par With the Best--No One Falls Behind," "Outstanding Results in Each Training Day," "Komsomol Concern for the Training Base," and "Stand Guard Over the Country as did the Heroes of War." Military life is rich with numerous examples of substantial contributions made to completion of adopted pledges by all soldiers and to heightening the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships by Komsomol collectives under the guidance of political agencies and party organizations.

Concluding his presentation of the material in this subject, the propagandist should emphasize that party requirements must be a law of life for every Soviet soldier, as is true of all Soviet people: They must refrain from flattering themselves with their successes, they must not become self-satisfied with their achievements, they must constantly adhere to the battle slogan "Work Better Today Than Yesterday and Better Tomorrow Than Today," they must constantly upgrade the quality and effectiveness of military work, and they must persistently improve the combat readiness of the personnel.

It is recommended that the students study the following works during their hours of independent work: V. I. Lenin's article "The Great Initiative" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 39, pp 5-6, 18-29), "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" (Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) (Politizdat, 1976, pp 110-112), "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" (The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (Politizdat, 1977, articles 10-18, 31,32,40, 60-63), Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's "Report to the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Present Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXV s'ezda KPSS," (Politizdat, 1976, pp 38, 75-78, 83), Section 1 of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "Velikiy Oktyabr' i progress chelovechestva" (Great October and the Progress of Mankind) (Politizdat, 1977), the greeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers to soldiers of the valorous USSR Armed Forces (PRAVDA, 28 February 1978), the letter of greeting from personnel

of the Soviet Army and Navy to the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers (PRAVDA, 23 February 1978), and USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov's report "Sixty Years on Guard Over the Achievements of Great October" (PRAVDA, 23 February 1978).

The documentary films "To Always Be On Guard," "Our First Commandment" and "The Watchmen of Peace" and the slide shows "To Be In Perpetual Combat Readiness" and "Act In Exercises As In Battle" could be shown in the evening. The propagandist can make use of sheets 9-18 of the visual album "XXV s"yezd KPSS ob ukreplennii oborony SSSR" (The 25th CPSU Congress on Strengthening the Defenses of the USSR) (Voyenizdat, 1976) in his preparations for the lessons.

The following problems should be discussed in seminars:

1. What is the basis of the USSR economic system, and what is the role of the socialist economy in supplying weapons and combat equipment to the army and navy?
2. The 25th CPSU Congress on a communist attitude toward labor and socialist property.
3. military work--a matter of honor to the Soviet soldier.
4. Persistent improvement of military skills.
5. Responsibility of servicemen for loss and damage of military property and for violation of the rules of vehicle driving and operation.

The forms and methods of the work of sergeants and master sergeants to instill, in their subordinates, the desire to work hard, to achieve perfect mastery of weapons and combat equipment, and to maintain military and public property in an exemplary manner should also be discussed in lessons with sergeants and master sergeants.

Literature for Propagandists

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4. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" (Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Politizdat, 1976, pp 110-112.
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IMPROVEMENTS IN TROOP LIVING CONDITIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 78 signed to press 11 May 78 pp 35-41

[Article by Col Gen Intend Serv V. Dutov, chief of the Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "In the Interests of Improving Troop Living Conditions"]

[Text] The Communist Party and Soviet Government show constant concern for improving the well-being of the working people. Questions of further raising the standard of living of the people were one of the key problems reviewed at the 25th party congress and at subsequent Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the congress: "In both material and nonmaterial terms, Soviet people now live richer lives. For us this is without doubt the most important thing." The 25th party congress proclaimed a social program which envisioned a further increase in personal income, improvement in the working and everyday conditions of Soviet people, and progress in public health, education, and culture. This program has received concrete embodiment in the decisions of the December 1977 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 8th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th convocation. The new Constitution is deeply permeated with concern for the welfare and happiness of Soviet people and their comprehensive personal development.

Four-fifths of the country's national income is spent to satisfy the needs of the Soviet people and improve their well-being. This includes housing and sociocultural construction. Consistent steps are being taken to increase real personal income. In the last 15 years real income per capita has roughly doubled and the total volume of material benefits and services received by the people has increased 2.4 times.

In the Ninth Five-Year Plan the wages of more than 75 million people went up; this was three out of every four employees of state enterprises and institutions. Real personal income rose 24 percent in

that time. In 1977 the minimum wage for workers and employees in regions of the Far North and localities equivalent to them, in regions of the Far East, Siberia, the European North, Urals, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Volga-Vyatka region, and the Volga region were raised and at the same time the rates and salaries of average paid categories of employees engaged in the nonproduction sectors of the national economy went up. The new rates and salaries will be introduced gradually in other regions of the country. When they have been introduced, 31 million employees will receive wage increases averaging 18 percent. State expenditures for this purpose will be more than 7 billion rubles a year. On 1 November 1977 the minimum wage for all workers and employees of nonproduction sectors was raised prior to introduction of the new wage conditions nationwide. The average earnings of workers and employees in our country will rise to 159 rubles a month this year.

Real personal income is also rising as a result of the growth in benefits and privileges granted from public consumption funds. Increases in pensions, grants, and stipends during the Ninth Five-Year Plan raised the incomes of roughly 40 million people.

In 1973-74 pensions were raised for military pensioners, primarily war invalids and the families of deceased fighting men. For war invalids and the families of deceased soldiers privileges in paying for housing and municipal services, using means of transportation, and receiving medical care were broadened. War invalids of groups I and II were guaranteed special Zaporozhets cars free of charge. The parents of fighting men who died at the front were granted the right to pensions regardless of whether they were dependent on the serviceman.

To achieve fuller and more efficient use of the knowledge and experience of discharged servicemen among the troops and in the national economy, working pensioners who are retired officers receive a full pension if their pension and earnings do not exceed the sum of wages for the position and military rank on which the pension is computed and the percentage paid for years of service before discharge from the army. Pensioners retired from military service in regions of the Far North and localities equivalent to them who have stayed there to work also receive a pay supplement for service in remote regions.

In the first two years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan 22 million people received new, well-appointed apartments and more than 110 million square meters of housing space will be built in 1978. Our country, as is commonly known, has the lowest apartment rent and payment for municipal services in the world. Many billions of rubles are spent from public funds to educate the growing generation. Numerous privileges are given to working mothers. The conditions of their labor and material status will be further improved in the future. A broad program is being carried out in the fields of public health, education, and culture.

The achievements of our great Motherland in building communism are a result of the intensive labor of the Soviet people. The workers, kolkhoz farmers, and specialists who are realizing the plans outlined by the 25th CPSU Congress are sparing neither strength nor energy to make our Fatherland even more beautiful, more majestic.

The peaceful creative labor of our people is reliably guarded by the glorious Armed Forces of the USSR. The CPSU, Soviet Government, and the Soviet people have done and continue to do everything necessary to see that the army and navy have all essential means to perform their important mission, to guard the socialist Motherland vigilantly and reliably. Soviet fighting men today have the most modern weapons and combat equipment. Each year the USSR State Budget appropriates the money necessary to maintain high troop combat readiness and insure that the fighting men have good living conditions and recreational opportunities.

The all-Army meeting on improving troop living conditions held in Moscow late last year was new testimony to the enormous concern of the Communist Party and Soviet Government for the armed defenders of the Motherland. This meeting summarized the results of work done in this area and, on the basis of the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, laid out the best ways to organize living conditions for Soviet fighting men and in this way create the most favorable conditions for a further rise in the level of combat and political training and military discipline and steady improvement in combat readiness.

The characteristic features of the organizational structure of the present-day Armed Forces and the complexity of the missions that face them determine specific features of military living conditions whose organization is closely tied to the entire process of combat and political training for army and naval forces. Material support and domestic services have the most direct and immediate effect on the life of fighting men and their political-moral condition. Therefore, it is a key principle of the organization of military living conditions that they be directed to accomplishment of the primary mission: insuring high combat readiness in military units and subunits.

In various stages of military building the requirements made for troop living conditions and meeting the nonmaterial and cultural needs of Soviet fighting men have changed significantly. These requirements are rising greatly in connection with the scientific-technical revolution and the economic, sociopolitical, and cultural changes in the life of Soviet society.

It is well-known that the physical and psychological loads on the human being increase sharply when operating modern equipment. Therefore, our fighting men, especially pilots, submarine sailors and certain other specialists, must have good living conditions. The increased nonmaterial needs of our people and the high cultural level of Soviet citizens are exercising a significant influence on the

organization of everyday living conditions and sophisticated leisure activities for personnel of the army and navy. All these things are taken into account when organizing material and cultural-domestic support for servicemen.

Differences in working conditions, difficulty of the job, and qualifications result in differences in the rates of monetary support and supplementary payments. This not only makes it possible to improve the material and cultural-domestic conditions of personnel but also promotes a rise in the qualifications and combat skills of Soviet fighting men.

The difficulties of mastering and operating equipment and weapons and climatic, territorial, and other characteristics of serving in the military are taken into account when developing and introducing norms for food and clothing and establishing privileges in performing the service.

In recent years the amounts of monetary support for numerous categories of servicemen have been raised. The system of supplementary payments to stimulate growth in combat skills and take account of the characteristics of serving under difficult conditions has received further development. Special attention has been given to servicemen serving in remote areas of the USSR and in regions with difficult climatic conditions.

The measures being taken by the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government to raise real personal income affect army and navy civilian workers and employees directly. Their wages rose significantly during the Ninth Five-Year Plan and they will rise further in the present five-year plan.

Constant attention is given to improving the living conditions of soldiers, sergeants, seamen, and petty officers. The soldiers and sailors rations have been upgraded several times in recent years and additional types of food have been introduced in the diet of the serviceman. As a result Soviet fighting men have a diet that is higher in calories and more varied.

A new uniform has been introduced for servicemen. They now wear attractive and well-made clothing. The periods that many objects of clothing and footwear are worn have been shortened and their quality improved.

Almost every garrison today has good barracks and housing facilities, messhalls, and modern cultural-domestic complexes. The soldiers and seamen live in well-appointed quarters. They learn the art of victory in well-equipped classrooms and training centers and at training grounds and ranges.

Conditions for political indoctrination work and sophisticated leisure activities for servicemen have improved significantly. The Houses of

Officers, clubs, and libraries, which in many units now work on long-range plans for cultural development of the fighting men, set up interesting and varied leisure activities.

The material base of cultural and educational work is improving. Every battalion now has a field radio relay center, tape recorder, cameras, and other equipment for sophisticated use of leisure time. The Lenin rooms and soldiers tearooms have television sets, journals, newspapers, and table games.

To maintain the health of personnel capital is allocated for the development of public health institutions and building and improving the operation of sanitariums, rest homes, and tourist centers. In short, everything necessary to give personnel normal living conditions now exists in the units and on the ships. But the best results in cultural and domestic support of fighting men are achieved in places where the material and monetary means being allocated are used efficiently. This depends on the organizational work and intelligent initiative of commanders, political agencies, rear specialists, and the financial service.

There are many military units and ships that have achieved good results in improving troop living conditions not by additional allocation of means but rather by intelligent use of already existing means, searching for internal reserves and skillfully organizing socialist competition. For example, let us take the unit commanded by officer F. V'yugin. It is stationed in a marvelous military post, the soldiers live in fine barracks, and they have outstanding classrooms and sports facilities at their service. The Lenin rooms and domestic service rooms are very comfortable. And the main thing is that it is all according to regulations, nothing superfluous. A great deal of work has been done in the unit to expand and improve physical facilities for training.

The money given to units to maintain and repair housing and service buildings and weapons and equipment and for domestic services to personnel is used economically and exactly as designated. The commander deserves a great deal of credit for this. He always tries to achieve maximum results with minimum expenditures of effort and money. Before he organizes work in the unit Comrade V'yugin always weighs and considers the work, consults with his officers, then chooses the best alternative for solving the problem and follows it through firmly and persistently. Capt Intend Serv A. Artazey gives him a great deal of help in strengthening financial discipline and using state capital efficiently.

Questions of economy and thrift are always a focus of attention for the party and Komsomol organizations of the unit. Meetings of the party bureau have many reports by communists on the storage and maintenance of military equipment and weapons, conserving fuel, electricity, and gas, and lengthening vehicle driving time between overhauls.

Meaningful and well formulated graphic agitation materials are very important in teaching personnel of the unit thrift. There are special displays, posters, and appeals in the Lenin rooms, club, messhall, and other public areas calling on fighting men to be thrifty with public property.

The economic commission makes a real contribution to finding internal reserves. One of its areas of work, for example, is seeking more rational ways of using money. This has helped cut expenditures for secondary administrative needs and increase money available for fixing up domestic service rooms, maintaining living quarters, and making them comfortable.

But, unfortunately, things are not like this everywhere. In some units there are still serious problems in keeping up military posts and barracks and work buildings and in organizing living conditions for the servicemen. But expenditures for living conditions in these places are no lower, and sometimes they are actually higher, than in units which have achieved good results. The point is that the material and monetary means allocated are not always used wisely, and sometimes mismanagement occurs; in addition, insufficient attention is given to searching for internal reserves. Let us look at just a few examples. In the unit where officer V. Kamlyuk serves more than 800 rubles of the capital allocated for cultural-educational work was paid to an artistic workshop to make up three displays. Considering that graphic agitation materials are always supposed to be timely and for this reason are regularly updated, it was hardly necessary to make up displays costing almost 300 rubles apiece. Moreover, as experience demonstrates, most graphic agitation materials can be made within the unit.

In another military unit the capital allocated for repair of barracks furniture was used to buy polished boot stands, expensive trays for shaving, night tables, and the like. What kind of management is this? Putting expensive articles in the domestic services room hardly improves troop living conditions. If they had bought less expensive stands and trays a good deal of money could have been saved and then used for other urgent needs to improve the living conditions of personnel.

The usual explanation in such cases is that certain officials do not understand their role in the use of state capital correctly. Their main concern is only to see that there are no irregularities in spending money: the source of the expenditure has been correctly determined, that the documents for the purchase have been made out by the established procedure, and so on, but whether the particular expenditure will help improve troop living conditions concerns them very little. In short, the efficiency of the expenditures is not determined. The result of this is that a great deal of money is spent but the final results obtained are insignificant.

Another situation that we cannot accept as normal is the one where money allocated for domestic needs, maintaining and operating weapons and equipment, and conducting personnel combat training is spent for unlisted capital construction, to pay penalties for allowing means of transportation to be delayed during loading and unloading, to pay penalties for inefficient shipping, and so on.

An uncompromising and determined struggle against cases of mismanagement and inefficient expenditure of money will make it possible to redirect significant sums to improving troop living conditions. Where work is well organized a significant economic impact can be achieved not only by rational use of allocated capital but also by improving the use, storage, and timely repair of clothing and administrative articles, prolonging the service life of weapons and equipment between repair jobs, and conserving fuel, electricity, and water.

It should be observed that these reserves are by no means fully utilized today. As just one example, take one of the military posts of the Belorussian Military District. The military units stationed at this post did not have electricity meters and water gauges; their electricity and water use there was not monitored. Electric lights were often not turned off during the day in the living and work quarters and at fire posts. Water leakage was permitted in many barracks because of bad faucets in the washrooms. Very little explanatory work was done among personnel on the subject of thrift.

When speaking of internal reserves for improving troop living conditions, I would like to emphasize the great importance of the military unit's monetary fund, which offers them an opportunity not just to diversify the servicemen's diet but also to have additional capital to satisfy the cultural-domestic and economic needs of personnel.

Military construction workers can make and are making a major contribution to improving domestic facilities for the troops. They are building high-quality, attractive residential buildings and cultural-domestic installations, striving to raise labor productivity and reduce the cost of construction at the same time. However, overstating the volume and cost of construction-installation work and other serious violations of plan and financial discipline have not yet been completely eliminated in construction. They result in unproductive expenditures and illegal payment of bonuses, which consume a good deal of money, including appropriations for housing and cultural-domestic construction. Additionally, capital is spread over numerous construction sites, leading to violations of timetables for building installations and an increase in the amount of incomplete construction.

For example, a bath and laundry combine was planned for construction in the N garrison of the Central Asian Military District in 1976. This was supposed to be done in eight months. But district construction workers simply put up the walls and stopped work. The quality of work dropped off greatly, bricklaying procedures were violated, and

the bricks began to be used for other purposes. The project essentially became useless.

The CPSU and Soviet Government demand that the material and monetary resources allocated to support the army and navy be used economically to accomplish the paramount task in maintaining high combat readiness and the political-moral condition of army and navy forces. While meeting these demands military councils, commanders, political agencies, and party organizations do a great deal of work to raise the efficiency of use of state capital, bolster financial discipline, and find internal reserves for fuller satisfaction of needs associated with troop combat and political training and the material-domestic and cultural needs of personnel.

The army and navy financial services have been given major and important jobs in providing timely financial support to troops and monitoring the correct and efficient use of state money. But the role of the financial service in performing these missions reveals itself most fully only where every military financial worker studies the life and needs of the troops thoroughly, systematically improves and raises the level of economic analysis of expenditures being made, and shows high principles and exacting standards in work.

A great deal was done to improve troop living conditions and save material and financial resources during the all-Army competitive inspection for best troop (ship) and financial administration of a military unit, best medical establishment, and best trade-domestic enterprise.

During the period of preparation for the competitive inspection many military posts, barracks, and messhalls were put in model order and questions of military and domestic support were resolved. Uninterrupted financing of steps being taken among the troops to improve living conditions and satisfy cultural needs was very helpful in creating attractive conditions for personnel. The role of financial monitoring in guaranteeing legal and efficient use of monetary capital grew and economic work among the troops became much more active. Intelligent initiative was shown in improving troop living conditions with minimal expenditures of state capital and steps were taken to find internal reserves. The personnel of units and ships fixed up Lenin rooms, classrooms, and domestic service rooms and made various kinds of displays and graphic agitation materials.

The experience accumulated illustrates that we have great opportunities for improving troop living conditions. It is important to use this experience aggressively and move forward, achieve more. The all-Army meeting on improving troop living conditions worked out the most effective ways to achieve further improvement in the domestic arrangements of personnel under conditions where military-technical progress has fundamentally changed the structure of the army and navy and the combat procedures of the different services and combat arms and imposes new, higher demands on individuals with respect to psychological and

physical characteristics. The meeting also developed recommendations on further raising the efficiency of use of money allocated to improve troop living conditions and on searching for internal reserves.

Considerable attention was given to the question of insuring the preservation of socialist property. This is certainly understandable. A thrifty attitude toward military property and completely eliminating losses and disappearance of physical assets offers significant reserves for improving troop living conditions. A great deal here depends on correct selection, placement, and indoctrination of persons responsible for things and on commanders, their deputies, and service chiefs' carrying out all regulation duties related to checking on the presence and storage of military gear and money at all times and having internal auditing commissions check on the troop and financial economies.

The meeting recommended that army and navy personnel be more broadly involved in the struggle for economy and thrift, using socialist competition skillfully to this end.

The Letter of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and Central Committee of the Komsomol to party, Soviet, economic, trade union, and Komsomol organizations and the working people of the Soviet Union under the title "Development of Socialist Competition to Fulfill and Overfulfill the 1978 Plan and Intensify the Campaign to Raise the Efficiency of Production and Quality of Work" was received with enthusiasm in the army and navy. Our servicemen responded warmly to the appeal to preserve public wealth, use materials, fuel, and electricity efficiently, and strengthen economy measures. Soviet fighting men know that rational expenditure of material and monetary means is also very important for improving troop living conditions and organizing sophisticated leisure activities for personnel.

When organizing our work we must always remember the goal for which we are working to provide material and domestic support. This goal is maintaining high combat readiness in the broad sense. And everything that helps reach this goal must be used to the full, while what stands in the way should be resolutely eliminated. In this process we must be constantly improving the style of all our administrative work and achieving maximum effectiveness in it.

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INDOCTRINATION GUIDE ON IMPORTANCE OF CONSTANT VIGILANCE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 78 signed to press 11 May 78 pp 68-76

[Article by Col N. Voronov: "Vigilance Is Our Weapon — Material for Political Training Periods on the Subject 'Maintain Military and State Secrecy Strictly, Be a Vigilant Serviceman!'"]

[Text] Six hours are allocated for study of this subject in the political training system for soldiers, sergeants, seamen, and petty officers. It is advisable to distribute this time as follows: two hours for the lecture or talk, two hours for independent work by the students, and two hours for a seminar or discussion.

In the lecture it is suggested that the following questions be treated:

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the necessity of high vigilance by Soviet people and the fighting men of the army and navy;
2. The ideological intrigues and espionage and subversive activity of the enemies of socialism;
3. Be vigilant, maintain military and state secrecy strictly.

In a brief introduction the propagandist observes that under the direction of the Communist Party and showing enormous enthusiasm, our people are continuing the construction of a new society, a cause that began 60 years ago after the victory of Great October. While putting the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress into effect Soviet people are filled with confidence in the triumphs of the great cause of communism.

We need prolonged and stable peace to carry out the grandiose program of communist building. That is why our party and our people are working hard and consistently to realize the Program of Continued Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, for the Freedom and Independence of the World's Peoples, which was advanced by the 25th CPSU Congress as an organic continuation of the Program of Peace adopted by the 24th party congress. The peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union is firmly fixed in the Basic Law of our country, the USSR Constitution. It says that the USSR consistently follows

the Leninist policy of peace and calls for strengthening international security and for broad international cooperation. The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at guaranteeing favorable international conditions for building communism in the USSR, protecting the state interests of the Soviet Union, bolstering the position of world socialism, and supporting the struggle of the world's peoples for national liberation and social progress; it also aims at preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principle of peaceful co-existence among states with different social systems.

The deeply just foreign policy of the USSR meets stubborn resistance from the ruling classes of the imperialist countries. Influential imperialist circles in the West are using every means to obstruct the process of international detente. They call for building up military preparations and spur on the arms race, which is a serious threat to peace and international security. Reactionary circles organize ideological intrigues against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and slanderous anti-Soviet, anticommunist campaigns and try to intervene in the internal affairs of the socialist and other countries. The imperialist special services carry on extensive espionage and subversion.

All this obliges Soviet people and the fighting men of the army and navy to show unflagging vigilance regarding the tricks of the imperialists and enemies of peace and socialism. We must always be on guard, constantly ready for the armed defense of our Motherland.

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Necessity of High Vigilance by Soviet People and the Fighting Men of the Army and Navy.

Before beginning the first question the propagandist should explain what we mean by the concept of vigilance in general and political vigilance in particular.

Vigilance is a very broad and multifaceted concept, but at the same time it is quite concrete. In the precise definition as given by a dictionary of the Russian language, it means "a state of alertness, unflagging attention."

In a political sense vigilance involves the ability to recognize the treacherous plots of the enemies of communism and successfully counteracts their subversive activities and all kinds of ideological sabotage, resolutely expose slanderous fabrications and provocative rumors, and maintain state and military secrecy strictly.

For Soviet fighting men vigilance is one of the key moral-political and fighting qualities. The highest manifestation of vigilance for defenders of the Soviet Motherland is their constant readiness to enter armed struggle against the enemies of our socialist Fatherland and to inflict a crushing defeat on them. Vigilance and combat readiness are

closely interrelated and depend on one another. The higher the vigilance of Soviet fighting men is the higher troop combat readiness will be. Any slackening of vigilance leads to a lowering of the level of combat readiness.

Vigilance in socialist society is based on communist ideological conviction, a profound understanding of the political situation, love for one's Motherland and the community of socialist nations, and awareness of international duty. In our country political vigilance has acquired nationwide importance and become one of the clearest manifestations of Soviet patriotism as well as a citizen's duty and essential quality in every Soviet individual.

The vigilance of Soviet people takes its beginning from the revolutionary vigilance of the Russian proletariat and its Bolshevik party. This vigilance formed during the period of struggle against the autocracy and bourgeoisie, during preparations for and carrying out the Great October Socialist Revolution, and during the years of Civil War and early development of the Soviet State.

V. I. Lenin constantly reminded the victorious proletariat how important it is to raise vigilance and be ready to come to the defense of the socialist Motherland at any moment. The bourgeoisie, he taught, will never give up their domination voluntarily. They use every opportunity to regain lost positions and destroy or at least weaken socialism. And the imperialists are capable of resorting to any kind of risky, unprincipled adventure and use the most highly refined means and methods. "The bourgeoisie," Vladimir Il'ich pointed out, "are ready for all kinds of savagery and crime to defend their dying capitalist slavery" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works] Vol 23, p 166). Therefore he called on them never to forget the constant danger threatening us which will not cease as long as world imperialism exists. "The first commandment of our policy," the leader said, "the first lesson which all workers and peasants must grasp, is to be on guard" (Ibid., vol 44, p 296).

V. I. Lenin taught that to be on guard means to observe revolutionary vigilance strictly at every post, to keep track of imperialist tricks, to see the treachery of their methods and procedures, to recognize and disarm the enemy in time, to keep party, state, and military secrets, and to reliably guard the borders of the Soviet State and the material and spiritual treasures of our people. Vladimir Il'ich warned Soviet people that "The enemy is watching us closely at every step and will make many more attempts to cut us down using whatever means he can: force, deception, bribery, conspiracy, and the like" (Ibid., vol 39, p 407).

High revolutionary vigilance is a mighty weapon for us in the struggle against the enemies of socialism. It is one of the key conditions for successfully building socialism and for its armed defense. Vigilance,

V. I. Lenin said, should show itself in both international relations and in resolving domestic questions of socialist building, on the political, ideological, economic, and military fronts.

Vladimir Il'ich attached special importance to observing vigilance in the military arena. Many of his writings such as "The Socialist Fatherland Is In Danger!" "Everything for the Fight Against Denikin!" "Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Occasion of the Victory over Kolchak," "Beware of Spies!" and others are permeated with the idea that vigilance finds its highest manifestation in military affairs. Lenin emphasized in these writings that in the struggle against a treacherous enemy "there must be military discipline and military vigilance raised to the highest limits" (*Ibid.*, vol 39, p 55). Such high demands come primarily from the fact that military vigilance is closely tied to the tasks of defending the country against the aggressive actions of its enemies. Loss of vigilance in this area is dangerous because it inevitably leads to a lowering of troop combat readiness, has a negative effect on the course of battle, and may lead to the gravest results. That is why the founder of the Soviet State and the Armed Forces said that we must have military vigilance and strictness and not waver in adopting all necessary precautionary measures.

V. I. Lenin considered maintaining state and military secrecy to be a critical matter, one of the most important manifestations of vigilance. Vladimir Il'ich emphasized that, regardless of whether it is done with deliberate malice or not, divulging a state or military secret causes harm to the state and its Armed Forces and is always a socially dangerous act. Therefore, he demanded that the strictest steps be taken with persons who divulge military secrets, going so far as turning them over for trial by a military tribunal. V. I. Lenin felt that personnel involved with the security and defense of important state and military installations and serving guard duty and other details should show high vigilance.

V. I. Lenin's teachings on vigilance are exceptionally important and timely today as well because under current conditions the vigilance of Soviet people and army and navy fighting men is even more important. This is related to the danger of war caused by imperialism and attempts by imperialist agents to wage aggressive espionage and subversive activities against us.

Thanks to the efforts of the USSR, the other socialist countries, and progressive peace-loving forces worldwide important and positive changes have taken place in the world situation in recent years. A turn has been made away from the "cold war" toward alleviation of international tension and normalization of relations of states with different social systems. The principles of peaceful co-existence and mutually advantageous cooperation between countries are receiving broader and broader recognition.

The main focus of the efforts of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries today is to completely eliminate the danger of nuclear war, see that the positive changes in international relations become stable, deepen and solidify detente, make the process of furthering detente irreversible, and put an end to the arms race. Our country has recently taken new peaceful steps towards solving these problems by advancing a number of very important constructive proposals. Particularly important are the Soviet proposals formulated by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his report "Great October and the Progress of Humanity" and in his talk at the 18th Congress of the Komsomol. The Soviet Union's new peace initiatives have been greeted with understanding and approval by progressive world opinion.

In the capitalist world, however, the forces of reaction and aggression exist and operate vigorously against detente and disarmament. They are trying to restore the situation of mistrust and balancing on the brink of war in international relations, seek to expand existing aggressive military blocs and form new ones, and yearn for military superiority over the socialist countries. These forces maintain centers of tension, provoke military conflicts, and spur on the arms race, which is becoming more and more dangerous.

"The enemies of detente and disarmament," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress, "still have significant resources. They are operating aggressively in various directions using various forms. Although imperialism's opportunities for aggressive actions have been significantly curtailed, its nature remains unchanged. Therefore, the peace-loving forces must show great vigilance" ("Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 24).

The aggressive NATO bloc is especially dangerous to the cause of peace. This is the principal military-political bloc of the Western powers and is aimed against the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and the democratic and national liberation movements. Military spending in the NATO countries is rising year after year. In 1949 when the bloc was formed the direct military expenditures of the member countries were 18.4 billion dollars; in 1975 they were 149 billion, in 1976 156 billion, and in 1977 they reached 165 billion dollars. Even higher appropriations are planned for coming years.

The lion's share of the arms race falls to the United States. The curve of U. S. military spending is rising at an ever-faster rate. In 1945 the U. S. military budget was just 12 billion dollars; in 1975 it had already reached 100 billion, and in the 1976-77 fiscal year the military budget was 113 billion dollars. For the current fiscal year 116.8 billion dollars has been appropriated for military expenditures, and the White House is planning to raise this figure

to a new record sum of 128.4 billion dollars for the 1979 fiscal year, which begins on 1 October 1978. If the military programs "hidden" in the "peaceful" budget sub-headings are included the total is 132 billion. U. S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown has stated that U. S. military expenditures will increase steadily in the coming years, reaching 172.7 billion dollars in the 1983 fiscal year. In its military expenditures the United States is emphasizing the development and deployment of new nuclear missile systems: winged missiles, super-powerful Trident atomic submarines equipped with ballistic missiles, new intercontinental mobile-based MX missiles, and the like.

Building the neutron bomb, a barbaric new means of killing masses of people, and supplying to NATO forces in Western Europe occupies a special place in Pentagon plans. Realization of these dangerous intentions would seriously complicate the situation in Europe and throughout the world by bringing about a new qualitative leap in the arms race and increasing the danger of nuclear war. The Soviet Union firmly opposes this prospect. Therefore, it has suggested to the Western countries that an agreement be concluded to jointly renounce the production of neutron bombs. However, the United States and certain groups in the other NATO countries show no readiness to go along with our proposal. Attempting to break up the wave of furious protest by hundreds of millions of people in the world against neutron death, Washington recently decided to "postpone production" of the neutron bomb. Judging by President J. Carter's statement, however, this decision in no sense reflects a renunciation of preparations for the production and deployment of neutron bombs. On the contrary, it allows the United States to return to the question of producing them at any time. In the meantime this barbaric weapon is being improved by the Pentagon.

If the United States begins producing the neutron bomb, the USSR will be forced to respond to this challenge in order to insure the security of the Soviet people and their friends and allies. "The economy, science, and engineering of our country," Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, said in his report entitled "Sixty Years Guarding the Achievements of Great October," "are capable of supporting the development and building of any weapon which our enemies might try to fall back on. At the same time, whereas the Soviet Union has substantial capabilities for building modern military equipment, it has announced many times that it does not want to follow the path of competition in the military-technical field. This is an extremely dangerous path." As was emphasized in the Greeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers to the fighting men of the valiant Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the essence of our military policy is to give everything for an effective defense; nothing is higher than this. The Soviet Union has never armed itself for the sake of arms; it never has been and never will be a defender of the arms race. Everything that Soviet people are doing in the military field is done to secure

themselves and their socialist friends against attack, to prevent aggression.

In order to justify the unrestrained arms race and conceal the true sources of their aggressive policy, the imperialists and their propaganda apparatus try to distort the sense of the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the essential character of our profoundly defensive activities. They launch slanderous fabrications about a "Soviet threat" that supposedly hangs over the Western countries. Speaking at the 23rd Congress of the Komsomol, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said the following on this subject: "In recent times the enemies of detente and disarmament in the NATO countries, all these politician-generals and militant politicians, have raised and are continuing a propaganda hullabaloo, spreading fabrications about a supposed menacing military superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries over the NATO bloc in Europe, about some aggressive intentions in Europe which they ascribe to the Soviet Union, and so on. Of course, this is all nonsense. But it is not harmless nonsense; it is pernicious, because it serves as a rationale and cover for truly dangerous and potentially aggressive actions: winding the arms race up to a new level, building up armed forces, and saturating the international atmosphere with the poisonous vapors of fear, suspicion, and hostility."

The current international situation is also made more complicated by the fact that the peace-loving forces must wage their struggle for detente on two fronts, both against the reactionary imperialist forces and against the Maoist leadership of China, which is offering stubborn resistance to the positive changes taking place in current international relations. The present Peking leaders operate openly as a force hostile to the cause of peace. By following their policy directed against the Soviet Union and most of the other socialist countries, Peking forms a bloc with the most blatant reactionaries and militarists. As was observed at the 25th CPSU Congress, the policy of the current Chinese leaders has in reality become an important reserve for imperialism in its struggle against socialism. The Peking leaders wage malicious propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union, call for the creation of a united anti-Soviet front, try to exacerbate the international situation by all means and kindle hostility and hatred among the world's peoples, stubbornly resist all peaceful initiatives by the socialist countries, oppose disarmament and detente, openly follow a policy of fanning the flames of conflict, and prepare actively for war.

"It is entirely understandable that the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community cannot ignore the military preparations and plots of the aggressive forces, no matter where they are occurring," said USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov. "Our people have paid a very high price for peace, and for us there is no more important task than guaranteeing the security of our Motherland

and the achievements of socialism." The Communist Party and Soviet Government combine the struggle for peace and international security with constant vigilance in relation to the intrigues of the reactionary forces of imperialism and building up the defensive might of the country and its Armed Forces by every means. Love of peace and readiness to rebuff an aggressor are merged into one in CPSU policy. This is its fundamental line, ratified by the 25th CPSU Congress which stipulated that the most important and responsible mission of the Armed Forces is to guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, act as the bulwark of world peace. This principle stated by the Congress has been fixed in the new USSR Constitution. Article 31 reads: "The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people is to reliably defend the socialist Fatherland, to be in constant combat readiness and guarantee the immediate repulsion of any aggressor."

The high vigilance of personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces today is one of the chief conditions for thwarting the aggressive plans of the enemies of peace and decisively smashing any aggressor at the proper time. It is one of the key components of army and navy combat readiness. The combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces is composed of the combat readiness of each soldier and seaman, each squad, team, and crew, and each subunit, unit, and ship. High combat readiness means a fighting man is capable of coming to the defense of the Soviet Motherland and the countries of the socialist community at any moment and defending them courageously, skillfully, with dignity and honor, sparing neither blood nor life itself to achieve complete victory over all enemies.

Combat readiness is determined by the degree of preparation of each serviceman to wage combat actions. It depends on his political consciousness, military skills, knowledge of functional duties, and ability to make maximum use of the potential of weapons and combat equipment. Moreover, it depends on strict observance of all the requirements of the oath, military regulations, and manuals and the orders of commanders and superiors. By striving for outstanding progress in combat and political training, working hard to master military skills and modern military equipment, and conscientiously performing his service duties each fighting man makes his own contribution to the combat readiness of the subunit, unit or ship, and Armed Forces as a whole.

2. The Ideological Intrigues and Espionage and Subversive Activity of the Enemies of Socialism

It is necessary to raise the vigilance of Soviet people and the fighting men of the army and navy today because the United States and its partners in the aggressive blocs, in addition to their open preparations for war, are placing increasing stock in the organization of widespread and diverse subversive actions against the socialist states. In the secret war against the USSR they use espionage, political, economic, and military intelligence, and extensive ideological

sabotage. When studying this subject, therefore, the question of the subversive activity of imperialism deserves special attention.

It should be observed that the monopoly bourgeoisie, in their treacherous plans to shake the new social order from within or at least make its development more difficult, assign a special role to ideological sabotage against the USSR and the other socialist countries.

The struggle between the two ideologies, socialism and capitalism, has been going on for a long time. However, imperialism has never put so much effort and money into the ideological battle against socialism as it is putting today and never before has the ideological struggle assumed such scope. In our time it has become one of the most critical fronts of the class struggle between the two social systems. Imperialism has raised the struggle in the ideological field to the level of "psychological warfare" and it uses this warfare as a way to build up international tension, kindle mistrust and hostility among peoples, and encourage military rivalry as a means of intervening in the domestic affairs of other countries.

"The positive changes in world politics and detente create favorable opportunities for broad dissemination of the ideas of socialism," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev observed at the 25th CPSU Congress. "But on the other hand, the ideological struggle between the two systems is becoming more active and imperialist propaganda today is more refined.

"There is no place for neutralism or compromises in the struggle between two ways of looking at the world. This requires high political vigilance, vigorous, practical, and convincing propaganda work, and a timely rebuff to hostile acts of ideological sabotage" ("Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" op. cit., p 74).

The imperialist reactionaries are mobilizing all possible means of ideological influence on the masses in the attempt to find faults with communism and its noble ideals and defend capitalism. The principal ideological-political weapon of imperialism is anticomunism which basically consists of slander against the socialist system and distortion of the policies and goals of the communist parties and teachings of Marxism-Leninism.

The apologists of imperialism try to counter the enormous attraction of the ideas of socialism with highly sophisticated slander against our system. The propaganda apparatus and special services of imperialism shamelessly attempt to distort the goals and very essence of the policy of the CPSU and Soviet Government, paint a dark picture of Soviet reality, and carry on other subversive actions in the ideological field which have rightly come to be called ideological sabotage. They try to erode and shake the communist conviction of Soviet people and impose views and morals alien to socialism on them; ultimately they are trying to achieve political and social changes in Soviet society that are advantageous to imperialism.

The ideologists of anticomunism direct their poisonous weapons primarily at Soviet young people, counting on their lower level of ideological maturity, hardening by experience, and stability. They would like to create doubts in the minds of the young generation concerning the true value of communist ideals, to undermine their belief in the realism of the plans set forth by the 25th CPSU Congress, to confuse their consciousness, and to develop apolitical attitudes and indifference to the goals of building a new society and devotion to the bourgeois West. The organizers of ideological sabotage do not hide the fact that for them it is especially important to weaken the morale of Soviet fighting men and they cynically say that, in case of war, all steps must be taken to prevent us from having heroes like Aleksandr Matrosov and Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya.

To achieve their goals the monopolies spare no expense for an enormous foreign propaganda apparatus and use the powerful technical mass information media: radio, television, film, and the press. The strategists of "psychological warfare" give radio propaganda a special role in subversive activity. Dozens of bourgeois radio stations broadcast around the clock to the USSR alone, producing a total of about 2,000 hours of radio programs a week. In addition to the American Voice of America and the English BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, Voice of Israel, Radio Vatican, Voice of the Gospel, and many others send regular antisocialist broadcasts of hostile content to the socialist countries. Voice of America, the main weapon in the American propaganda arsenal, broadcasts 168 hours a day in the Russian language and the languages of the other USSR peoples. The CIA radio centers Liberty and Free Europe, located in the FRG and existing on American subsidies, play an especially malicious and openly subversive role. They are a true propaganda and espionage combine. They employ 1,800 people. These centers broadcast 980 hours a week in 22 languages, including 16 languages of USSR peoples. In 1977 the U. S. Congress appropriated 75 million dollars to finance these subversive radio stations, and in 1979 expenditures for their upkeep will increase to 79 million dollars.

The anticomunists try to depict the propaganda information broadcast by radio and other media as objective fact, dish out lies and slander in controlled portions, and mix blatant falsehoods with elements of truth which, in the opinion of the Western ideological services, makes the information more "plausible."

Our enemies are actively taking advantage of the channels of scientific, cultural and tourist exchange, broadened in conformity with the Helsinki agreements, for subversive activities. The hostile ideological centers enlist some tourists, members of various delegations, and employees of exhibitions heading for the USSR to illegally carry material glorifying the capitalist way of life into the USSR and to make contacts with certain morally unstable and unscrupulous individuals around whom anti-Soviet propaganda furors are later raised. In 1976 alone, more than 50 foreign tourists were expelled from the Soviet Union for such activities.

Ideological sabotage is carried on by organizing very broad and prominent anti-Soviet and generally anticommunist campaigns. Thus, imperialist propaganda recently has been waging an unbridled, hypocritical campaign "in defense of human rights." It is an impudent intervention in the domestic affairs of the socialist countries and an attempt to discredit socialism, to hinder the growth of its influence on the minds of people, and at the same time to draw the attention of world public opinion away from the shameful way that civil rights are flaunted and democratic liberties restricted in the capitalist countries.

At the same time bourgeois propaganda has made a hullabaloo about the so-called "dissidents." This is a pathetic little group of schismatics, alien to Soviet society, who exist only thanks to Western financial assistance. They have taken up the path of anti-Soviet activity, break the law, provide the West with slanderous information, spread false rumors, and try to organize various types of antisocial action. Soviet people correctly see the group of "dissidents" as enemies of socialism, people who are going against their own Motherland, accomplices and sometimes even agents of imperialism.

These are just a few of the ways and means of the "psychological war" which the imperialists are waging against our country and the countries of the socialist communities.

The propagandists should stress that our political vigilance is a tested and reliable weapon in the fight against bourgeois ideology. It is based on communist conviction, which helps recognize and expose the tricks of ideological enemies and counter the bourgeois influence. Marxist-Leninist conditioning is a kind of ideological immunity to everything antisocialist, alien, and hostile. Therefore, every serviceman must be constantly concerned to strengthen his ideological conditioning, develop implacable class hostility to the tricks of the enemies of socialism and their accomplices, and firmly rebuff those who consciously distort our reality. "Every young Leninist," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in his talk at the 23rd Komsomol Congress, "must be an active political fighter capable of spreading party policy in practice and waging an implacable struggle against hostile ideology."

Next the propagandist explains that our class enemy makes broad use of espionage in subversive actions against the USSR, the fraternal socialist countries, and their armed forces. Imperialist circles in the United States, for example, have created a gigantic network of intelligence services and organizations that run to more than 200,000 persons, according to reports in the foreign press. Their annual budget is billions of dollars. The U. S. CIA has gained particular notoriety. According to official figures it employs 16,500 people. Comrade Fidel Castro accurately called the CIA the most criminal organization in the world. This sinister "cloak and dagger" empire organizes coups d'etat and murders of progressive political figures, finds out the plans of others, and sows provocative rumors. Its tentacles reach the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

To collect secret information, some of it concerning military affairs, our enemies enlist personnel of their diplomatic corps. They often send specially trained persons to the Soviet Union posing as tourists, journalists, businessmen, and the like. The scientific, technical, cultural, sports, and other relations that have expanded in recent years are used extensively for intelligence purposes.

The imperialists make broad use of the latest technical devices for intelligence purposes. This includes special Earth satellites which are used to photograph various objects. Powerful listening radio stations have been set up around the Soviet Union. Enemy radar sets observe USSR territory continuously. Ships, airplanes, and helicopters are used for intelligence purposes. The agents of imperialist intelligence have many different devices for observation and photographing, listening, and recording. For example, binoculars, every possible kind of telescope, and stereotubes with miniature infrared instruments have been built and can be used to observe and photograph objects day or night from distances of 10 kilometers and more. There are miniature cameras capable of taking pictures through buttonholes. They have portable electronic listening and recording devices that are so small they can be hidden in women's hairdos, purses, the rims of eyeglasses, cigarette cases, lighters, bracelets, cuff-links, and buttons. Some devices can hear and record a conversation taking place in a closed room if it has window glass. The slight vibration of the glass transmits the sentences spoken to the outside where they are recorded by sensitive devices at a distance of several hundred meters.

It is important to stress that the Soviet Armed Forces have always been and remain one of the primary targets of the espionage and subversive activities of the forces hostile to socialism. Our fighting men must always remember this and always remain ready to forestall and thwart the treacherous plans of our enemies and render their agents harmless.

3. Be Vigilant, Maintain Military and State Secrecy Strictly

In handling this question the propagandist must consider the special features of duty in the different services of the Armed Forces and combat arms and the specific missions performed by fighting men in different specializations. Along with a presentation of the general principles of observing vigilance servicemen should receive a more detailed explanation of the special requirements for maintaining vigilance that are made of men of the particular subunit, unit, or ship. It is also important to discuss the special features of vigilance by Soviet fighting men who serve on the country's frontier or go on distant sea cruises. The propagandist should illustrate his talk with local examples.

The presentation of this question can begin with a reminder that each serviceman entering the ranks of the Armed Forces takes the military oath. He solemnly swears to be vigilant, to maintain state and military secrecy strictly, and to be ready at all times when ordered by

the Soviet Government to come to the defense of his Motherland. This point of the sacred oath expresses the will of the people and the Communist Party. It permeates our regulations, all military life and work, and the everyday life of personnel; it is an immutable law for all servicemen.

To be on guard in our day for fighting men of the army and navy means to remain constantly in a state of high readiness to repulse an attack by any aggressor and to resolutely crush him. The high demands for vigilance and combat readiness in the Soviet Armed Forces made it necessary to introduce the system of combat duty. Combat duty is performance of a particularly important combat mission. Combat duty is performed by the Strategic Missile Forces and National Air Defense Force. The troops who stand combat duty are in fact the first echelon of our army, expected to enter battle against the enemy at any moment if he dares to attack our Motherland.

Precise organization of guard and watch duty is an essential condition for maintaining vigilance and constant combat readiness in army and navy forces. Even in peacetime guard duty to secure and defend installations is considered performance of a combat mission. It demands that personnel observe all the principles of the Manual on Garrison and Guard Duty exactly and show high vigilance, unbending determination, and initiative. As the popular saying puts it, "Remember, sentry, that your post is the forward edge and at your post be doubly vigilant, as if it were war."

Many examples could be given of vigilant performance of guard duty by fighting men. For example, Sr Sgt A. Ragozin, PFC A. Kudra, and Pvt S. Grigorenko showed great vigilance, courage, and steadfastness. Here is what happened. Private Grigorenko was at his post one night, guarding an important military installation. PFC Kudra was working on an assignment from the commander in one of the neighboring rooms. Grigorenko was informed of this. Suddenly the sentry faced two armed bandits. One of them, carrying an axe, dashed toward the room where Kudra was working. The other fired a sawed-off double-barreled gun at the sentry, but missed. The hot lead only singed Grigorenko's right temple and dug into the wall. Grigorenko fired a round from his automatic weapon. The gunman hid in the hallway. The second bandit struck Kudra with the axe but, hearing the shooting, ran back to the sentry and threw the axe at him hard. Grigorenko covered his body with his weapon as one does in hand-to-hand fighting. The axe slipped along the metal and cut into the sentry's right hand. Overcoming the pain Grigorenko took the gun in his left hand and, holding it on the bandit, forced him to turn face to the wall. At the same time the gravely wounded Kudra, summoning up his remaining strength, made it to a telephone, reported the attack to the guardroom, and fell unconscious. The rescue group commanded by guard commander Aleksandr Ragozin came quickly and captured the second bandit. Thus, in peacetime the Far Eastern fighting men performed a feat equal to those of wartime days. They were commended by the USSR Ministry of Defense for courage and steadfastness.

High vigilance is inconceivable without strong military discipline, firm regulation order, and precise performance of internal service in every subunit and unit. The men appointed to the daily detail must not retreat from the regulations a single step. "The slightest legal offense, the slightest violation of Soviet ways," V. I. Lenin taught, "is an opening which the enemies of the working people will immediately use" ("Poln. Sобр. Soch." vol 39, p 156). For example, it is very important for duty officers at check points and their assistants to perform their duties in such a way that not a single outsider penetrates into the unit area without the appropriate pass.

Well organized garrison, guard, and internal duty guarantee reliable protection of headquarters and command posts, airfields, military depots and storehouses, garages, and motor pools, barracks, and other installations, fire safety, and preservation of physical assets and preclude the possibility of theft of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Strict observance of discipline, organization, regulation order, and rules closes all loopholes for spies, saboteurs, and other enemies of the socialist state.

One of the chief indexes of the vigilance of servicemen is strictly maintaining state and military secrecy.

State secrets are pieces of information important to the state that are guarded by the state and are not supposed to be divulged.

Military secrets comprise information on the organization of the Armed Forces and their size, location, fighting effectiveness, weapons, equipment, combat training, moral-political state, and material and financial support. Information on the security of the state border, military inventions and modifications, the location of military installations such as storehouses and airfields, and the condition of communications and transportation are also military secrets. In short, military secrets include all information which in some degree could give an enemy an idea of the fighting effectiveness, combat readiness, and location of our troops. All this should be solidly grasped and fighting men should be taught to protect military and state secrets at all costs.

Soviet fighting men have always been able to be vigilant and keep state and military secrets. They prefer death to giving secrets to the enemy. Many examples from the period of the Great Patriotic War demonstrates this. Soldier Yuriy Smirnov and Seaman Yevgeniy Nikonov, for example, performed immortal feats. During a battle Guards Pvt. Yuriy Smirnov, part of a tank assault party, was gravely wounded and captured by the fascists. Attempting to learn the direction of the tank strike and the number of Soviet troops, the Nazis tortured Smirnov cruelly. An ardent patriot of his Motherland, Yuriy Smirnov courageously withstood all tortures and would not give the enemy this secret information. When our forces drove the Nazis back from the positions they occupied, the body of Yuriy Smirnov was discovered in one of the bunkers, nailed to the wall. There too they found Smirnov's

Komsomol membership card and the record of the interrogation conducted by the Nazi officers. After each question the record contained an entry, "The prisoner said nothing." Navyman Yevgeniy Nikonov did the same. For their heroic feats Guardsman and Komsomol member Yuriy Smirnov and Seaman Yevgeniy Nikonov, two fighting men who upheld the secrets of our Motherland were posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet State cannot permit its secrets to be revealed, because this would weaken its power. Therefore it is entirely understandable that divulging state and military secrets is considered a grave crime against the Soviet people and socialist Motherland and is punishable with the full strictness of Soviet law. According to Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding articles of the criminal codes of the other Union republics, deliberately giving secret information to foreign states is considered treason against the Motherland and may be punished by loss of freedom for a period of 10-15 years or even by execution. Where the elements of treason against the Motherland are absent, persons guilty of divulging secret information are sentenced to various terms of incarceration in conformity with Article 23 of the Law on Criminal Responsibility for Military Crimes. If there are mitigating circumstances, the steps established by the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces may be applied to the guilty persons.

People sometimes ask, "What kind of secrets can a soldier know?" This is mistaken and very harmful reasoning. Any Soviet fighting man, no matter what post he may occupy, knows a great deal: the location of his unit, the size of the subunit, its organization, and its weapons. He knows unit security procedures, what questions of combat training are studied at training periods, and many other things that are military secrets. This means that military secrets are not kept only in safes. To one extent or another they are entrusted to every fighting man, and they must be kept.

The imperialist intelligence agencies count primarily on morally unstable people, drunkards, gossips, braggarts, and scatterbrains to collect the information that interests them. The heads of the bourgeois intelligence services teach their agents to look for gossips and braggarts and be able to listen to their talk for hours. The gossip is always a find for the spy. People who cannot hold their tongue involuntarily become accomplices to the enemy. The vigilant fighting man will never talk about service subjects where he is not supposed to. He invariably follows the rule of life that says, "Do not always say what you know, but always know what you say."

Vigilance should not be forgotten when using the telephone. Agents of the foreign intelligence services have special devices with which they can listen in on official conversations even without connecting into the communication line. Under no circumstances should radio operators violate the rules of radio communication; they must always

use call signs and code tables and never transmit in open text. The operators at radar subunits must observe the rules of radio camouflage envisioned by instructions on the operation of radio and radar stations strictly.

A person who handles secret materials carelessly or is negligent in taking care of personal documents may also cause great damage to the state. Enemy agents make broad use of forged documents. However, in view of their unreliability, spies always try to obtain authentic documents: the official records booklet and identification cards of servicemen, party and Komsomol membership cards, trip authorizations, leave orders, passes, and the like. Imperialist agents often get secret information from the letters of servicemen. A foreign agent is interested in the actual envelope, on which the address of the military unit is written.

From all this it follows that constant vigilance at work and in free time is essential for every Soviet fighting man and must become an immutable law in his life and activities. The interests of the security of the Soviet Union in all the countries of the socialist community demand this of us.

Speaking recently to the personnel of a missile unit in the Novosibirsk region, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and chairman of the USSR Council on Defense Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "The party and people are proud of the Soviet Armed Forces. I want to say that I am confident that you will continue to be in constant combat readiness, guaranteeing the immediate repulsion of any aggressor, and that you will honorably fulfill your sacred duty to the people, to our great Motherland."

Such high praise of the military labor of the armed defenders of our Motherland inspires them to new successes in combat training and in work. Filled with pride at the great trust they have been given, Soviet fighting men, patriots and internationalists, vigilantly guard the constructive labor of the Soviet people and defend peace on earth.

During the period of independent preparation for the seminar or discussion it should be recommended that the fighting men study V. I. Lenin's work "Beware of Spies!" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." vol 38, p 399), "Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" (Politizdat, 1976, pp 16-27, 83, 154), D. F. Ustinov's report "Sixty Years Guarding the Achievements of Great October" (PRAVDA 23 Feb 1978), and chapter 12 of the textbook "Na Strazhe Rodiny" [Guarding the Motherland] (Voyenizdat, 1974).

During discussion of this topic at the seminar or during the discussion period the following questions may be raised:

1. What is vigilance and why is it essential to the armed defenders of our Motherland? What did V. I. Lenin teach Soviet fighting men about vigilance and combat readiness?

2. Why is an increase in vigilance necessary under contemporary conditions? What tasks were posed by the 25th CPSU Congress in this area?
3. What does it mean to maintain military and state secrecy strictly?
4. What forms does the espionage and subversive activity of the enemies of socialism take and how can we fight it? Exactly what is required of the fighting men of our subunit to raise vigilance?

At the seminar a report entitled "The 25th CPSU Congress Concerning the Increased Importance of Vigilance Under Contemporary Conditions" may be presented.

When the subject is taught to sergeants and petty officers some time should be given to their role in indoctrinating subordinates in a spirit of high vigilance.

For graphic aids it is advisable to use the album "Vigilance Is Our Weapon" (Voyenizdat, 1977) and sheets 4, 9, and 19 of the graphic aids album "The 25th CPSU Congress on Strengthening the Defense of the USSR" (Voyenizdat, 1976).

Before and during study of this subject it is useful to show the documentary films "Always Be On Guard," "The Spider's Web," and "The Pentagon" and the film strips "The Teachings of V. I. Lenin for Soviet Fighting Men on Vigilance and Constant Combat Readiness," "The 25th CPSU Congress on the Aggressive Nature of Imperialism and the Need to Maintain High Vigilance and Constant Combat Readiness in the USSR Armed Forces," "Vigilance Is Our Weapon," and "Ideological Sabotage — The Treacherous Weapon of Imperialism."

Recommended Reading for Propagandists

1. Lenin, V. I., "The Socialist Fatherland Is In Danger!" "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 35, pp 357-358.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Beware of Spies!" Ibid., Vol 38, p 399.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Occasion of the Victory over Kolchak," Ibid., Vol 39, pp 151-159.
4. Lenin, V. I., "The Domestic and Foreign Policy of the Republic," Ibid., Vol 44, p 300.
5. Brezhnev, L. I. "Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Forthcoming Party Tasks in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS," Politizdat, 1976, pp 5-34, 75-76, 83, 154.
6. Brezhnev, L. I., "O Konstitutsii SSR. Doklady i vystupleniya" [The USSR Constitution. Reports and Statements], Politizdat, 1977.

7. Brezhnev, L. I., "Velikiy Oktyabr' i Progress Chelovechestva" [Great October and the Progress of Humanity], Politizdat, 1977.
8. "The Speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 18th Congress of the Komsomol" PRAVDA 26 April 1978.
9. Ustinov, D. F., "Sixty Years Guarding the Achievements of Great October," PRAVDA 23 February 1978.

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GREATER ATTENTIVENESS, PRECISION IN RADAR TRAINING URGED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 78 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col G. Suleymanyanyan: "Habit Can Fail"]

[Text] Among the radar troops there is the firm rule that any primary information on an air "enemy" should be transmitted without delay, from the first blip for processing to the superior command point. At the same time it also happens that in individual crews, in the course of tactical exercises and training, a great deal of time is lost on the preliminary analysis of received data. As a result this prolongs the time for passing on the radar information and thus leads to a decline in the efficiency of carrying out a combat training mission.

This day the men of the crew of the command post headed by Capt I. Nosov had worked intensely. The training was coming to an end. But then the command post received a message that a low-flying target had been detected. What should the leader of the crew do in such a situation? Of course, the first thing was to pass on the received information to the superior command post. And only after this to examine the situation, to analyze and compare the routes of one's own aircraft with the aim of the suddenly appearing "enemy." However here this rule was neglected. And they were slow in investigating the target which was flying along the lower edge of the detection zone.

What was the reason for this? Why had the crew not performed in the best manner? In the analysis of the training session it was established that one of the specialists had thought the first blip was a "dummy" target. And Officer Nosov had decided first to investigate the situation before passing on the data. The slowness in the actions of the specialists, and above all the leader of the crew, and their ignoring of the corresponding requirements told negatively on the quality of carrying out the combat training mission.

Although such instances are rare, they must be brought up because in a combat situation such failings are fraught with serious consequences. In each instance the primary radar information should be given a "green light" for immediate transmission to the appropriate command post. If the specialist has some doubt on the reliability of the data, still he must first give the coordinates of the target to the required level of command and only after this more carefully analyze the air situation.

Unfortunately, some radar officers are unable to overcome their habit which can fail. They feel that in all probability the target is a "dummy" and hence they need not hurry in transmitting the information on it. This also happens because individual leaders of the crews do not always carefully monitor the actions of their subordinates, above all in complicated air situations.

One of the crews successfully carried out the given mission, and tracked a large number of low-altitude and maneuvering targets. Then there was a pause in the work. But soon thereafter the command was given to locate targets. The operators were also up to things and the first acquisitions were immediately passed on. However they did not immediately reach the command post. As it was later ascertained the plotting board operator at the command post had taken off his headset during the pause. And only after an order did he go back to work.

Here negligence on the part of the plotting board operator is apparent. A large portion of the blame also rests on the crew leader. He should have immediately monitored the receipt of the first blip from the operator, the time of plotting on the plotting board, and verified when it had been transmitted to the superior command post.

This is precisely what the experienced radar officers do. As an example, take Sr Lt L. Solodkov. During training a remote indicator is also connected to his work area along with the radar. From the first scan he carefully follows the air situation and monitors how quickly and accurately the men of the crew process the target data. Let us assume that one of the specialists has been slow in giving the first fix. The leader, using the loudspeaker system, immediately corrects the situation.

With the appearance of the first blip, the officer reports the obtained information to the command post. He has a firm rule: not only to pass on the first data on the target, but also to make certain that they are promptly received by the superior command post. There are many methods of control. For instance take the situation which is depicted on the control plotting board. Here everything is visible: when the first fix was made, how skillfully and precisely the tracking is being carried out, and much else.

The leader can also use other methods of control (back-up), for example, request by phone from the superior command post how it is receiving the first fixes and other data on the training targets. Take the following example. A planned training session is underway with a command post crew.

Maximum use must be made of this for developing a spirit of competitiveness among the men in the rapid and most importantly precise giving of information. What is required for this at the command post? In receiving the first fixes, it is essential to request when the target was detected and by what crew, and how the reliability of the giving of its characteristics was assessed. This makes it possible to objectively evaluate the actions of the specialists. It is a good thing when after the training such analysis is reduced to a table for each training target.

For the prompt giving of the first target fix it is essential to also see to it that each operator knows the mission given him, the capabilities of his radar, and the particular features of detecting the air enemy considering the terrain of the given position. For this purpose in the subunit headed by Maj V. Yatsik, special unannounced quizzes are held periodically with the operators to test their knowledge of the detection zones. These quizzes are carried out in approximately the following manner. On the indicator the azimuth is indicated, the altitude is given, and immediately the specialist should determine at what point of the screen the appearance of the first fix is possible, where there are unviewed areas, and returns from local features in the given sector. Or another time the operator tells the possible directions for the flight of an air "enemy," and shows on the indicator screen where the corresponding blips can appear, he indicates the place for giving the first fix, and so forth.

These quizzes improve the skills of the operator, and teach him attentiveness and the ability to develop optimum working methods. After such training the operator knows precisely his zone for giving the first fixes (the detection zone).

Experienced commanders in training their subordinates rationally combine control over the work of the radar operators with the granting of independence to them in their actions. But in giving the first data on air targets, control is essential without fail, no matter what experience a soldier possesses. Why? In a complex situation, he is engulfed in the high pace of work. He endeavors to respond (out of the best motives) to all the targets, and to "maintain" the quality of data processing. As a result he may overlook a certain detail or make a mistake. And here unflagging control over the work of the specialists is required on the part of the chief of the radar station and the leader of the command post crew.

Of course, true control has nothing in common with interfering in the work of subordinates. The continuous explanation of the same truth or what should be done and how can develop routine in certain people. "Why hurry," a soldier may feel, "it is better to wait for a command 'from above'."

The practice of combat training convinces one that in order for a specialist to surmount the psychological barrier in giving the first target fix, it is essential first of all to learn how to analyze the air situation efficiently, profoundly and in detail, to know perfectly one's functional duties and to strictly observe the rules of combat work.

FACTORS INFLUENCING TRAINING OF OFFICER CANDIDATES REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 78 p 4

[Article by Maj Gen N. Badeykin: "To Value Time"]

[Text] The February issue of AZIMUT published an article from Capt A. Meshkov entitled "Do It Today." This raised the issue of the factors which impede certain officer candidates in achieving high and stable results in training. The editors have received a number of letters in which the readers have voiced their opinion and given advice and recommendations.

We have acquainted Maj Gen N. Badeykin, the chief of the Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni S. M. Kirov with the AZIMUT mail, and have asked him to comment upon the questions raised.

In my view the letters which I have become familiar with contain many interesting thoughts. It is a pleasure to note that the readers largely complement Capt A. Meshkov and significantly broaden the subject of the conversation.

I can judge the timeliness of the problem raised in the article "Do It Today" from how the publication was greeted in our school. It was discussed in many of the officer candidate subunits. And all the speakers were unanimous in that it is essential to learn how to study.

What does one mean by learn how to study?

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev provided a remarkable answer to this question at the 18th Komsomol Congress. He said: "Our main compass on the path to communism is the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the development patterns of society. It is impossible to overestimate the significance of the profound and systematic assimilation of this revolutionary science. And this must be a conscious, thoughtful assimilation and not mechanical learning of individual true formulas. A knowledge of theory is worth something only when it is turned into a conviction and reinforced by action."

This applies completely and fully to all the students, including the officer candidates of military schools.

To know how to study means to creatively analyze what is being studied, to utilize study time correctly and rationally, and to work painstakingly with the primary sources.

The study department endeavors to compile a schedule of exercises in such a manner that the load during the time for self-study is distributed more or less evenly. But here it is impossible to consider all the nuances. And it is not excluded that at present, let us assume, we must prepare for one subject, and tomorrow for three all at once. And here, on the first day, an "escape" appears for those of weak will.

Of course, there is a great enticement to give oneself a breathing space. But what will this cause in the future? Here is what is written on this subject by the officer candidate at the Riga Higher Military Political School imeni Mar SU S. S. Biryuzov: "I spoke at several seminars and examination sessions and was reassured. I thought I could take a rest as my grades would be high. But when I was resting I myself did not notice how I had begun to fall behind my comrades...."

Similar instances were described in the letter from the instructor at the OPOCHKA Higher Air Defense Missile Command School, Maj U. Uralov. He was able to carry out a unique study which showed that far from all the officer candidates were completely prepared for each exercise.

And the hope that tomorrow you will not be called upon because you spoke today is certainly not always justified. And it is not even a question that a bad grade can be earned. Significantly more dangerous is the accumulating of unassimilated material. This is a heavy and insidious load. Later on at a price of enormous effort one succeeds to some degree in making up for the missed and even pass the exam or quiz. But the knowledge acquired by the "storming" method would never be sound.

I would like to raise one other question which attracted the attention of many readers. They are disconcerted by the fact that certain young officers, in having good theoretical knowledge, possess weak practical skills in the area of organizing the exercises, or commanding the subunit during tactical exercises and training for the operation of weapons and military equipment.

It happens that yesterday's officer candidate can skillfully evaluate a complicated tactical situation and take an optimum decision, but is then unable to carry it out. Or, for example, he can explain brilliantly how the equipment is designed, but when it is a question of performing the simplest adjustment, he is stumped. Engr-Capt Lt V. Burachkov who serves in Severomorsk has written on such instances in his letter to the editors. And he sees the cause in the fact that certain officer candidates, in relying on the fact that upon completing the school they receive an engineer's diploma, assume that the daily work on equipment will be performed for them by someone else.

Obviously this mistaken opinion at times gives rise to passivity in practical exercises. Let us assume, a group is going out for driving or firing. The execution of the exercise itself requires just several minutes for each officer candidate. But how is the remaining time utilized?

In accord with the plan, the trainees are shifted to other work areas where, according to the plan of the instructor, they are to work on simulators, study the firing rules and so forth. But certain officer candidates, having performed the basic exercise, feel that the mission confronting them has been carried out. And the time in other working areas is not always utilized efficiently.

Of course, here supervision is needed from the instructor. However, it is a question of future officers and their conscientious attitude toward training. Are the officer candidates themselves really not interested in using each training minute?

Passivity in the tactical exercises involves similar losses. One man acts as the platoon commander, he judges the situation and takes a decision, but someone else does not even do this mentally. If only to escape the eyes of the instructor or to avoid an input. If you do something wrong, you are then embarrassed in front of your comrades.

"To be embarrassed in front of one's comrades" in school is, as they say, a semimisfortune. It is much worse when, because of failings in tactical training, one is embarrassed before one's subordinates, in exercises in the field.

One other thing must be mentioned. Of course, high and stable results in training are determined by the tenacity and endeavor of each officer candidate and by the exactingness of the commanders and instructors. But an important role is also played by that atmosphere which prevails in the collective. For example, the officer candidate of the Kamyshin Higher Military Construction Command School, V. Belokonev, has written that when the party and Komsomol organizations became truly involved in the struggle for high indicators in studies, the platoon rather quickly emerged from the laggards among the leaders.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to take up all the questions raised in the readers' letters. Nevertheless the conclusion can be drawn from them that it is always essential to work at full force and to value time.

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EDITORIAL DESCRIBES GOALS, PROBLEMS IN MISSILE FIRING TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 78 p 1

[Editorial: "Missile Firings"]

[Text] The carrying out of the task posed by the 25th Party Congress before the Armed Forces, that is, to guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and to be the bulwark of universal peace, has become an unfailing law in the training, life and service of our military. In competing for the complete and high quality fulfillment of the socialist pledges during the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces, the men of the Army and Navy are fully determined to achieve new successes in military and political training during the summer training period, and to raise the combat readiness of the subunits, units and ships.

High combat readiness and a perfect ability to master the mighty weapons were demonstrated in an exercise by the men of the missile unit which was visited in April by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Chairman of the USSR Defense Council Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov.

The missile troops of all the services of the Armed Forces attained great successes in improving military expertise during the winter training period. Missile firings were executed excellently by the subunits, units, ships, and air squadrons under the command of officers V. Baturov, A. Serichenko, O. Boldyrev, A. Shumikhin, A. Kazakov, Ye. Goncharuk, A. Chaban, V. Nurmukhametov and many others. All the teams and crews demonstrated efficient organization, teamwork, outstanding skills, and the targets were hit with the first missile and with high precision.

Tactical exercises with field missile launches during the current training year are being carried out under more difficult conditions. This demands from the men the able and full use of the automated control systems, the radar reconnaissance equipment, and the combat capabilities of the missile complexes and other equipment. In order that each exercise be carried out

in an instructive manner, and be a real school of military mastery, the commanders, political workers and the staff officers should prepare carefully for them, in utilizing the achievements of military science and troop practices and in introducing advanced experience daily. Here great and responsible tasks have been entrusted to the engineers and technicians. They must see to it that the specialists thoroughly study the equipment, and unfailingly carry out all the directive documents regulating the procedure for the servicing and combat use of the weapons.

The success of missile firings is established in daily training, exercises, and tactical exercises conducted under difficult conditions, with surprise and diverse inputs for servicing the equipment, including under emergency conditions, with the skillful and broad use of trainer and simulating equipment. Here an exceptionally high role is played by the well thought-out organization of the socialist competition in carrying out the missions and fulfilling the standards, and for raising the quality of their fulfillment in reducing the time spent.

Unfortunately, not all of the officers, the warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"] and the crews headed by them in the course of the tactical exercises involving field firing demonstrate high professional skills in readying the equipment and weapons for combat use. The technical capabilities of the service systems, the means of control, and the arsenal of tactical procedures for countering the enemy are not always fully utilized. It happens that the back-ups, those who should take over for the leading specialists when necessary, still have little knowledge of the equipment for the methods of its combat use, and do not have sufficiently firm skills in combat command.

Such shortcomings occur where the combat training is conducted with weaknesses and oversimplifications, and where the high demands dictated by today's conditions for conducting combat are not made on the personnel. As a result, the effectiveness of a tactical exercise with missile launches, as a school of military skill, is reduced. Such shortcomings must be disclosed even in the course of preparations for the combat training firings, they must be analyzed, judged strictly and with principles, and efficiently eliminated.

The commanders, the political workers, as well as the specialists of the staffs and the services participating in working out the problems for tactical exercises involving field firing should show party responsibility to this question. It is important that each exercise be marked by newness and dynamicness of concept and require the full utilization of the combat capability of the missile weapons and other equipment and a maximum straining of forces by all the participants. In the exercises it is essential to create conditions which would contribute to a further improvement in the methods of leadership using modern means of control, and would aid the seeking out and testing of new, more efficient procedures for conducting combat and for the combat use of the weapons and equipment.

High responsibility has been put on those whom have been given the right to judge the actions of the crews, teams, subunits, units, and ships in the course of carrying out the training field missile launches. Their competence and principledness determine the profoundness of the analysis, as well as the objectivity in assessing the combat work of the personnel, the tactical maturity and technical intelligence of the commanders, their deputies, the engineers, technicians and all specialists.

During the preparations for as well as in the course of a tactical exercise involving the launching of missiles, party political work assumes exceptionally great significance. During this period the missile troops assume increased socialist pledges, and endeavor with great enthusiasm to carry them out. By all forms and means of ideological indoctrination, the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations must support this patriotic campaign and direct the energy of people at achieving new successes in combat training. The communists and Komsomol members must set the example for tenacity and organization in the struggle to raise the quality and efficiency of military work and the fulfillment of obligations.

The missile weapons entrusted by the socialist fatherland to our military are the most modern and powerful weapons. It is the duty of the missile troops of all the services of the USSR Armed Forces to master them perfectly and maintain them in a state of high readiness for combat use.

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TRAINING PROCEDURES OF GUARDS AIR REGIMENT DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 78 p 2

[Article by Guards Col G. Shchitov, regimental commander and military pilot first class of the Southern Group of Forces: "Reserves of Time"]

[Text] The skies were cut by a signal rocket. In a few minutes the supersonic fighter-bombers were taking off. The flight was under the command of military pilot first class, Guards Sr Lt A. Podkopnikov. The mission was to destroy the command post and missile unit of the "enemy." There followed a rapid maneuver and the missile attack was made from the air. The targets were hit on the first attack. The grade for the flight was "excellent."

During this same time, a flight under the command of Guards Capt V. Barushchak was attacking another target. He and Guards Capt A. Zaslavskiy had to cross the "enemy" air defense system and put the landing strip of the enemy airfield out of commission. The variable flight profile and skillful antiair defense maneuvers made it possible for the pilots to reach the target on time and attack it. Still another excellent evaluation.

These were the flights completing the winter training period. For the initiators of the socialist competition in the Air Force, the personnel of the Guards Krasnogvardeysk Order of Lenin, Twice Red Banner and Order of Kutuzov Air Regiment imeni 50-Letiye SSSR, all the indicators for fulfilling the combat training plan and the socialist pledges are high. The number of outstanding men in training and the high-class specialists has increased. The times required for readying the equipment for combat have been reduced by 5 percent. At a recent inspection conducted by Mar Avn A. Yefimov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Air Force, the pilots from the regiment showed increased combat skill. Above we have already mentioned the successful actions of officers A. Podkopnikov, V. Barushchak and A. Zaslavskiy. Many other pilots also distinguished themselves. The secret to their success is basically explained by the skillful use of training time and by an unflagging struggle for efficiency and high quality in each exercise and each training session.

In our regiment it has become a tradition to hold research checks, the purpose of which is to determine the "bottlenecks" in the preparations of the equipment and in the actions of specialists to bring the subunits to a state of combat readiness. Then the shortcomings are carefully analyzed and measures are taken to eliminate them, while the proposals of the personnel are studied in the aim of improving the organization of the training process.

Here a broad field of activity has opened up for the commanders, the party and Komsomol activists. Measures relating to the most efficient use of the time resources are thoroughly discussed at the sessions of the party bureaus and at meetings of the communists and Komsomol members. Those who do not value training time are criticized.

Recently the solving of problems related to improving the training process in our forces has been accompanied by greater individual work, and by increased attention to the training of each specialist. We are aware that this is no brief campaign. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in speaking at the 18th Komsomol Congress stressed that a great deal in the struggle for efficiency and quality depends upon each worker. To work with maximum productivity, with the greatest output--this is the combat motto of the unit's aviators.

It is our mission to be not only a precise executor in one's job, but also the creator of the new, and to be constantly searching for the most rational training and indoctrinal methods. The best instructors, sniper pilot Guards Lt Col S. Danilin and military pilot first class Guards Maj Yu. Lychkovskiy work precisely in this manner with their subordinates. They endeavor not only to complicate the missions, but also to show in practice in what ways it is possible in a short period of time to attain a high level of combat skill with the unswerving observance of the requirements of flight safety.

Guards Sr Lt S. Chubich constantly works to attain tangible results from each flying day and from each flying shift. He prepares conscientiously for carrying out the flight missions regardless of the degree of their complexity and repetition. His crew, in being rightflankers in the socialist competition within the regiment, constantly excels in high combat readiness. The specialists of this crew in servicing the equipment have attained complete interchangeability. This substantially saves time.

There is another important reserve for saving training time which during the winter training period we endeavor to put actively into use. We have in mind the generalization and dissemination of advanced experience. At a recent tactical flying exercise, the first-rate pilot, Guards Capt V. Kochergin, acted skillfully. The group of airplanes which he was leading under nighttime conditions ably carried out a complex maneuver and appeared over the target from a direction where the "enemy" least expected an attack. The firing position of the artillery battery was subjected to a devastating attack. A second attack was not needed. And is this not a saving of time,

money and the life of expensive equipment! The experience of the preparation of Guards Capt Kochergin and his subordinates for the flights have been carefully generalized by us and we have endeavored to more rapidly introduce this into the practice of the aviators. Here we showed with particular thoroughness what maneuvers under the appropriate conditions are to be selected by the pilots in modeling the flight, and how all sorts of factors were considered including the location of the air defense weapons, their combat capabilities, the safe zones, and so forth.

The experience of the masters of combat use teaches the young pilots resourcefulness and purposefulness in the course of the preliminary preparations for the flights. Precisely these hours, when used productively, make it possible for the aviators not to waste extra seconds during the attack. For each minute of delay can cost dearly in modern combat.

The personnel of the regiment is helped in saving training time and in spending it rationally by the training facilities developed by the regimental inventors under the leadership of Guards Majs V. Tokarev and V. Fomichev as well as other officers who are pilots, engineers and technicians. In each squadron, trainers and working models have been created for readying the missile-carrying aircraft for performing various versions of tactical flying exercises. Not only the pilots but also the technical specialists here can improve their knowledge and skills.

The commanders and party activists show particular concern for the young technical specialists and the graduates of military schools. For example, gaps in technical knowledge were discovered in Guards Lt Tech Serv V. Yaryshev and these had caused violations in the procedure for servicing the aircraft. The party organization secretary, Guards Engr-Maj V. Moskalenko and the communists of the subunit helped the young officer carefully plan his personnel training. Being guided by this comprehensive plan for shaping up the specialist, the engineers and technicians in a comparatively short period of time helped Yaryshev master the working procedures with the complex equipment of a supersonic aircraft.

Guards Engr-Capt I. Karaulov has made a worthy contribution to ensuring the effective operation of the equipment and reducing the time required for readying the aircraft. Specialists are also successfully using the various mechanized tools developed by the rationalizers of the unit. One could name also many other improvements which reduce the time required for readying the equipment. In an order of the commander of the Southern Group of Forces, our regiment has been mentioned among the finest in the area of rationalization work.

However, the great intensity of winter combat training also disclosed certain flaws in the struggle for the effectiveness of the training process. The procedural training of certain young commanders leaves something to be desired. Of course, it is pleasant to speak of outstanding results in bombing and the launching of rockets. But certainly lamentable failures have

occurred in individual pilots and the reason for them has been self-complacency. The unit communists have waged an irreconcilable struggle against this.

The regiment has entered the summer period of combat training. This is a decisive period for carrying out the combat training plans and the high socialist pledges, the main one being to keep the title of an outstanding unit. The results of the winter period of combat training and the high political and professional upsurge among the personnel make it possible to conclude that the regiment will fully carry out all the missions confronting it.

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UNRELIABLE RANGE TRAINING EQUIPMENT CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 78 p 2

[Article by Engr-Lt Col P. Petrovskiy of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "The Firing Range Requires Attention"]

[Text] The reinforced motorized rifle company was fighting in the desert. In ably using the tactical and technical capabilities of the infantry combat vehicles, the motorized rifle troops confidently crossed a ridge of barkhans [sand dunes], and came out in the flank of the troops on the defensive and... stopped. At the crucial moment of combat the control panel for the target field failed. After several minutes, the company resumed the attack, but soon thereafter was again forced to slow down the pace of the advance. It was essential to allow the operators of the firing range to activate the targets which simulated a counterattack by "enemy" tanks....

This episode from a company tactical exercise with field firing, in dating to the middle of the winter training period, is recalled now with good reason. Summer training has started, and it is very important to draw lessons from previous shortcomings which were factors for breaks in the training process. One of the reasons is the rather frequent breakdown of the firing range equipment.

The maintaining of this equipment in a state of constant readiness is a common concern. No commander the subordinates of whom are learning the art of being victorious in one or another firing range or training ground can be indifferent to what they encounter here. Training combat should be carried out in an intense and dynamic situation, and this depends largely upon the capabilities of the firing range equipment and upon those who service it.

The role of the range specialists who take a most direct part in supporting the training process is constantly growing. Year after year the demands upon their training have risen, and this has been caused by the complexity of the equipment. For example, for carrying out a tactical exercise involving field firing a certain percentage of the targets should be moving. The firing range has all of the necessary equipment for this. The control of it requires high skills. The absence of specialists with the necessary level of preparation leads precisely to the instances similar to the one we have mentioned above.

In various collectives this problem is solved in their own way. For example, in certain units all the subunits which come to the firing range prepare the target and other equipment independently. However, this entails many difficulties and does not always bring the desired effect.

It is beyond dispute that the working pace of the firing range to an ever greater degree depends upon the ability of the personnel in the servicing subunits to use effectively the increased capabilities of the training facilities, and to put modern technical training equipment into use for combat readiness. Our training centers, the firing compounds and the tank and artillery moving target gunnery ranges are equipped with modern instruments and mechanisms. Need it be said how important it is to have good specialists for the range equipment.

In this regard, the demands are increasing upon the chief of the training center. He should have a good understanding of the questions of tactics, the organization and weapons of the troops, and he should know the design and working principle of the mechanisms used on the range, the rules for their operation, servicing and repair. We feel that this knowledge would also be useful for each graduate of a military school and the warrant officer ["praporshchik"] schools. The future commanders must be more profoundly acquainted with modern training equipment and in particular the range equipment. This will help them to avoid many mistakes in practical activities.

I would like to mention one other aspect of the problem, namely indoctrinal work among the range workers. Unfortunately, they at times are in a poorer situation in comparison with the personnel of the other subunits. Lecturers visit them more rarely and newspapers do not always arrive regularly.

In a word, the firing range needs attention. And it is particularly important to recall this now, during our summer training period which will be full of exercises of varying scale. To achieve a precise operating rhythm for the firing range means to create conditions for raising the effectiveness of combat training.

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'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA' REPORTS 28 JULY MOSCOW MEETING FOR NAVY DAY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 78 p 1 LD

/Correspondent Report: "Ceremonial Meeting in Moscow" /

/Text/ A ceremonial meeting devoted to USSR Navy Day was held in the M.V. Frunze central house of the Soviet Army 28 July.

In the presidium at the meeting were Ya. P. Ryabov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; N. M. Pegov and N. I. Savinkin, Chiefs of CPSU Central Committee sections; M. V. Yegorov, Minister of shipbuilding industry; Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov, USSR first deputy defense minister; Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov, and chief Mar Avn P. S. Kutakhov, USSR deputy defense ministers; Mar Avn A. I. Koldunov, Engd-Col Gen V. M. Shabanov; Army Gen I. N. Shkadov, Chief of the USSR Defense Ministry main personnel directorate; Col Gen G. V. Sredin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; Adm V. M. Grishanov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Navy Political Directorate; Army Generals, marshals of categories of troops, admirals of the fleet, admirals, generals, officers, and representatives of the capital's party and soviet organizations, creative unions, and labor collectives.

The ceremonial meeting was opened by Moscow Gorkom Secretary V. P. Trushin.— Greetings were addressed to the military seamen by A. P. Kopchenkov, worker at the "Kalibr" tool plant, M. V. Yegorov, minister of shipbuilding industry, and D. A. Okhromiy, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee.

The meeting was addressed by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov, commander in chief of the Navy. Soviet military sailors, he said, devote all their strength to fulfilling their sacred constitutional duty-- to reliably defend the socialist homeland and to be in a state of constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

With great enthusiasm, the participants in the meeting adopted a greetings letter to the CPSU Central Committee and to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general

secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

A concert was given by the song and dance ensemble of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet.

CSO: 1801

VLADIVOSTOK REPORTS ANTISUBMARINE SHIP'S ACTIVITIES

Crew Members Praised

Vladivostok Maritime Service in Russian to the Pacific Far East 0700 GMT
30 Jul 78 OW

/Recorded report by correspondent Vladimir Moldavan on his visit aboard the antisubmarine ship "Admiral Oktyabrskiy" of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet--date not given/

/Excerpts/ /Begin Moldavan recording/ The large antisubmarine ship "Admiral Oktyabrskiy" has arrived in Vladivostok to take part in the holiday parade of ships of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. Today the ship was opened to the public, making it possible for the working people of Vladivostok to see the modern might of our naval fleet for themselves. The "Admiral Oktyabrskiy" is docked near the memorial to the legendary S-56 submarine, a fact stressing the continuity of military traditions of Soviet sailors.

The ship's Komsomol organization has been awarded a pennant by the Komsomol Central Committee for excellent results in the communist training of personnel, and for successes in military and political training. Lt Igor Preobrazhenskiy, secretary of the ship's Komsomol organization, today acquainted visitors with his crew. /End Moldavan recording/

/Begin Preobrazhenskiy recording/ Comrades: We are aboard one of the most modern ships in our fleet, which bears the glorious name of admiral (Fedor) Sergeyevich Oktyabrskiy, hero of the Great Patriotic War and a Black Sea Fleet sailor. Our ship is designed to search for and destroy enemy submarines and surface ships. It is equipped with the most advanced weapons and technology whose operation requires great knowledge, skill, and training. The men serving aboard our ship come from all parts of our great motherland, and represent almost all nationalities in the Soviet Union. The majority of them are Komsomol members. They have much respect for their service and work. Many of them have already achieved great success and have become specialists in their field. This has been repeatedly confirmed in training and during long voyages at sea.

Recently, a regular reinforcement of young men arrived. The young sailors realized from the beginning that they are not guests here but masters enjoying full rights. The Komsomol organization, senior sailors and officers, have shared naval experiences with the young sailors and described long voyages they completed and the ship's history and traditions. The young men recently underwent sea trials.

The ship has always successfully completed its tasks, and this has become our good tradition. The men undergo difficult but interesting training aboard the ship, and always speak well of it and write letters to us after completing their tour and leaving the ship. Working at Komsomol construction projects after transferring into the reserve has become one of our traditions. A greeting card has been received by the ship from some of its former sailors. It says: We wish all personnel excellent success in military and political training. We will exert every effort in construction of the Sayan-Shushenskoye GES in order to not disappoint the ship's crew. /Signed/ Reserve sailors Yuriy Kozlov, (Koval Ladorov), Aleksandr Vavulin, and Vladimir Menshikov. —

Intensive military training is presently underway aboard the ship, which is making preparations to fulfill new tasks. Special attention is being devoted to preparing the new reinforcements for training. I would especially like to name senior sailors and Komsomol members such as Pakhilov, Petrenko, Somov, Kupriyanov, and Tsesarenko, who have mastered their skills excellently, and who spare no efforts in helping their younger comrades. Among such men is Sergy Shamparov, a signalman. He was recently accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU. Sergey has granted leave and promoted to the grade of senior sailor for great success in mastering his job. /End Preobrazhenskiy recording/.

Navy, Party Leaders at Celebration

Vladivostok Domestic Service in Russian 0935 GMT 31 Jul 78 OW

/Excerpt/ Soviet Navy Day was a festive occasion for the sailors of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet, the working people of Vladivostok, and guests of Primorye. In Sportivnaya Harbor, Admiral Maslov, commander of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet, received the commander of the Parade of ships and congratulated the sailors.

From launches, Admiral Maslov; Lomakin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and Primorskiy Kraykom first secretary; Karabanov, Primorskiy Krayispolkom chairman; and others, reviewed a parade of navy ships. The commander greeted and congratulated the sailors on the big holiday.

After the naval parade, a big /words indistinct/ the holiday program was mainly devoted to the 60th Komsomol anniversary. A drama on the topic of (?the Komsomol) in the navy was presented.

The roar of engines over the bay heralded the beginning of a war exercise. A large landing force (?from) the ships, including amphibious vehicles and armored carriers, came ashore.

ADMIRAL SMIRNOV NOTES NAVY TRADITIONS, QUALITY OF PERSONNEL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jul 78 p 2 LD

/Article by Flt Adm N. Smirnov, first deputy commander in chief of USSR Naval Forces: "On Ocean Watch"/

/Text/ USSR Navy Day has become a truly nationwide festival. On this day the motherland fêtes military sailors, fleet veterans, creators and builders of formidable ships, and modern combat materiel and weapons, and everyone who strengthens the state's naval might with his labor. On this day, military sailors report to the party and the people on their fulfillment of their sacred constitutional duty--reliably to defend the socialist homeland and to be in a state of constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

Special enthusiasm in the military labor of soldiers of the Soviet Army and Navy is sensed this year, a jubilee year for the armed forces. Together with the entire Soviet people, soldiers have perceived with great enthusiasm the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee July (1978) plenum, the results of the trip to regions of Siberia and the Far East by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and his speeches on the cruiser "Admiral Senyavin", and at the 18th Komsomol Congress. L. I. Brezhnev's instructions and recommendations serve as a combat program of training and service and of all activities of military sailors.

The present generation of naval soldiers keeps sacred and augments the glorious revolutionary and combat traditions of the older generations of military sailors. Revolutionary sailors made a great contribution to the cause of the victory of Great October. V. I. Lenin made a high evaluation of the Fleet, calling it a forward detachment.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War the navy, in single formation with the other branches of the armed forces, fulfilled with honor its duty to the motherland.

From the first to the last day of the war, the fleet's energetic actions insured the stability of the fronts' coastal flanks. Ships and aircraft rained down crushing blows on the combat formations of enemy troops in coordination with the plans for frontline and army operations. Baltic aviators were the first, on 8 August 1941, to make a bomb attack on Berlin military targets.

During the war years, our fleets landed more than 100 naval landing parties with a total strength of up to 30 divisions. L. I. Brezhnev makes a high evaluation of the art of carrying out landing operations and of the courage and valor of military sailors in his remarkable book "Malaya Zemlya."

More than 400,000 military sailors fought on land fronts. They distinguished themselves in the battles of Moscow and Leningrad, beyond the Arctic Circle, at Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Odessa, Novorossiysk and Kerch, and in many other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

The fleets and flotillas rendered the fronts great assistance in insuring the regrouping of troops by sea and river. Side by side with ground troops, the Danube military flotilla reached Vienna, and the Dnepr military flotillas reached Berlin.

Our fleets' fierce struggle against the enemy navy did not abate for a single day--disrupting enemy communications, blockading groups of fascist troops crowded against the sea, and insuring shipments by sea of reinforcements, ammunition, military equipment, and national economic freight. More than 2,500 enemy warships, launches, and transport ships were sunk as a result of the energetic actions of submarines, naval aircraft, surface ships, and shore batteries, and many thousands of enemy tanks and trucks, and hundreds of thousands of tons of fuel and strategic raw materials were sent to the bottom with them.

Noting the fleet's services to the motherland, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "Is it possible not to mention the heroism and courage of our glorious eagles --the sailors whose feats in the Black Sea and the Baltic, in the cold waves of the Arctic, and in the expanses of the Pacific inscribed unforgettable pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War?"

Having won the victory of worldwide historic significance over fascist Germany and militarist Japan, the Soviet people have now been living and working for more than 30 years under conditions of peace. The economic and defense potential of the socialist state has grown immeasurably over these years. The outstanding achievements of the society of developed socialism are enshrined in the new USSR Constitution.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government are struggling firmly and consistently to assert the principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems, and for international cooperation and the peoples' freedom and independence.

However, the aggressive forces of imperialism are trying to wreck the detente process and harden the international situation, and are building up the arms race and organizing anti-soviet and anti-communist campaigns. The Peking rulers are acting in unison with these forces.

The aggressive NATO bloc, which unites the major sea powers of the capitalist world, is building up the arms race year by year and improving its fleets. The United States has concentrated a large part of its strategic nuclear facilities in its naval forces.

All this requires soldiers of the Soviet armed forces to display high vigilance and to strength combat readiness. Our navy resolves crucial tasks in the system of the country's defense.

The broad introduction of nuclear power, nuclear missile weaponry, and radio-electronics, has radically changed the combat potential of our fleet. It consists of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with missiles and torpedoes, and antisubmarine, missile-carrying, minesweeping, landing, and other surface ships with powerful modern weapons. Antisubmarine cruisers, which carry helicopters and aircraft on board, have become a new class of surface ship in our fleet. The marines have been revived on a new technical basis, and shore-based artillery missile troops are armed with powerful weapons.

The creation of a modern ocean-going fleet is an outstanding labor feat of the Soviet people, and we military sailors express profound gratitude to the shipbuilders, defense industry workers, and everyone who creates the fleet's perfect material and technical base.

Distant voyages have become one of the principal features of the modern fleet's activity. It is precisely on the ocean, above all, that the combat and sea training of crews, and tactical skill of commanders, are improved, and that the ships' combat readiness is strengthened. The principles of Soviet naval comradeship, and of the militant spirit of collectivism, in which our sailors value and take rightful pride, find most graphic embodiment on ocean voyages. It is perfectly natural that it is precisely on long voyages, as though developing the traditions which arose in the war years, that the best sailors join the party's ranks or the Komsomol.

While on long voyages, Soviet ships make business calls and official visits to ports in dozens of states. During these visits, our sailors worthily represent their people abroad and contribute in many ways to increasing liking, respect, and friendly feelings for the Soviet Union.

Our navy has especially close ties with the allied navies of the Warsaw Pact countries. They hold joint exercises and exchange experience--which helps in many ways to strengthen fraternal combat friendship.

Military councils, commanders, political organs and staffs, party and Komsomol organizations are concentrating their efforts on implementing the 25th CPSU Congress decisions.

The task consists of continuing to enhance combat readiness, the efficiency and quality of military labor, and the effectiveness of the socialist competition, strengthening military discipline and regulation order, and improving party political work on ships and in units.

Military sailors of all categories of naval forces, and labor collectives of naval enterprises and establishments, are greeting their festival with lofty achievements in military labor. Approximately half the navy's personnel has attained the "excellent" grade, and 90 percent of military sailors are rated specialists. As always, communists and Komsomol members set an example in training and service.

The absolute majority of ships and units is successfully fulfilling the high socialist pledges adopted by them. Right-flankers in training and competition are the crew of the nuclear-powered missile carrier commanded by Capt A. Kazakov, the personnel of the ships and units where officers Ye. Bobrov, V. Plokhikh and V. Makartsev serve, the crews of the submarine "Ulyanovskiy Komsomolets," the training ship "Smolnyy", and the sea-going minesweeper "Meshadi Azizbakov", and others.

Military sailors, like soldiers of all branches of the armed forces, are constantly strengthening their indissoluble link with the Soviet people, seeing this as the inexhaustible source of our state's strength and invincibility. Ships and units cordially receive delegations of workers, kolkhoz members, scientists, and representatives of the creative intelligentsia. Military sailors in turn can also frequently be seen at industrial enterprises and on kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and every year they help the countryside at harvest time.

The close link between military sailors and party and Soviet organs, the Lenin Komsomol--the fleet's proven patron--and DOSAAF organizations, contributes to the military-patriotic education of Soviet youth, and helps to develop in the rising generation an interest in naval service, and to bring highly trained reinforcements into the fleet.

Military sailors, like all our soldiers, constantly feel the paternal concern of the party, the government, and the entire Soviet people. They are full of determination to fulfill the Leninist party's instruction with honor--to be always ready reliably to protect the achievements of Great October, and firmly safeguard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

CSO: 1801

GROUND FORCES DEPUTY CHIEF STRESSES COMBAT COMMANDERS' TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Aug 78 p 2 LD

/Article by Army General V. Petrov, first deputy commander in chief of USSR Ground Forces: "The Commander Is the Organizer of Combat"/

/Text/ The organization of combat has always demanded extreme exertion of mind and will and great theoretical and practical training. The fundamental changes in military matters linked with scientific and technical progress have led to the even greater complication of the commanders' activity in organizing and leading combat operations. Organizing combat skillfully, with consideration for all features of the situation, making full use of existing means of warfare, and turning to his advantage the slightest blunders by the opposing side, can only be done by an officer who possesses profound professional knowledge, firm organizational skills, a high degree of psychological tempering, and a strong will.

The instilling of these qualities in command cadres, for whose training and education the party is constantly concerned, begins in the military training establishments and continues throughout their service. In units where the commanders' training is approached in a thoughtful, thorough way, the formation of the young officers proceeds successfully and they rapidly accumulate the necessary experience.

For instance, Guards Captain A. Krasikov, Commander of a motorized battalion, displayed tactical maturity in combat training. Preparing to break through the defense, he first of all studied in detail the "enemy" opposing him and ascertained the task. The officer's decision provided for rational ways of suppressing antitank and other fire weapons. He skillfully allocated the targets to be destroyed by the motorized infantry, artillery, and tanks. During the attack, firm, constant collaboration was insured. The attackers made skillful use of protective fire, pinning down the "enemy's" maneuver, and imposing disadvantageous combat conditions on him.

In organizing combat operations, Guards Captain Krasikov made efficient use in their dynamics of the results of strikes by aircraft and combat helicopters.

Rapid reaction to changes in the situation, the timely specification of tasks, the desire to forestall the enemy in implementing a maneuver, opening fire, or making a strike--all this attested to the fruitful work of the subunit's officers in improving their personal training and to the efficiency of command training in the regiment.

Many examples of efficient organization of combat operations and their firm control may be cited. But, whatever high results an officer may achieve in this sphere, there can be no grounds for complacency. Military matters are constantly developing.

Against the common background of the officers' cadres' high degree of training, we have no right to ignore omissions in tactical training of individual subunit commanders. Not every officer has sound skills in organizing combat or controlling the subunits directly under his subordination or attached and supporting subunits. In holding exercises, the main attention is sometimes paid to the external aspect of operations. At the same time, major, integral components of combat organization and tactical control, like the determination of the ways of fulfilling tasks, terrain work to ascertain their specific content, the organization of collaboration, and the fire defeat of the enemy, combat and material and technical back-up are undervalued.

Our combat rules and instructions which generalize the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the latest achievements of military science and military practice are for the officer a real treasury of professional knowledge. The formation of the commander as an organizer of combat begins with the assimilation of rules. But by this we understand by no means the mechanical learning of statutory provisions. The depth of a commander's understanding of the requirements of the rules is judged above all by his ability to take original, creative decisions, and by the degree of his independence in selecting possible variations for the conduct of battle.

Every battle--this is confirmed by life itself--together with typical features also has its own traits. Failing to take them into account means placing oneself in disadvantageous conditions.

The most rational scheme for the commander's work in organizing combat is known to every officer. It promotes precision and consistency in work, and helps make more rational use of existing forces and assets, and use time sensibly. But this does not mean that it is necessary in every situation to retain every point, as they say, of the "classic" procedure for organizing combat operations. Sometimes the desire to do this is harmful instead of beneficial, and deprives the commander's activity of the efficiency required by the situation which has taken shape.

In recent years, many new features reflecting the changing nature of modern combat have appeared in the work of the commanders and staffs in organizing combat operations and controlling the troops. The recently independent

processes of defining the mission, assessing the situation, taking and formulating a decision, setting combat tasks and organizing collaboration, are increasingly frequently coinciding in time. Individual elements of a decision already ripen, in an experienced commander, when he is defining the mission and assessing the situation. The main indications for coordination also frequently merge with the setting of combat tasks. All this is logical: the volume of the tasks which the commander resolves in organizing combat and controlling the troops is constantly growing and the time for their fulfillment is reduced.

The carefully considered decision to go into battle is only the precondition of success. There are many other factors of no less significance for victory.

First of all, the will and determination of the commander. In elaborating the decision to go into battle, the commander faces himself, the staff, chiefs of the categories of troops and services, and commanders of attached and supporting subunits with dozens of natural "but-ifs." For the preparatory period, when the battle is being planned, this is natural. But when the decision has been taken, when the tasks have been set, there can be no room for "but-ifs" or any fluctuations or doubts. The will of the commander is a great moral force. The commander must be convinced that the mission will be successfully accomplished, and know how to convey this conviction to all those taking part in combat.

Great significance attaches to the general style of work of the commander in organizing combat and controlling his subordinates during its operation. Combat, even training combat, is a test which in terms of mental strain cannot be compared with the solution of daily routine tasks. Nonetheless, even in this situation, it is important for the commander to remain himself, so to speak, to preserve his originality and the style of work to which the personnel is accustomed. Inconsistency in methods of leadership always complicates mutual understanding, gives rise to nervousness, and has a negative effect on the mood of subordinates.

It must be remembered that, even in its external aspect, the commander's activity in organizing combat has a strong influence on the personnel. The commander, of course, must always be on the main salient, in the decisive sector. The precise setting of tasks, verbal succinctness, the lack of general dissertations, the ability to guess the essence of reports from a half-word--all this not only plays an organizing role but also instills confidence in success.

Battle is the supreme test of an officer's executive ability and discipline. A superior commander's decision and his intention constitute an indisputable law for those who carry these into effect. In this connection, you occasionally hear from young officers: but what about creativity and initiative? The answer is simple: one and the same task can be solved in different ways on the battlefield. It is precisely in the selection of methods and modes

of action that the commander's individuality and his talent are displayed, but in any event an order must be precisely carried out.

In a tactical exercise on any scale, the creativity of officers and their search for methods of solving the assignment they have received that will come as a surprise to the "enemy" must be encouraged in every way. A leader's methodological artistry lies in his ability to create a situation closely resembling the reality of battle, to pack it with critical situations, to secure from the commanders undergoing training a creative and unfettered approach, and to demand that they bring all their knowledge into play.

Very much depends on the quality of exercises and training sessions with the officers--group exercises, brief tactical meetings--and all other forms of training of the commanders. A training session held in an unfamiliar locality, in a difficult and instructive situation, and in an atmosphere of high exactingness, and of the creative application of tactical propositions under specific situations, not only enriches officers with new knowledge, but also shapes in them the moral-combat qualities that a commander must possess.

Unfortunately, instances where exercises are held according to the "flow-line" pattern, in one and the same locality and under invariably the same tactical situation, still persist.

For example, in the tank regiment commanded by Lt Col V. Voloshchenko, all company exercises involving field firings were conducted in accordance with a single intention and in the same section of the firing range. Here the commanders controlled subunits and fire firmly, and their organizational skills seemed well established. But when, during a check, they had to conduct a training battle in an unfamiliar locality, in a more difficult tactical situation, not a trace of their former confidence remained. Need it be said that a commander's creativity and the rapid development of his skill are impossible under conditions of oversimplification and indulgence.

The time taken to shape a commander of general troops as a battle organizer depends to a great extent on the senior commanders and their ability and readiness to painstakingly educate the officers under their command, to teach them how to work in particular localities, to orient themselves well, to draw up maps, and to develop in them a desire to find novel methods of conducting battle, and to outwit the enemy.

Organizing battle is inconceivable without the profound and thorough study of the enemy, and especially--and I emphasize this--his systems of fire. The enemy's fire is the main--and frequently the sole--obstacle standing in the way of fulfilling the set assignment. How to destroy the opposing side's firing system in the shortest possible time? This question, which is of paramount importance for a commander as a battle organizer, is inseparable from another question: how best to use his own firepower and how to utilize as efficiently as possible the potential of all types of weapons?

On the theoretical plane, these truths are clear to every officer. But in practice not all of them know how to be guided by these truths. Here is an episode from one of the exercises held at the end of the winter period of training. At a critical moment of the training battle, when the maximum density of fire was required, Maj I. Melnichuk, commander of a motorized rifle battalion, failed to remember about the existence of the great potential of the mortar battery. The mortarmen did not immediately receive any specific tasks.

It is the practical task of the commander and of the entire personnel to learn how to get everything out of their equipment and weapons. We have remarkable equipment. But we are learning how to vanquish a strong and technically equipped enemy. It is necessary to persistently develop at training sessions in the commander-training system the ability to organize battle in such situations, and to take advantage of the slightest advantage which you might have.

This circumstance sometimes, unfortunately, remains in the shade during exercises. Even a battle that is over very quickly requires tremendous material expenditure. How can battle reserves and fuel stocks be replenished under the changing situations of battle activity? Approximation and "ifs" and "buts" are inadmissible in solving this question. After all, the best intentions come to nothing if they do not have material backup.

Military vocabulary includes the words--verification of battle. This is a severe and stern check. A commander's ability to skillfully organize battle and achieve victory is the supreme indicator of his maturity and of the effectiveness of the style of his whole work. Rearing a commander as a battle organizer means shaping in him professional skill and high political and moral-combat qualities. The party's demands which it makes of its cadres apply fully to the commanders and all officers. "A modern leader," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed at the 25th CPSU Congress, "must organically combine in himself party-mindedness with profound competence and discipline with initiative and a creative approach to his work." Leonid Illich also gave a reminder about the high responsibility of each person for the results of his labor during his trip to regions of Siberia and the Far East, and in his report at the CPSU Central Committee July Plenum.

For us, these party demands are filled with special meaning. The party and service duty of each officer is to tirelessly enhance the efficiency of training sessions and the effectiveness of socialist competition, and to utilize every day and hour of summer combat training in order to reinforce his military and political knowledge, and in order to improve his organizing ability and professional skill.

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